

Administrative Theory in Education

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Administrative Theory in Education

EDITED BY

ANDREW W. HALPIN

*Sponsored by the University Council
for Educational Administration and the
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FOREWORD



In February, 1957, the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA) decided that the first seminar in a proposed series should be devoted to the role of theory in educational administration, and accepted an invitation to hold the seminar at the University of Chicago. The seminar was held here on November 11, 12, and 13, 1957, and was sponsored jointly by the UCEA and the Midwest Administration Center. Eight major papers were presented. Sixty professors and deans attended the meeting; twenty-eight of the UCEA member institutions were represented (the thirty-four member institutions are listed in Appendix A). Thirteen UCEA members served as chairmen, discussion leaders, and panel members (these program participants are listed in Appendix B). In response to the UCEA Interim Committee's recommendation that the papers be made available to the members, the Midwest Administration Center has published this book.

Several people contributed immeasurably to the planning of the seminar upon which this book is based. Frances S. Chase, then Director of the Midwest Administration Center and then and now Chairman of the Department of Education, University of Chicago, initiated that planning. H. Thomas James, Director of Field Services for the Department of Education, University of Chicago, carried the planning forward; and Jacob W. Getzels, Professor of Education at the University of Chicago, and Daniel E. Griffiths, Research Director of the University Council for Educational Administration made valuable suggestions for the program.

The Midwest Administration Center was particularly fortunate in having the services of Andrew W. Halpin at the point of making detailed plans for the seminar and as editor of this publication. Dr. Halpin began his work in public education as a school psychologist, a position he held for five years. A significant part of his background, relative to the editing of this book, was the four years he spent as a research psychologist with the Per-

sonnel Research Board, participating in the Ohio State Leadership Studies. This book is better because the papers at the time of preparation and at the time of editing were influenced by the incisive mind of Dr. Halpin.

The Center is happy to have a part in promoting the development of theory in educational administration.

ROALD F. CAMPBELL, DIRECTOR
MIDWEST ADMINISTRATION CENTER

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First and foremost, I am indebted to the seven authors who made this book possible.

Mr. Luigi Petrullo, Head, Group Psychology Bureau, Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, granted permission to reproduce sections of Dr. John K. Hemphill's chapter that had appeared originally in a report on research conducted for the Office of Naval Research.

To the publishers listed below I acknowledge with thanks their permission to quote from the indicated publications:

Irwin D. J. Bross, *Design for Decision* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), Figure 2.06 on p. 25, and pp. 171, 172.

Alfred Einstein and Leopold Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1938), p. 33.

Herbert Feigl, "Principles and Problems of Theory Construction in Psychology," in *Current Trends in Psychological Theory* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951), pp. 181-82.

Ernest S. Griffith, *The Impasse of Democracy* (New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, Inc., 1939), p. 182. (Present distributor: A. S. Barnes & Company, New York).


Daniel E. Griffiths, *Human Relations in School Administration* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), pp. 204, 215.

Ralph V. Hunkins, *Superintendent and School Board* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1949), pp. 75-76.

Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 241.

Finally, I thank Mrs. Carolyn Conn and Mrs. Dorothy Emmons for their conscientious assistance in typing the manuscript.

A. W. H.



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INTRODUCTION

The concern for theory in educational administration is of recent origin and has been stimulated primarily by the rapid changes that have occurred in the social sciences. Before World War II, Chester I. Barnard, Elton Mayo, and F. J. Roethlisberger had opened new vistas for the study of administration, but their studies did not immediately find their way into the main stream of work in the social sciences. The war forced social scientists out of their laboratories; psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists had to tackle a whole range of new problems, and their research was supported on a scale previously unknown in those disciplines. In effect, the social scientists were told—in the colloquialism of the poker table—to “put up or shut up.” They “put up.” During the war years social science research came into its own and achieved a new maturity. Federal support of research on leadership and related problems in administration was continued at the close of the war and was further increased during the Korean “incident.” The impact of the scientists’ new knowledge about administration was quickly felt in the postwar period, but this information was applied principally to industrial, governmental, and military organizations. The newly acquired knowledge was important in itself, but of even greater moment was the accompanying growth in the social scientists’ own sophistication about the role of theory in the study of administration.

The National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration (NCPEA), founded in 1947, was aware of some of the developments in the social sciences. Yet when the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration (CPEA) began in 1950, its initial projects paid little heed to the new approach to administration; they tended to ignore the role of theory in research. Even though we grant that the CPEA was not established primarily as a research endeavor, it is important to note that most of the research conducted under its aegis was highly empirical and showed scant concern for administrative theory. By 1955, however, one could discern that the leaders in educational administration were dissatisfied with the results of much current

research. The interdisciplinary seminars conducted at several CPEA centers had shown that educational administrators and social scientists shared many concerns. The more that men from these two fields worked together, the more were they forced to conclude that the failure to take theory into account had retarded their efforts to advance educational administration as a profession.

Meanwhile, in 1953 a few members of NCPEA had suggested that the Conference sponsor a book designed to synthesize research findings in administration and to suggest implications for preparation programs for educational administrators. A formal proposal was approved by the Conference in August, 1954; Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg were named the co-editors. The book, *Administrative Behavior in Education*, was published in August, 1957. The eighteen authors who worked on the project for more than two years found that the lack of *any* theory of administration had produced wide gaps in research knowledge on administrative behavior. A salient new note in the NCPEA book was the plea it made for greater attention to theory. This plea produced results: for example, the seminar reported here—the first in the series conducted by the newly established UCEA—is one devoted to theory.

In the biological and physical sciences, theory has emerged very slowly. In some areas the period of transition from sheer empiricism to hypothetico-deductive theory has had to be reckoned in centuries, not decades. Since the social sciences as disciplines distinct from social philosophy did not emerge until the end of the nineteenth century, we need not feel embarrassed by the present dearth of theory. Administration as a field for scientific study is of much more recent origin. We should have no illusions about where we stand. We are still just making feeble efforts toward the development of theory. Consequently, this book does not present *the* theory of educational administration; it does not even describe *a* theory of educational administration. We have not reached the stage where we can talk with precision about *a* theory of administration, and I earnestly hope that we shall never claim to have found *the* theory; such smugness would violate the essence of scientific inquiry. No, this book does not give a set of answers. The authors present their ideas tentatively; they say, "We need to develop theory in the field of administra-

tion. We are not quite sure how to go about this, but here are a few suggestions. Here are different ways in which we are trying to formulate theory in this field. Here are some issues that we think must be taken into account, and some dead ends that we had better watch out for. We invite you to think with us about these problems." In short, this book is concerned with the exploration of ideas; it gives no pat answers and is not a "how-to-do-it" manual.

The seminar was designed to facilitate an exchange of ideas between social scientists and educational administrators. Representatives from these two fields sometimes have difficulty in communicating with one another. In chapter i these communication issues are discussed and some problems of theory development are examined. In chapter ii James D. Thompson discusses the role of theory in the study of administration and outlines a few modern approaches to theory development. Next, in chapter iii, Talcott Parsons examines another set of issues that must be taken into account in devising a theory of formal organizations. He is particularly concerned with the relation between organizations and the external situations in which they function. Both these authors question orthodox assumptions about the relation between line and staff personnel.

Chapters iv through vii present different approaches to the study of administration. In chapter iv Carroll L. Shartle describes a very broad framework for the study of behavior in organizations. He and his associates at the Ohio State University have embarked upon an interdisciplinary program of research and are using his framework as a guide. His approach is broad and eclectic; he says, in effect, "Here are the types of variables that we think must be taken into account, and this is how we hope to determine the relationships that obtain among them."

John K. Hemphill's theory of administration as problem-solving (chapter v) grew out of his theory of leadership in small groups. This is a psychological approach that concentrates upon the behavior of the individual leader; Hemphill carefully examines the relationship between the leader and the group and delineates the conditions that give rise to leadership acts. This is not an eclectic approach. The theory is hypothetico-deductive in character, and a number of hypotheses derived from it have already been subjected to experimental study.

Daniel E. Griffiths, in chapter vi, views administration as decision-making. He elaborates the position he described earlier in the NCPEA book and offers several propositions for further inquiry.

Jacob W. Getzels describes administration as a social process (chapter vii) in which behavior is conceived as a function of both the nomothetic and the idiographic dimensions of the social system. This is a social-psychological approach that focuses upon the behavior of the individual actor. Hypotheses from this formulation have been tested in "live" educational situations. This statement, like that in chapter v, defines a theoretical model whose components can be defined operationally.

The first seven chapters examine administration qua administration and either explicitly note or implicitly assume that educational administration, business administration, public administration, hospital administration, and other forms of administration are essentially alike, that they all share important features. In chapter viii Roald F. Campbell explores the converse of this position, "What Peculiarities in Educational Administration Make It a Special Case?"

Do the approaches to theory presented here exhaust current endeavors? Of course not. We cannot claim that they are even representative, for certainly there are conspicuous omissions. For example, the carefully formulated mathematical models of Herbert A. Simon (Carnegie Institute of Technology) and the stimulating ideas of Chris Argyris (Industrial Administration Department, Yale University) are not represented. Other omissions will occur to the reader. We therefore do not pretend that this is a definitive book on theory in administration. It is not. Instead, it is a progress report by a few of us who have tried to grapple with the task of devising administrative theory. The fact that these formulations are not all polished to a high gloss does not stop us from sharing our ideas with you. Perhaps you, too, will hear the Lorelei song, and will try your own hand at theory development.

A. W. H.

University of Chicago
May, 1958

ADDENDUM

The reissue of this book by The Macmillan Company is dated 1967, yet the eight papers that compose the book were first presented at a meeting held in 1957. Despite this ten-year interval, the ideas that the authors present here are even more timely today than they were a decade ago. Both our modern society and the tasks of administration within that society have become increasingly complex within the past decade. Now, more than ever, the effective administrator needs a theoretical understanding of the sociology and the psychology of large organizations. No longer will anecdotal, avuncular advice or "research" based upon the methods of "naked empiricism" provide a fledgling administrator with sufficient guidance for making wise decisions.

This book was among the first in education to direct attention to the value of theory in understanding administration. What the authors have said about the nature of theory is timeless and for this reason the material in this book is not "dated." Furthermore, in addition to being pertinent today the book has a particular historical value within the field of educational administration. In 1957 the use of *theory-oriented research* in educational administration was essentially a novel and hence an alien idea for most professors in this field; the papers presented here had a dramatic effect in opening up new and highly rewarding research vistas.

For example, the "theoretical model" that Professor Jacob W. Getzels described has deservedly become famous. Likewise, Professor Talcott Parsons' differentiation of the technical, the managerial, and the institutional levels of formal organizations has proven especially relevant for research on administration. I should note, too, that this book is still the only place in which Dr. John K. Hemphill's extremely insightful "theory of leadership" has been published. I refer to these three chapters only as examples; indeed, all eight authors have continued to make significant contributions to our present knowledge about administration.

The first printings reached a much wider audience than we had anticipated, an audience that extended far beyond the field of educational administration. The book has been out of print for almost two years. This reissue again makes it available in its original form, with no changes in the text.

I acknowledge with thanks the gracious cooperation of Dean Roald F. Campbell and of Dr. Luvern L. Cunningham, Director

of the Midwest Administration Center at the University of Chicago, who have granted me permission to allow The Macmillan Company to republish the book.

Claremont Graduate School
October, 1966

A. W. H.

Administrative Theory in Education

THEORY OF THE EARTH

CHAPTER I

The Development of Theory in Educational Administration

ANDREW W. HALPIN

Our purpose is to communicate with each other in an endeavor to develop useful theory in educational administration. Holding a seminar such as this, with professors of educational administration and social scientists sitting down to work together, is salutary; it illustrates the progress we have made in the past decade, progress characterized by a marked change of emphasis in the training of administrators. Traditionally, our training programs have stressed the "practical" and have concerned themselves more with techniques than with understanding. During the post-war period, however, administrators have become increasingly aware of the role of theory and have come to recognize the contributions that social scientists can make to our understanding of educational administration. The superintendent's job and the jobs of principals and supervisors have been viewed afresh in the light of recent human relations research. Those of us responsible for training administrators have welcomed research findings on leadership and group behavior, and we have found ourselves drawing heavily upon insights about administration derived from other disciplines. But at the same time we have been abashed by the poverty of theory within our own field, have been dismayed by the extent to which our own research has been anchored to "naked empiricism." Out of this realization has grown our present attempt to develop theory in educational administration.

Several influences during the postwar period have contributed

to this realization. Three in particular deserve mention. The first was the establishment of the National Conference for Professors of Educational Administration (NCPEA) in 1947. This group, through its annual meetings and other activities, has facilitated communication among those who train administrators and has fostered higher and higher standards of training.

The second influence—one is tempted to say revolution—came about through the Kellogg Foundation's support of the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration (CPEA). This program, begun in 1950, provided much needed support for research and development. Among other things, it opened new avenues of communication between educational administrators and the members of other disciplines. Professors of educational administration and social scientists began to talk to each other. This did not come easily, for each group was wary of the other. As members of these two groups discovered that they were not speaking the same language and found that their orientations were strangely different, their initial wariness gave way to varying shades of frustration, rejection, and hostility. It took time to overcome these negative attitudes, to develop ways of communicating with each other, to develop the mutual respect necessary for efficient co-operation. Some of the original nine CPEA centers have made substantial progress in this regard.

The third influence is that of the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), established in 1956. Even within the space of one year, the UCEA along with the Educational Testing Service and Teachers College, has sponsored a large research project designed to develop measures of the performance of school administrators. The financial support for this project comes primarily from the United States Office of Education but will include contributions from Educational Testing Service, Teachers College, and others. The UCEA is also co-operating with the University of Chicago in sponsoring the seminar that we are holding here today. Several other UCEA projects are contemplated.

As in any form of social change, progress has been slow and along an uneven front. Four recent books reflect the present state of affairs. First is the signal book by Coladarci and Getzels,

The Use of Theory in Educational Administration,¹ published in 1955 and stimulated—at least in part—by their participation as consultants at the 1954 NCPEA meeting in Denver. Coladarci and Getzels call attention to the dearth of theory in educational administration, emphasize the integrity of theory and practice, and propose one approach to a theory of educational administration. This important monograph has not yet had much time to “take”; it will require a few years to appreciate its full impact. The second book, to be published soon, is “The Uneasy Profession,” by Gross,² who deplores the hortatory flavor of much that has been written about the superintendency and who points out that theory must be concerned with how the superintendent *does* behave, not with someone’s opinion of how he *ought* to behave. The third book, sponsored by the American Association of School Administrators, is Moore’s *Studies in School Administration: A Report on the CPEA*.³ Moore, in reviewing the publications that have appeared thus far from the nine CPEA centers, observes that few of the investigations are theory-oriented. The bulk of the studies reviewed are exhortations, how-to-do-it prescriptions, catalogues of opinion, or normative “status” investigations which do not permit us to generalize beyond the immediate data. The fourth book, sponsored by the NCPEA and edited by Campbell and Gregg, is *Administrative Behavior in Education*.⁴ Here again, the contributing authors found a lack of theory-oriented research. However, Griffiths⁵ in his chapter has taken steps in working toward a theory of educational administration. The current gloomy side of the theory picture that these four books reflect is of less importance than what they herald for future, more constructive efforts to develop better theory. Note that all four books have appeared within the past two years. The significant point is that they have appeared at all; they examine issues that would

¹Arthur P. Coladarci and Jacob W. Getzels, *The Use of Theory in Educational Administration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955).

²Neal Gross, “The Uneasy Profession” (in preparation).

³Hollis A. Moore, Jr., *Studies in School Administration: A Report on the CPEA* (Washington, D. C.: American Association of School Administrators, 1957).

⁴Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (eds.), *Administrative Behavior in Education* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

⁵Daniel E. Griffiths, “Toward a Theory of Administrative Behavior,” *ibid.*, chap. x.

not have come within the purview of educational administration prior to the end of World War II.

This brief historical perspective has bearing upon our task in the present seminar because our progress here may be impeded by the same issues that have cropped up from time to time in the NCPEA, CPEA, and UCEA. Several of these issues were epitomized in the communication problem that beset the authors who produced the recent NCPEA book. A few of the contributors sought to employ the social scientists' point of view and stressed the importance of theory; other contributors held to a more "practical" orientation. The writers found that they were talking past each other. It took a great deal of good will among the participants and superb tact on the part of the editors to achieve constructive communication between the adherents of these two groups. The development of better communication and understanding among the members of this writers' group is a story in itself and one that would be well worth examining as a guide for other groups engaged in co-operative enterprises of this kind.

We, here, are faced with a similar problem. Our seminar group is composed of people from two major backgrounds: educational administration and social science. What can we learn from the experience of the NCPEA writers' group that will help us accomplish our present task? Perhaps by identifying the issues that have baffled others we can place ourselves in a position to approach these problems with greater rationality.

Our problems appear to arise from three major sources which we may classify roughly as substantive, communicative, and motivational. These three sources of difficulty are not distinct; they overlap in subtle and intricate ways, and in a sense all revolve around problems of communication. For purposes of presentation, however, let us pretend that there are no interaction effects among them.

In our efforts to develop theory in educational administration, we have been impeded by three substantive problems. First, we have not been clear about the meaning of theory. Second, we have tended to be preoccupied with taxonomies and have confused these with theories. And third, we have not been sure of

the precise domain of the theory we are seeking to devise. Let us examine each of these in turn.

The construction of a theory demands an act of creative imagination. This is a tough assignment, and not many of us are equal to it, nor can we get help from a "how-to-do-it" manual. Theories cannot be produced on demand; they evolve, and they evolve in many shapes and in many different degrees of precision. The building blocks of which they are composed—the constructs, the postulates, the assumptions—may be molar or molecular. Thus, Parsons' "input" and "output" of social organizations and Hemphill's leadership acts are concepts of different orders. A theory may be broad and eclectic in its range, or narrow and specific. Shartle, for example, in formulating his theoretical framework for the studies of behavior in organizations, has deliberately sought constructs from a variety of disciplines and has sketched his ideas on a broad canvas. The components of a theory may also differ in the ease with which testable hypotheses can be adduced from the postulated model. Thus Getzels and Guba⁶ have tested empirically several specific hypotheses about role conflict derived from their model. On the other hand, the tri-dimensional concept of the Job, the Man, and the Social Setting, to which Griffiths⁷ refers, is essentially a taxonomy rather than a theoretical model in the strict sense of the term; for this reason, it does not lend itself to the derivation of specific, testable hypotheses. Griffiths, however, is not unaware of the shortcomings of this tri-dimensional approach; although he has found it useful in outlining the job of the administrator, he nonetheless has used a decision-making model for the theoretical approach he presents in chapter vi of the present book.

Consequently, it is not surprising that we may sometimes wonder about the meaning of theory. Theories do not come in a standard brand; we find them in packages of different size and shape, wrapped in different ways, and labelled differently. One must respect these differences and must recognize that theories, like the human beings who create them, follow different

⁶Jacob W. Getzels and Egon G. Guba, "Social Behavior and the Administrative Process," *School Review*, XLV (1957), 423-41.

⁷Daniel E. Griffiths, *Human Relations in School Administration* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), p. 4.

courses of development and grow at different rates. We must avoid rejecting a theoretical proposal simply because it still has a few rough edges. *But it is one thing to respect these differences; it is another to deny them.* The crux of the problem is that the term "theory" carries the burden of too many different meanings. Feigl has stated the problem well:

A set of propositions may be called a "theory" for various reasons. It may be because these propositions are highly inferential—either because of the sweep of their generalizations or because of the remoteness of the concepts from those of direct observation. That is, we tend to regard assumptions as theoretical if they are only very incompletely or very indirectly confirmed. This customary terminology does not altogether recommend itself for the simple reason that a well confirmed set of propositions could then not be called a theory. Yet, such is the ambiguity of our terms, that by a "theory" in the empirical sciences we may mean anything from a style or jargon of mere descriptions, from a mere classification, inventory, or typology to a full fledged hypothetico-deductive system; from a bold guess or a suggestive working hypothesis, a program of research, to an elaborate model in either analogical or purely abstract mathematical terms.⁸

In educational administration this issue is complicated even further by the fact that some writers have used this term in the sense of "value theory," to refer not to how administrators *do* behave but to how they *ought* to behave. This confoundment between the "is's" and the "ought's" of behavior is responsible for a greater failure in communication between educators and social scientists than any other issue. No one will deny that we need normative standards—in the ethical meaning of the term—for how administrators *ought* to behave, but these prescriptions do not constitute a theory. These standards cannot be secured through the methods that we must use for constructing a theoretical model in science. In this model we must confine our attention to how administrators *do* behave. In short, the description of events and their evaluation must be kept distinct. To state the issue in other terms: the immediate purpose of research

⁸Herbert Feigl, "Principles and Problems of Theory Construction in Psychology," in *Current Trends in Psychological Theory* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951), p. 181.

is to enable us to make more accurate predictions of events, not to prescribe preferential courses of human action.

Miller⁹ has noted our problems of communication in educational administration and has urged us to use words with greater precision. One place at which we might start is with the concept of "theory." Specifically, we may want to examine the advantages and the disadvantages of restricting this term to the meaning assigned to it by Feigl:

In order to provide for a terminology which will not constantly involve us in a tangle of confusions, I propose to define a "theory" as a set of assumptions from which can be derived by purely logico-mathematical procedures, a larger set of empirical laws. The theory thereby furnishes an explanation of these empirical laws and unifies the originally relatively heterogeneous areas of subject matter characterized by those empirical laws. Even though it must be admitted that there is no sharp line of demarcation (except a purely arbitrary one) between theoretical assumptions and empirical laws, the distinction, at least in the sense of a gradation, is illuminating from a methodological point of view.

One more terminological suggestion may help: Let us speak of scientific explanation wherever more specific or more descriptive statements are derived from more general or more hypothetical assumptions.¹⁰

Our first major problem, then, in developing theory in educational administration is that we do not share a common understanding of the meaning of "theory."

Note that according to Feigl's definition, a taxonomy, or classificatory scheme, is not a theory. To say that a proposal is only a taxonomy is not to disparage it, for even in the physical and biological sciences we find taxonomies that have served as useful precursors to theory. The difficulty is that taxonomies can become alluring in their own right and that sometimes we are tempted into offering them as "genuine" theories.

There are three related snares that we must watch out for in establishing taxonomies. First, the number of classifications we establish is limited only by the size of our vocabulary. The

⁹Van Miller, "Assessment and Projection," in Campbell and Gregg, *op. cit.*, chap. xiv.

¹⁰Feigl, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

cogent question is whether the verbal categories we posit correspond to events in the "real" world, whether the events assigned to these categories are in fact mutually exclusive. It requires no great imagination to produce new sets of verbal categories—lists of skills and competencies, and various tabulations to describe the components of the administrative process. But for research purposes we must still demonstrate that one set of categories permits us to make a better prediction of events than another. The merit of our rubrics must be determined not by their Trendex ratings but by the quality of hypotheses that can be generated from them, by the extent to which they improve the accuracy of our predictions.

The second snare in using taxonomies is that we run the risk of mixing oranges and battleships. We seldom are sure that the rubrics we have established are at a similar level of ordinality. There is the further danger that we may mix phenotypic and genotypic categories¹¹ quite indiscriminately. The essential snag, of course, is that the taxonomic method—as we have ordinarily used it in education—is based upon the Aristotelian as opposed to the Galileian mode of thought. The taxonomic approach therefore fails to take advantage of the very shift in emphasis which has brought about such great progress in the physical and biological sciences.

The third snare in using taxonomies is the fallacy of assuming that if we juxtapose two or more taxonomic schemata, we can somehow or other produce a theory. We discover, however, that even when we force two taxonomies into mating position, nothing happens: the conception of theory demands greater fertility than taxonomies possess. Why? Because the classification of similarities and differences does not in itself permit us to specify the *order* of the phenomena we study or to define the relationships that obtain among them. This must be accomplished by a creative act of a different kind. Taxonomies have their place, but they do not automatically grow into theories. Nor do all taxonomies have good potentials for being developed into theories.

¹¹For a discussion of phenotypic versus genotypic categories, see Kurt Lewin, "The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, V (1931), 141-77.

Much depends upon the type of events that are classified and the exclusiveness of the categories into which the events are sorted. But even the best of taxonomies, or the best two or more taxonomies taken in conjunction, will not yield a hypothetico-deductive theory.

This diatribe against the snares of the taxonomic method is no mere tilt at a windmill; a great deal of research energy in educational administration has been dissipated through the failure to recognize these snares. One need only examine the bulk of the studies conducted through the CPEA. We can charge off our early mistakes on this score as "good learning experience," but it is difficult to condone dogged persistence in repeating these same mistakes.

In sum, then, our second major problem in developing a theory of educational administration is that we have tended to be too preoccupied with taxonomic methods.

Finally, we have not been sure of the precise domain of the theory we are seeking. Administration is a practical art, pursued by men in a world of action. Yet a theory of administration can be practical only in a limited sense; it can permit us to declare that if you do X, consequence A will result; and if you do Y, consequence B will result, but the theory itself cannot give us information on whether consequence A or consequence B is more *desirable* for a given organization at a given time. Accordingly, when we say that we want to develop theory in educational administration, it is important for us to know what we are buying. What is the domain of the theory that we are trying to forge? What kinds of predictions are we seeking to make? To make these predictions with sufficient accuracy to warrant our efforts, how molar can we afford to make the components of the theory? How molecular? It is not enough to say that we intend to make better predictions of behavior and of other events; we must also specify the level of events and the kinds of behavior with which we propose to deal.

This is the place, too, where we must be sure to keep our "is's" and "ought's" straight, where we must be prepared to take all our hidden value assumptions out into the open and make them explicit.

Hence, there are three major questions about theory that we

must examine. The first is: what is the minimum number of value assumptions we must invoke in order to construct a satisfactory theory of educational administration? And the corollary: Can we agree on these assumptions? The second question concerns the molar-molecular issue. Should we seek to articulate molar theories, such as Parsons' and Shartle's, with theories of a more molecular type, such as Hemphill's and Getzels'? If we agree that this is desirable, then how do we achieve articulation? The third question relates to possible differences between administration *qua* administration and the special province of educational administration. Obviously, business administration, hospital administration, public administration, and educational administration have many characteristics in common, and to the extent that we can identify a *g* (or general) factor, a theory of administration is meaningful. But there are *s* (or specific) factors, too, that distinguish educational administration from other forms of administration. These *g* and *s* factors require examination.

At this juncture we have touched only lightly upon the problems of the domain of theory. Thompson, in chapter ii, will discuss modern approaches to theory in administration, and Campbell, in chapter viii, will deal with the *s* question: What peculiarities in educational administration make it a special case?

So much for the major substantive problems that impede the development of theory in educational administration. Let us turn now to the major communicative issues.

Even in the present brief attempt to discuss the problem of developing theory in administration, questions about the use of language arise. Practitioners and theorists must work together in developing theory and must be able to communicate with each other. Unfortunately, because of differences in their training, background, and day-to-day sphere of operations, the members of these two groups tend to think about events in different ways—and with different time perspectives. The way they think, the concepts and ideas they use, and the conceptual frameworks within which they organize their ideas are different. This does not mean that one way is right and the other wrong. Each can be right for its own purpose. Nor does it necessarily mean that the two approaches are irreconcilable.

We must guard against castigating the practitioner as "purely empirical." The general run of practitioner is no more purely empirical than many social scientists. There are scientists so utterly empirical that their research never gets off the ground. On the other hand, there are scientists and administrators, too, who consistently soar in the clouds. They forget that every theory must be rooted in the actual world of experience. In cloud-soaring, the scientist has an advantage: he can get away with flights into space for a longer time than the administrator; he is not as promptly called to account. But he, too, must eventually relate his theory to the "real" world.

The scientist has no monopoly on theory: effective administrators have invariably based their decisions upon some kind of theory of administration. The administrator, however, does not usually state this theory explicitly; he may not even recognize it as such. The explicitness with which a theory is stated contributes to the ease with which we can examine it, can subject it to criticism, can modify it. But let us not make the mistake of assuming that explicitness, in itself, guarantees a better theory. A "good" theory can suffer through lack of explicitness, but a "poor" theory, no matter how explicit, will remain sterile.

When the practicing administrator and the social scientist encounter each other, several intriguing reactions occur. The scientist is quick to see shortcomings in how administrators perceive their problems. He notes especially the lack of operationally defined terms and the intermingling of facts and value judgments. Consequently, the probing character of the scientist's questions can help the administrator better understand his own problems. The administrator, however, does not always detect shortcomings in how social scientists formulate problems. He often allows himself to be too impressed by the scientist's technical jargon; he is afraid that by asking questions he may expose his naïveté. This is unfortunate, for hokum can suffuse the scientist's language just as easily as it can bog down the language of the practical man. Yet because science is a sacred cow in our culture, the pronouncements of scientists have been sanctified. Nor has this situation been relieved by scientists who trade upon the obscurity of their own jargon. What we forget is that no

change in wording can make a trivial idea profound; we sometimes mistake complexity for profundity.

The administrator's hesitance in questioning the scientist results in a loss for both groups. The social scientist loses the wealth of ideas that practical men can contribute; he loses an important feedback on his own theorizing. Similarly, the administrator loses either by contenting himself with a superficial acceptance of what the scientist has to say or by categorically rejecting as impractical all that the scientist has to offer. In either event, the schism between the two groups is sharpened. Despite pious protests on both sides that theory and practice are an integrity, these adjurations become an empty catechism, while each group, *de facto*, continues to play its own game by itself.

Each set of players has its own defense mechanism. The scientist becomes increasingly disdainful in casting his pearls of wisdom—and I have chosen this metaphor deliberately because of the attitudes of many social scientists. The scientist concludes that it is not his responsibility to communicate his ideas clearly to the ultimate consumer. On the other hand, the practitioner consoles himself with the knowledge that he is on the *real* firing line, that what he contributes to his school system is more important than any misty theory. Talk about theory may be good chatter in a seminar, but the administrator proudly admits that he is no egghead; he is a man of action.

To circumvent these language difficulties, we must be sure that we understand the referents of the concepts we use. This understanding can be achieved only through patient and respectful questioning and crossquestioning. We shall have to learn to be tolerant with each other, and we must be willing to ask questions that appear naïve. Naïve questions are disarming; they puncture the balloon of hokum that gives our jargon a false impression of substance. In addition to patience and respect, it would be well for us to bring to our task a good sense of humor. In many ways administrators and scientists take themselves too seriously. What we need most, perhaps, is the freshness of approach that marked the little boy in *The Emperor's New Clothes*.

The participants of this seminar would not be here today were we not already agreed on the interdependence of practice

and theory. Incantations on this score need not be repeated; we must, however, vivify this point through a rich supply of concrete examples, so that administrators will be better able to relate their day-to-day experiences to appropriate theoretical frameworks. We need to build bridges between our theories and live, concrete case material. Sargent and Belisle,¹² and Griffiths¹³ have made a start in this direction.

The third source of problems in developing a theory of educational administration is motivational: What are our personal motives in working on this problem? This is a delicate issue, but it demands examination.

Administrators and social scientists alike must guard against personal motives that are less than lofty. We are part of our culture, and there are values in our society that can lead us astray in our effort to develop a theory. The present comments will be confined to only three of these values. First, as we have noted earlier, is the high value our society places on Science, with a capital "S." In the Middle Ages it was fashionable to be a "Man of God"; today it is fashionable to be scientific. The second and third values have been identified by Shartle in his list of value dimensions.¹⁴ The second is newness: that new ideas and things are better than older ones. The third is change: that frequent changes are better than infrequent ones.

Madison Avenue's wordmongers know how to capitalize upon all three of these values. By putting their TV pitchman into a white coat they give greater credence to their claim for THE BIG CHANGE: that Wheezies, with their NEW scientific filter, with 20,972.68 separate filter traps, will not produce lung cancer. Observe the shrewd touch of including the .68 filters; this "accuracy" makes the statement more scientific.

In the world of everyday affairs we are all barraged by appeals to change to something new, appeals often bolstered by the argument that the new is more scientific. This applies to detergents, automobiles, and movements in education. For example, there is a tendency in education to latch onto new movements

¹²Cyril G. Sargent and Eugene L. Belisle, *Educational Administration: Cases and Concepts* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955).

¹³Griffiths, *op. cit.*

¹⁴See Carroll L. Shartle, chap. iv in this volume.

not so much because of their intrinsic soundness, but simply because they are new. "Progressive" education, the look-and-say method of teaching reading, and group dynamics have all been embraced with greater enthusiasm than understanding. Fads and styles in education, like the length of women's skirts, have had their ups and downs and have been pursued accordingly. We would like to hope that our pursuit of theory in educational administration is based upon appeals of less transitory revelation. Our task deserves a stronger commitment than this.

The participants of this seminar are not likely to succumb to such temptation. Yet to choose two other examples—and with no intention of presumption—John Dewey and Kurt Lewin were less dogmatic and less zealous about their own ideas than were their disciples. Consequently, our progress in developing useful theory in administration may depend, at least in part, upon our ability to keep this endeavor from being viewed as a new *movement*. Progress over the long pull will be steadier and more constructive if we can discourage as prospective co-workers those eager individuals who perceive the effort as a new bandwagon and aspire to increased status by being among the first to jump on it.

To repeat, our purpose is to enrich our understanding of administration. The fact that our effort to devise theory is new, that it reflects change, and that it wears the white cloak of science guarantees neither the achievement nor the intrinsic merit of our objective. Although the values of science, newness, and change have a positive side, they can also become meretricious. Consequently, our effort should not be construed simply as a new "pitch" or a new gimmick for educational administration, nor should it be proffered as a panacea.

Likewise, we must not let our ideas degenerate into slogans. Expressions such as "research design," "action research," "group dynamics," and "the whole child" have been used so loosely and with such abandon that they have been debauched of meaning. "Administrative theory" will become another empty slogan if we use it as a rallying cry and proselytize in its name.

Some of us will need to examine our motives rather carefully. Are we seeking a better *understanding* of theory, or are we trying to *promote* the idea of theory? These motives are starkly

different. In seeking a better understanding of theory, and through patient application to the development of better theory, we shall gain greater acceptance for this approach. But this acceptance will come about through the merit of what we actually accomplish, not through claims of what we intend to accomplish. Neither a particular theory nor the *idea of theory* are things to be sold, to be marketed as an advertiser might market a new breakfast cereal.

Most administrators develop skillful techniques to secure support for the programs they initiate; this often is necessary in education, and for this reason some promotional ability on the part of the administrator is useful. But because these promotional skills have proven effective in other areas, a few of us may be tempted to apply them to the present endeavor. This would be a mistake, would reflect motives alien to our purpose. Our gains must be measured by the integrity of the ideas we generate, not by the number of supporters we enlist. In education we have paid so much obeisance to the dogmas of democratic method that we have failed to stipulate those areas where the method does not apply, have failed to observe, for example, that the merit of a theory cannot be assayed by majority vote.

Social scientists, too, are not innocent of contaminated motives. Few are as crass as one former colleague who declared, "A theory is better than money in the bank. You can't get ahead in this field unless you publish a theory—*any* theory." The promotion system in American universities, with its premium upon the length of a professor's publication list, does little to discourage this attitude. Furthermore, Professor Zilch likes to be able to refer to Zilch's theory even if it consists of nothing more than two fugitive ideas held together with Scotch tape. As Zilch, or one of his brethren, once declaimed, "I don't care whether they understand me, whether they damn me or praise me, just so long as they quote me." These premises lead to a preoccupation with theory for the sake of theory, a form of intellectual masturbation. The theorist becomes concerned chiefly about the elegance of his creation and is motivated by the admiration he expects from other theorists who are playing this same narcissistic game.

The theory, of course, is only a model, and it has no more "reality" than its creator endows upon it. Bross's observation on this point is pertinent.

There is another very grave danger in the use of models. After a scientist plays for a long time with a given model he may become attached to it, just as a child may become, in the course of time, very attached to a doll (which is also a model). A child may become so devoted to the doll that she insists that her doll is a real baby, and some scientists become so devoted to their model (especially if it is a brain child) that they will insist that this model *is* the real world.¹⁵

When social scientists and administrators come together there is a danger that the negative aspects of their motives will be accentuated. The scientists, not quite prepared to answer the questions of practical administrators, may tend to regress to the "theory for the sake of theory" position. The administrators, on the other hand, following the line of least action, may be inclined to support the *idea* of theory without fully comprehending its meaning. The interplay of these defense mechanisms can create for both groups an illusion of greater agreement than actually exists.

One purpose for administrators and scientists to work together is to provide better reality-testing for their ideas; without this, the scientific method sacrifices its most important self-corrective feature. Thus, to continue the quotation from Bross:

Now things are not this bad at the scientific level largely because of the self-corrective features of the sequential process of model-making which provide a periodic return to the real world after each excursion into the symbolic world. The test of the model acknowledges, as it were, the supremacy of the real world. If the model fails to predict what will happen in the real world, it is the model that must give way. This is the standard of scientific sanity.¹⁶

This standard will guard us against a search for *the* theory of educational administration and will help us recognize the possibility of alternative explanations. The scientist's predicament in this regard has been nicely stated by Einstein:

¹⁵Irwin D. J. Bross, *Design for Decision* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 171-72.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 172.

In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison. But he certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions.¹⁷

Thus, as various theories of administration are presented to us, we need not ask, which is right? Each may help us make better predictions of events, and for this reason may appear "good" or "right." But note, as Einstein observes, that the scientist can never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. The fact is that we can never open the case to find out what really makes the watch tick.

This should teach all of us concerned with theory development some sense of humility, a sense less conspicuous among social scientists than among physicists and biologists. Specifically, we may do well to examine the principle of complementarity that Niels Bohr has enunciated in the field of atomic theory.¹⁸ This principle, in slightly paraphrased form, states: The use of certain concepts in the description of nature automatically excludes the use of other concepts, which, however, in another connection are equally necessary for a description of the phenomenon.¹⁹ From this perspective, the dilemma of free will versus causality is resolved; both "explanations" are needed, and in their own right both are tenable. The application of Bohr's principle to the social sciences has not been examined—let alone

¹⁷Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1938), p. 33.

¹⁸Niels Bohr, "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," *Nature*, CXXI (April 14, 1928), 580-90.

¹⁹Diagrams of a mechanical model designed to illustrate the complementarity principle may be found in John A. Wheeler, "A Septet of Sybils: Aids in the Search for Truth," *American Scientist*, XLIV (October, 1956), 360-77.

spelled out. But if we view various theories of administration in the spirit of Bohr's principle of complementarity rather than construe these theories as *competing* explanations of the truth, our progress will be healthier. This attitude may also alleviate some of the obnoxious symptoms of young investigators freshly pregnant with theory.

There is no intention to paint as a villain every scientist who devises a new theory, to imply that his motives are solely those of self-aggrandizement. Nor need we denounce categorically administrators who conscientiously seek to promote the idea of theory. Both scientists and administrators may operate with perfectly decent motives; the ends they avow may be perfectly laudable. But the means most readily available to them within their respective milieux may contaminate these ends, may in fact subvert their personal motives. Consequently, we must all be alert to the devious ways in which our motives can be corrupted by the social pressures under which we operate. This awareness will not guarantee the elimination of such corruption but may reduce its likelihood.

As I noted at the outset, our problems in developing a theory of educational administration may be classified under three general headings: substantive, communicative, and motivational. For purposes of presentation I have discussed these three sources of difficulty in order, knowing full well that the problems we encounter within a specific context can never be attributed to a single source of difficulty apart from the other two. Most of our difficulties stem from problems of communication, from the fact that we do not always make our concepts clear. Unfortunately, even when a writer defines his concepts with startling precision, there is no assurance that his readers will receive his concepts in this way. Their own predilections may prevent them from incorporating into their own thinking the speaker's ideas. This is why repeated feedback is needed between communicator and communicatee.

What are the implications of these remarks for our present meeting? Very simple. That we listen to each other, that we listen to each other with respect. That we feel free to raise critical—even damning—questions, but without malice or antagonism, and that we stand ready to answer such searching

questions, but without defensiveness. We must all recognize that we are engaged in solving what Hemphill refers to as a "mutual problem."²⁰ To accomplish this, each of our co-operating disciplines must forego any claim to a monopoly on wisdom.

If the lessons we have learned from NCPEA, CPEA, and UCEA mean anything, then the success of the present seminar will depend upon liberal portions of two ingredients. The first, of course, is complete respect for each other's intellectual integrity. The second is patience—the patience to listen, the patience to explore each other's ideas through questioning and cross-questioning in an effort to comprehend what we are saying to each other. More than mere verbal acceptance is necessary; we must understand at the gut level as well. This kind of listening is tough work, but there is no alternative.

In conclusion, these remarks come full circle. It is salutary that we are holding a seminar like this, that professors of educational administration and social scientists are sitting down to work together. This physical proximity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. Whatever strides we take toward developing theory in educational administration will depend upon two important sets of skills. The first is our skill in listening to several different points of view. The second is our skill in identifying the consistent, major themes that recur in the various presentations—the ability to see the essential similarities as well as the differences. If we can help each other improve these skills, then we will have overcome a major obstacle in developing theory in administration.

²⁰See John K. Hemphill, chap. v in this volume.

CHAPTER II

Modern Approaches to Theory in Administration

JAMES D. THOMPSON

Gradually we in our culture are coming to understand that distinctions between theory and practice are artificial distinctions. Men of action as well as scholars entertain notions of cause-and-effect relations— notions which are generalized out of series of specific events and which are employed in new and similar situations. Some of these theories—these notions of cause and effect—may be generated from the personal experiences and insights of the actor, but many are incorporated in what his particular culture and generation consider common sense.

The common-sense basis of our theories does not make them less theoretical, but it may well make them less useful than we would hope. It seems characteristic of common sense that it does not make explicit the conditions under which the relationships it asserts actually hold. When these unknown conditions change, common sense becomes a misleading guide to further action.¹

In setting about to train students for administration, we assume that there exists generalized or generalizable knowledge about administration which can be imparted. There is the further assumption that common sense does not contain all of that knowledge; otherwise, the student would be wasting his time. Thus theory is a basic aspect of our training programs, even while the courses labeled "theory" occupy minor roles in our curricula.

¹For an interesting elaboration of this, see Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952).

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MODERN APPROACHES TO THEORY

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Theory per se faces an uphill battle in programs which train future administrators. The situation is different, of course, where future scientists are being trained; here theory is recognized as the core of training. This distinction, I think, reflects the fact that administrators and scientists use theory in opposite ways. The administrator uses theory as a basis for deriving answers or approaches to specific situations; he seeks principles capable of guiding the application of general notions to specific situations.² The scientist uses specific situations as a basis for arriving at improved theory. Hence, the same specific situation may have quite a different meaning to the scientist and to the administrator, and it may call forth quite different motivations.

These differing uses for theory do not mean, however, that the theory which the scientist seeks to build and that which the administrator seeks to use must be different theories. Indeed, unless they are basically the same, the accumulated knowledge contained in basic theory must be rediscovered by the administrator—and he lacks both the time and the training to do so. In the more mature fields of applied science, advances have come precisely because teachers and practitioners have learned to employ the systematic theories developed by rigorous science.

We who staff professional training programs have dual needs for theory. We are obligated to equip our students with the best available theory as a guide to their practice. We also need theory to guide our search for better understanding. At this stage in our development these needs are equally pressing.

On the assumption that an adequate theory would serve both purposes, I will attempt to discuss modern approaches to theory in administration from both viewpoints. I will not attempt to judge specific formulations or "models." If these meet the test of internal logic, I know of no other test than that of empirical trial. My remarks will be on a more general level, for it seems reasonable to ask: (1) What do we hope to achieve through the use of theory? (2) What are the sources of traditional theory?

²This matter is thoughtfully treated by Harold Guetzkow, "Three Cognitive Barriers in Utilization of the Social Sciences," April, 1957 (privately circulated). See also Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson, 1957), and Alvin Gouldner, "Theoretical Requirements of the Applied Social Sciences," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (February, 1957), 92-102.



(3) What are the criteria for administrative theory? (4) Are we approaching an adequate theory?

WHAT DO WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE THROUGH THEORY?

Much has been written about the uses of theory in research, less about the potential contributions of theory to the training of future administrators. In my opinion, an adequate theory of administration would go a long way toward preparing students for change. It would condition them to think of the administrative process as a complex of simultaneously variable factors rather than as a set of specific techniques. We cannot expect techniques of administration for 1977 to have much resemblance to those current today. Nor can we predict, with any degree of confidence, the nature of the techniques which will be available and current in 1977. An adequate theory would equip the future administrator to alter the values of those variables subject to his control as other variables beyond his control change in value. Rather than describing currently accepted practices, an adequate theory would explain *why* such practices work and why they might not work, if and when the surrounding context changes.

Perhaps this point can be illustrated by two examples of changing concepts of authority. "Good supervision" of the 1920 variety in America was rooted in a firm paternalism in which fear-inspired discipline had a large role. The same supervisory behavior today is "bad supervision."³ Why? In part, I think, because the individuals being supervised have more education, are better organized, and place higher value on human dignity.

The military provides another example of changing patterns of authority. Our Air Force grew out of an army where rank and authority were intricately connected. The traditional basis of military authority was appropriate under conditions where work was repetitive and easily divided. Individuals were practically interchangeable, and the supervisor was the one who could do everything other members of his unit did—but could do it all a little better. Each rank was occupied by people who had become experts in the activities they supervised; the various

³American industry spent vast amounts retraining foremen to the newer concepts and replacing those on whom the training did not "take."

echelons differed primarily in the *scope* of their concern rather than in the *kinds* of work done. The modern Air Force, however, has very complicated equipment and missions, and it employs quite complex processes carried on by a great variety of technical specialists. In such units the supervisor can no longer be an expert in more than one or two specialized processes. Despite assignment rotations, then, it is no longer possible to assume that "any" captain is necessarily competent to exercise authority over "any" corporal. Here, I think, technology is the primary variable undermining what was once an accepted view of authority. Air Force administrators have certainly felt the impact of the changes.

A second advantage which an adequate theory of administration might offer is a system of thinking which would allow the administrator to incorporate knowledge produced by the several disciplines. Even if we could provide the administrator with the most up-to-date knowledge from all related disciplines, this would be woefully out of date long before he left active administration. We do our students a disservice if we lead them to believe that today's psychology, sociology, history, economics, or political science provides him with irrefutable facts. I mentioned above one probable reason for the change in supervisory standards; a second reason, I am confident, is that new knowledge about human motivation challenged older notions about behavior based on fear.

Somehow, in the future, our students must be alerted to the results of new discoveries and interpretations. But it is not enough to bombard them with leaflets or to call them back for "refresher" sessions. We must equip them to trace through the implications and ramifications of forthcoming knowledge about human beings and behavioral processes; we must equip them to alter their own behavior accordingly.

We are learning, for example, new things about the triad and its instability, and game theory predicts that under certain conditions triads resort to coalition behavior. As these lines of inquiry develop, the administrator must see them as more than merely "interesting" new findings. He needs a *systematic* way of thinking which will lead him to re-examine his use of competition

and his methods of allocating rewards and resources among groups in his organization.

An adequate theory would also prepare students for further growth through their own later experiences by providing them with economical ways of ordering that experience. By emphasizing the interrelatedness of phenomena, such a theory would help them remain alert to the unanticipated consequences of their actions; it would help them avoid oversimplified explanations of those actions which were successful; and it would caution them to be aware of changing conditions which might call for changed behavior patterns.

If administrators are to profit from their experiences, they must have systems for ordering and generalizing specific events. The more explicit and rigorous the system for ordering experience, the greater the facility in learning.

In short an adequate theory would direct the student's attention to processes and relationships rather than to techniques. It would provide him with a framework into which he could place both the future findings of the social sciences and his own experiences in administration.

WHAT ARE THE SOURCES OF TRADITIONAL THEORY?

There appear to be four primary sources of theory for administration: the comments and reports made by practicing administrators, the survey research of teachers, the deductive reasoning of teachers, and the adaptation of models from other disciplines. These are listed in the order in which they have appeared on the scene. The first two are long established and traditional; the last two reflect newer developments. Because my assignment is to discuss "modern approaches to theory in administration," I would like to comment first on the more traditional sources of theory—to establish some sort of base line for comparing, afterward, the more recent developments.

I have suggested that every administrator uses more or less rigorous theory in meeting specific situations. These theories become of importance to educators only when they are verbalized and, eventually, written—when they can be passed on to others. Perhaps this stating of theory is not central to the role

of the administrator, but I think it is evident that much of the reading we now assign to students (and much of our lecturing) is based upon statements of theory made by practicing administrators.

We have a vast machinery for encouraging, facilitating, and disseminating such statements. We hold conferences and training institutes where administrators generalize from their experience. Our trade and professional magazines and journals vie in presenting the views of distinguished administrators; publishers compete for text manuscripts written (or ghosted) by men who "really know" because they do it every day.

These people undoubtedly have much to tell us; we have much to learn from them. Yet they are not necessarily adept at verbalizing their own behavior for purposes of systematic theory. It is not uncommon to find a real discrepancy between what they do and what they tell us they do. On many occasions, I am convinced, our students would do better to "do as they do, not as they say."

We are perhaps handicapped in the behavioral studies, as compared with the biological and physical, by the fact that the things we study—people—are "verbal." The atom and the virus cannot talk, and those who study the behavior of atoms and viruses are forced to learn about that behavior through observation by the investigator. We tend to be content to let the administrator tell us how he behaves, and we are lulled into believing that he has perceived and articulated accurately.⁴ In effect, we rely on him to be not only his own philosopher but also his own psychologist, sociologist, anthropologist, historian, political scientist, and economist. The day has long passed when even a full-time scholar can master more than one or two of these disciplines.

This is not to deny that men of action have useful insights. To the contrary, their ingenuity and creativity often would put the academician to shame. I am suggesting, however, that the really creative insights of these people seldom are incorporated into our recorded theory because: (1) They lack the time to

⁴Few of us would rely on the centenarian for a prescription on living to a ripe old age.

record and develop such insights.⁵ (2) They tend to force their theoretical thinking into the concepts we have taught them and which we constantly reinforce in our writings and speeches. Our teachings act as blinders. (3) The platforms we afford them are not conducive to reflective critical thought, but rather to the use of journalistic or visual-aid "gimmicks"—three well-illustrated points, seven rules to success, or simple diagrams understandable at the flicker of an eye.

I suspect that in the early development of the various areas of professional training the voice of the practitioner quickly becomes the "voice of authority." Nevertheless, there also develops a pattern of research by faculty members who find it necessary to supplement the pronouncements of practitioners or to systematize their various pronouncements. We now have an extensive literature on the results of such research. With a few notable exceptions, it has been of the descriptive, survey variety. When our teaching materials have lacked details or have appeared out of date, we have interviewed practitioners or have given them questionnaires. From their replies we have developed "modal models"—models which are based on the most common way of handling administrative problems. Our journals and magazines of administration are filled with reports of this type of research.

On occasion we also do "scholarly" research in the libraries. Here we survey, collate, and compare the terminology of the distinguished writers on administration, reducing these materials to their common denominators in order to extract the essentials, or we develop an expanded list of categories which is "all inclusive," or we reorganize the list of categories into memorable slogans such as POSDCORB. Incidentally, this can be great fun. I have always found POSDCORB easy to remember but hard to pronounce, and I would like to suggest my own arrangement, which contains all of the letters but is easier said: P - S - C - O - B - O - R - D, pronounced with the *P* silent.

I repeat, this can be fun; but where does it get us? Whether we have relied on the visiting dignitary or on our own survey efforts, we have seldom produced new knowledge. Rather, we

⁵Chester Barnard is a notable exception; he wrote while president of a large corporation.

seem to have periodically produced new packages for the same old product. Any honest appraisal of the theoretical literature of administration will reveal that the vast bulk of it is of this "grass roots" variety—a mixture of common sense, descriptive categories one (and only one) step removed from common sense, and slogans and catch phrases which have dramatic appeal but little else.

Within our lifetimes there have been tremendous changes in administrative behavior. Presumably the fundamental process has been constant, but there is no denying that the behavior through which that process operates has changed considerably. Many administrators have responded to new situations, new conditions, and new opportunities by adjusting or adapting their behavior. These responses have not always been consistent or successful, but could we expect otherwise when administrators are forced to rely on hunch and ingenuity, trial and error? These are expensive tools.

The economy of theory has been missing because we have tended to build grass roots theories which "explain" what has been done; we have not examined the outcomes of all possible permutations and combinations of variables and have not generalized the relationships into systematic theories. Our grass roots theories have described the past, but they have not faced the future. In contrast, the abstract theories of physics have had profound effects on human life; they have done more than merely reflect an aspect of reality.

Probably the most damaging criticism that can be made of any theory is that it does not generate new knowledge; I have indicated my belief that this criticism applies to traditional theories of administration. Why? A major reason, I feel, is that we have focused on descriptive categories as pigeon holes for data (for pedagogical neatness), but we have neglected the dynamic relationships among these categories. We have provided, in effect, for electric light sockets and for wall switches, but we have failed to provide the wiring which relates them, and we remain in the dark.

Typically, I think, when we decide to do research, we set aside our verbalized theories of administration and draw on common sense as the source of our research problems. More

often than not, it is the common sense of practicing administrators; hence, we do research on the topics which they label as most urgent.

When industrial administrators are vexed by the changing role of foremen, we get a rash of research on this topic; and when these same administrators begin to puzzle over resistance to change, we flood the market with research and theories designed to overcome resistance to change. When the competition for skilled personnel increases employee turnover rates, we shift our research attention to matters of inducements and loyalties. We usually approach these "urgent" topics with the variables stated by the practitioner, hoping that by more careful collection of data and more minute analysis we will find answers for him. In short, I think that we only infrequently undertake research because our theories say a topic is important.

But do our grass roots theories point to strategic topics? Do they in themselves raise new questions to be answered? Do they suggest that since such-and-such relationship holds, we should also be able to find X —or be forced to revise the theory? I think not. Our traditional theories lack this self-correcting feature because they are weak in stating relationships.

My remarks have, of course, been exaggerated. To some extent our theories of administration do pose relationships, at least implicitly. Our theories indicate, for example, that "planning" or "communication" have a positive relationship with performance. Yet, a reading of such theoretical discussions usually leaves the strong impression that the relationship is linear—that twice as much planning (or communication) will double performance—and, of course, we know from experience that this is not necessarily true.

The poverty of our thinking about relationships is indicated by the fact that often we can explain the outcomes of administrative behavior only by value-loaded adjectives—that more or better communication was present, that organization was inadequate, or that planning was democratic. These "principles by adjective" are no better than rules of thumb.

A second serious indictment of our grass roots theories is that they do not facilitate the accumulation and incorporation of new knowledge. As forces from without have changed administrative

behavior, have our theories been generalized and expanded to incorporate these new phenomena? Usually, we have added new courses and kept our "theory" or "principles" course intact, with the result that we now offer our students a variety of part-theories but no theory. We have added courses in human relations, operations research, group dynamics, organization and methods, and so on. Our students find a wide assortment in our curriculum cafeteria, but they get no guide to a balanced diet.

A third weakness of our grass roots theories is that they tend to be special theories of administration rather than general theories. By using the language and concepts of practitioners and by trying to see through their spectacles, we have developed theories of business administration, military administration, educational administration, hospital administration, and public administration. As Litchfield has noted:

The most serious indictment which must be made of present thought is that it has failed to achieve a level of generalization enabling it to systematize and explain administrative phenomena which occur in related fields We seem to be saying that there is business administration and hospital administration and public administration; that there is military administration, hotel administration, and school administration. But there is no administration.⁶

Of course there are differences between school systems and industrial organizations, and these differences lead to variations in administrative behavior. But there are similarities of administration which we do not observe when we use grass roots frameworks. Each of these areas has its special concerns, its pressing problems, and its distinctive jargon. When we try to approach administration as the practitioner of a particular area approaches it, we focus on the unique or distinctive, and we join him in taking for granted the underlying bases of administration which are not unique.

WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY?

I have tried to suggest some of the advantages to be expected of an adequate theory and some of the weaknesses of traditional

⁶Edward H. Litchfield, "Notes on a General Theory of Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I (June, 1956), 7.

approaches to theory in administration. Now I will climb further out on the limb and suggest at least a minimum set of criteria for a really usable theory. These are predictions of the characteristics an adequate theory will display when we have it.

The variables and constants for such a theory will be selected for their logical and operational properties rather than for their congruence with common sense. Common-sense terms and concepts gain currency because they are convenient for dealing with frequent events which must be acted upon. To the extent that such terms and concepts are also useful for systematic theory, it would be wasteful to discard them. But where common-sense terms lack precision or clarity, or where common-sense concepts do not order experience in the ways required by systematic theory, then new terms must be invented or adopted. Chemistry did not really begin until it stopped regarding fire, water, earth, and air as the four basic elements. These were "obvious" and "real"; hence, it was common sense to work with them. But what kind of chemistry would we have today if those concepts had not been set aside?

Perhaps I can give an example a little closer to our field. One frequent distinction between "line" and "staff" in complex organizations is that the "line" gives orders while the "staff" gives advice. Now we all know the difference between orders and advice. Or do we? When a staff assistant to my boss indicates that I am doing something inefficiently, have I received advice or an order? In many cases, I am convinced, advice has been given (or intended), but orders have been received (or perceived). The line-staff distinction is common sense to a great many administrators, but, in my opinion, it has seriously interfered with the development of administrative theory.

The selection of variables for logical and operational properties rather than for common-sense properties means that we will face charges of uttering meaningless jargon, but I believe this is an occupational hazard for those seeking new and more useful ways of looking at the world. If we cannot develop thick skins, I doubt if we can develop more useful theory.

An adequate theory will be generalizable, hence abstract. The broader the range of specific events it explains, the more powerful the theory. To regard educational administration as

unique is to deny prematurely the relevance of that which is known about business administration, or military, or church administration. The inescapable conclusion in that case would be that the entire task of building a theory of educational administration falls entirely to a pitifully small number of individuals. The only hope, I think, is to approach educational administration as a variety of administration and to incorporate into the theory a variable which will encompass first one, then another, such purpose or task. If relevant knowledge from other types of administration is to be applied to education, then educational administration must be considered as only one special case. Similarly, public school administration, military training education, religious education, adult education, and so on must be considered special cases of education, and a theory adequate for educational administration must be able to encompass them all.

Another reason for abstraction is that an adequate theory of administration cannot be limited by time or place. We cannot afford to be content with a theory of educational administration for America and another for Indonesia, or with a theory of educational administration for America in 1950 and another for 1970. The theory should enable us to deal with different times and places, but again as variables and not as limits to the theory.

The values capable of being attached to education and to administration will not be incorporated into the theoretical system itself; instead, the system will treat such values as variables. The values of "democracy" undoubtedly color both education and administration in twentieth-century America. But if we sincerely want to understand educational (or any other type of) administration, we must not attempt to build a theory of democratic administration into education. Instead, our theory must account for administrative behavior and processes in cases where democracy is highly valued and where other political ideals are highly valued. Similarly, we cannot afford a separate theory of profit-oriented administration, although our general theory must be capable of explaining administration where profit is an important concern. Values must be treated as variables, for purposes of theory, rather than as limits to the theory.

An adequate theory of administration will be rooted in the basic social and behavioral sciences. Administration is accomplished through the behavior of administrators in interaction with others. Hence, basic understanding of human behavior must be included in our theory of administration. We cannot hope to start from scratch and develop a psychology of administration, a political science of administration, or an economics or sociology of administration. Yet the subject matters of all of those fields have manifestations in administration. Psychology deals, for example, with motivation, learning, and decision processes, all of which are important in administration. The political scientist's understanding of federalism or of bilateral negotiations, for instance, is pertinent to administration. The administrator in any field has problems of resource allocation and opportunity costs; these are intensively studied by the economist. The sociologist's considerations of bureaucracy and small group processes also are clearly pertinent.

To the extent that such disciplines do not focus on behavioral processes in *administrative* situations, we face the task of extending them. But unless we build on the foundations being laid so painfully by these disciplines we face a hopeless task.

The focus of an adequate theory will be on processes rather than on correlations. Admittedly a theory is valuable only if it simplifies. Still there are limits beyond which simplification is misleading. It seems to me that administration as a self-conscious, definable activity occurs only when the activities to be administered are themselves highly complicated; and, therefore, the behavior which contributes to administration involves chain-like reactions more often than simple cause-and-effect relationships. It helps to know that A leads to B, but if the reality of administration is complex, our theory must eventually not only show that A is associated with H but also show the relations between B, C, and so on to H. In other words, it is not enough to show that a particular pattern is correlated with performance; we must eventually be able to explain how the relationship occurs.

This means, I believe, that we cannot be content with structural concepts—which tell us “what.” We must also have “how”

concepts.⁷ The structural concept "role," for example, gives us guide lines regarding the future behavior of a supervisor, but it does not explain how members of the work group gain understanding of the supervisor's role or how various roles articulate and operate within the work group or how roles change. Structural concepts seem to be indispensable but are not sufficient for a really useful theory.

ARE WE APPROACHING AN ADEQUATE THEORY?

A decade is a short time for which to reckon the development of a body of knowledge; for the immediately preceding decade we do not have sufficient perspective in time to make a firm evaluation of what has been accomplished. Yet I believe that since World War II we have witnessed developments which will turn out to be especially significant. I will have been greatly mistaken if this flurry of activity in theories of administration becomes merely a passing fad.⁸

The war probably had much to do with this increased interest in administration. Thousands of men and women with administrative experience discovered that at least some of it was applicable in new and quite different kinds of organizations, even as they discovered that their administrative behavior also had to be adapted in some respects. War, as any crisis, placed a new urgency on problems and questions which had only occasionally crossed our minds in more "normal" times. The more mature students who returned to our campuses following the war had experienced this urgency. They were less ready to accept clichés and slogans and were often more eager to disregard traditional boundaries between bodies of knowledge. Their questions challenged complacency, stimulated multi-disciplinary study, and on occasion underscored the need for research.

Whatever the sources, research and theoretical activities in-

⁷This point is adapted from James D. Thompson, William J. McEwen, and Frederick L. Bates, "Sounding Out as a Relating Process" (paper read at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society), April, 1957.

⁸A recent survey of administrative courses in the field of business illustrates the "boom" in this area since 1945, as well as the newer emphasis on behavioral models. See Charles E. Sumner, Jr., *Factors in Effective Administration* (New York: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, 1956).

creased after World War II in most of the fields of professional administrative training: business, public, educational, social work, hospital, and so on. In each of these fields, more honest-to-goodness field research is going on than ever before, and still more is demanded. New blood in the form of new disciplinary backgrounds has been injected into these fields to the point where we can no longer identify a man's training by his title or his location in the university. Admittedly, interdisciplinary collaboration is difficult, and frequently its results are disappointing. Yet in the overview, I think, the signs are clear that hypotheses are being borrowed back and forth among schools which formerly were isolated. Generalizations and concepts generated by one school turn up a year later in another. Sometimes they are embraced, or they may be bitterly challenged, but they cross boundaries more frequently.

An adequate theory has not yet come out of all this, but there have been several promising starts. The sources of these modern developments, as indicated above, have been two: the deductive reasoning of scholars and the adaptation of models from other disciplines. I doubt that it is possible to identify theories which have been derived exclusively from only one of these sources, but we can identify examples characterized by the predominance of one or the other of these approaches.

There have been a number of deductive approaches to theory—attempts to postulate a few general ideas which for one reason or another appear to be “true,” or “plausible” and important, and to arrive by logical steps at more specific propositions. Two approaches of this kind have influenced a great many of us; I refer to the formulations by Chester I. Barnard and Herbert A. Simon. Both men produced books which are as instructive on the second or third reading as on the first, and both have had an influence that extends far beyond the recognized boundaries of administration as a subject.⁹ Students usually find these books difficult to read, perhaps because the

⁹See Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), and Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1957). Many social psychologists studying small groups have derived their hypotheses from Barnard and Simon; many sociologists studying formal organizations have done likewise. Both writers are referred to frequently by political scientists.

authors' ideas are more sophisticated and their terms more precise than those we encounter in common-sense language and in textbooks on administration, but readers who exert the necessary effort invariably find these writings extremely challenging.

Also, in the last decade several attempts have been made to formulate administrative theory on the basis of models derived from a number of different sources: learning models, decision-making models, group dynamics models, leadership models, social system models, game models, and so on. Some of these have been more deeply rooted in empirical observation than others; each has started from unique premises. The very proliferation of these models suggests that we are dissatisfied with traditional approaches and are motivated to do something about them. Probably all these models contain some "truth," although my impression is that they are helpful primarily in broadening the scope of our inquiry. Two examples may be briefly noted. Parsons' approach via social system concepts has pointed to the importance of the organization acquiring "legitimization."¹⁰ I think this calls for an expansion of our concept of authority beyond the boundaries of the organization. Game theory, by explicitly calling our attention to the interaction conditions between two or more "organizations" seeking the same or competing goals, forces us to recognize the importance of strategies for dealing with outside forces.

None of these approaches in its present formulation is adequate. Perhaps none can be expanded into an adequate formulation. Yet despite their differences, most of them reveal similar underlying themes, and this convergence is encouraging. One of these common themes is the serious consideration of definitions and of making them operational. There is nothing magic in definitions, and we could bog down in them. On the other hand, when we seek new concepts to be used in logical systems, those concepts must be given labels and precise descriptions. There is much confusion in our current literature over definitions; "role," "status," and "authority," for example, are three terms for which there are conflicting definitions and which therefore

¹⁰Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I (1956), 63-85, 225-39.

confront us with conflicts about how data should be classified. But perhaps confusion is inescapable in moving from an old way of ordering ideas to a new way. At least, I think, the concern over precision and operationalism reflects a search for something more powerful than common-sense concepts.

A second common theme in these modern approaches is that they are *explicitly* relational regarding human behavior. Whether they draw on deductive reasoning or stem from the more empirically based models of the behavioral sciences, these approaches attempt to predict human behavior under stated conditions. Sometimes we complain that the conditions stated are not very lifelike—but it seems to me that we need to observe behavior under all conceivable conditions. The predictions made by the several models may turn out to be incorrect, but if these predictions are explicit enough to be matched against actual human behavior, then the models can be revised accordingly.

Moreover, the predictions contained in the several models are based upon recognition of the fact that human behavior *flows out of* persons in situations. Some models, as opposed to others, elaborate more on the person and less on the situation. There is a great unevenness here, and each model analyzes its major variables in different ways. One may posit "rational man" and try to determine how the situation interferes with his rationality. Another may posit "robot man" and try to explain how environment prevents his automatic responses. A third may seek group uniformities irrespective of personal idiosyncrasies, thus placing emphasis on the individual's social environment. This is another way of saying that each model tends to be based primarily on one discipline and to include others in subordinate ways. Here again there is confusion and very little uniformity. Nevertheless, I believe that this confusion reflects a searching for ways of incorporating the various disciplines; competing suggestions at this point can protect us from complacency.

A third common theme is that all of these models are or attempt to be generalizable. They differ in degree of abstractness, but they are hypothesized as potentially capable of explaining administrative behavior in a great variety of specific situations and in the several types of administration. Whether the models stress learning, decisions, leadership, group dynamics, games, or

something else, they are dealing with phenomena which are not confined to one or two levels in a hierarchical organization; and they are not confined to phenomena unique to the school system, the hospital, or the business firm.

A fourth common theme is the attempt to free these models from culturally defined values, while permitting us to use values as data. The models do not tell us how to be "democratic" administrators or how to be "economically-rational" administrators so much as they predict how administrators will behave if they happen to be committed to one or another of these values. My personal belief is that our models are remiss in not explaining how such values enter the administrative system, but this is correctable by extension, provided that values are used as variables in the models rather than as assumptions upon which the models themselves are predicated.

Thus on four of the five suggested criteria, I think, modern approaches appear to be progressing. On the fifth—the explanation of long chain-like processes—there is less encouraging evidence. We still are fumbling for process concepts, and our models are better at dealing with relations between two variables—with perhaps one intervening variable—than with long sequences. Probably this is largely because these models tend to emphasize a few aspects of administration or behavior in selected types of administrative situations. But it is in the long sequences that complicated "switching" takes place and that outcomes of administrative activities are determined. My personal belief, also, is that we tend to stress internal relations and structures to the point where we fail to see the significance of external relations or the interaction between internal and external activities. There, perhaps, is where we will find the source of the values held by administrators and the impetus for administrative change.

In brief, modern approaches to theory in administration appear to me to be developing more promising concepts of variables which can be defined operationally; they are seeking generalizability and freedom from value-limitations; they are focusing on the sources and the consequences of human behavior. The ultimate criterion of a scientific theory, of course, is its utility in adding to our understanding. Few of these models can

yet claim to have made much of a contribution in this respect, but I think there is reason to believe that they are laying the foundation for an adequate theory.

SUMMARY

I believe we are seeing in schools of education, business, public administration, hospital administration, and social work the growing pains and confusion that attend moving from infancy through adolescence. The more mature (but I trust not senile) professional schools—medicine, law, engineering—probably exhibited the same sorts of bewilderment and fumbling at an earlier stage in their development.

Professional schools, however much nurtured and protected by the university, are sired by a clientele of practitioners. They are elaborations of an apprenticeship system and are close to the grass roots.¹¹ Their first faculties are chosen for demonstrated success and reputation in the professional field regardless of the usual trappings of academic qualifications. Despite their popularity with students and practitioners, however, these people are considered by the rest of the university community as poor relations. They are forced to defend themselves against charges that they are operating trade schools. Under pressure to attain recognized status as a profession and to achieve academic respectability, they therefore raise the academic standards for faculty members. Gradually this encourages them to think that there are other useful approaches to their subject and reduces their subservience to their immediate clientele. Eventually, at least in the cases of medicine and engineering, the professional school incorporates into its own structure representatives of related basic disciplines and seeks to make fundamental contributions to knowledge.

In these terms, we in the fields of administration are not yet mature. But we are fighting back against the trade school charges; we are raising our standards for faculty members; we

¹¹An interesting set of parallels among various aspects of professional school history and current problems is discussed by Lloyd E. Blauch (ed.) in *Education for the Professions* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955). The generalizations made in these closing paragraphs, however, are mine.

are considering more abstract materials and de-emphasizing techniques. We have even begun to incorporate into our faculties representatives from the social sciences, although we are not quite certain whether we want the facts they command, the research techniques they have mastered, or the theory in which they are disciplined.

Having presented my own "model" of professional school development, I will climb to the end of the limb and assert that we are on the way toward fashioning a bridge between the basic disciplines of human behavior and the field of administration, similar to those bridges which link medicine to the biological sciences and engineering to the physical sciences. Eventually our theories of administration may lead practice rather than follow it, and in time we may contribute significantly to the behavioral sciences.



CHAPTER III

Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organization

TALCOTT PARSONS

Most of the recent literature in the field of formal organization has tended to deal with internal structure and processes: such problems as line authority, staff organization, and the process of decision-making. I have therefore selected for comment three fields which have been less in the center of attention. The first of these is the set of differences which arise at various levels in the hierarchy of control and responsibility in systems of organization. The second concerns analysis of the *external* relations of organizations to the situations in which they function, and the third is the variation in *types* of organization—which is related on the one hand to their technical functions, on the other to variations in their external relations. These three problem areas are closely interdependent. It would not be useful to deal with them entirely independently; it will be necessary to interweave them. But I would like to build the main structure of the chapter on the distinctness of these three themes and at the same time their interdependence.

The theory of "bureaucracy" has been so strongly influenced by the conception of "line" authority that there has been a tendency to neglect the importance of what in some sense are qualitative breaks in the continuity of the line structure. There is much sound observation and comment on many relevant problems but little direct attempts to analyze them in a more formal way. I would like to suggest a way of breaking down the hierarchical aspect of a system of organization—of examining, for

example, the line within a school system that runs all the way from the chairman of the school board to the teacher of most junior status, or even to the non-teaching employee in the humblest position. I make this breakdown according to three references of function or responsibility, which become most clearly marked in terms of the external references of the organization to its setting or to the next higher order in the hierarchy. These three may be called, respectively, the "technical" system, the "managerial" system, and the "community" or "institutional" system.

THREE LEVELS IN THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATION

In the first place, every formal organization has certain "technical" functions. In an educational organization these are the actual processes of teaching; in a government bureau, the administrative process in direct relation to the public (e.g., tax collecting by the Bureau of Internal Revenue); in a business firm, the process of physical production of goods, etc. There is, then, always a type of suborganization whose "problems" are mainly those of effectively performing this "technical" function—the conduct of classes by the teacher, the processing of income tax returns and the handling of recalcitrants by the bureau, the processing of materials and supervision of these operations in the case of physical production. The primary exigencies to which this suborganization is oriented are those imposed by the nature of the technical task, such as the "materials"—physical, cultural, or human—which must be processed, the kinds of co-operation of different people required to get the job done effectively.

I assume, however, that on the level of social differentiation with which we are here concerned, there is another set of "problems" which becomes the focus of a different order of organizational setup. In the area where parents teach their own children, for example, to speak their language, there is no problem of the selection and appointment of teachers, or even of their qualifications; the status of parent *ipso facto* makes him the appropriate teacher. But in a school system teachers have to be especially appointed and allocated to teach particular classes. Moreover,

classrooms have to be provided; the teacher does not automatically control adequate facilities for performing the function. Furthermore, while it is taken for granted that a child should learn to speak the language of his parents, what should be taught in what schools to what children is by no means automatically given.

In a complex division of labor, both the resources necessary for performing technical functions and the relations to the population elements on whose behalf the functions are performed have become problematical. Resources are made available by special arrangements; they are not simply "given" in the nature of the context of the function. And who shall be the beneficiary of what "product" or "service" on what terms is problematical; this becomes the focus of organizational arrangements of many different kinds.

When the division of labor has progressed beyond a certain point, decisions that pertain to this division must take precedence over those on the "technical" level. Thus it does not make sense to set up classrooms without having decided what children should be taught what things by what kinds of teachers, or without knowing whether specific teachers and specific physical facilities can be made available. Similarly, the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not just "collect taxes" in general; it collects specific taxes, assessed by a higher authority, from specific categories of persons. And the plant does not just produce goods without anyone's worrying about how the materials will be procured, who will do the actual work on what terms, and who wants the goods anyway—again on what terms. In the case of a subsistence farm family there is no problem: its members have to eat; they have access to soil, seeds, and some simple equipment; and they work to produce their own food. But this is not the typical case for a modern society.

We may say then that the more complex technical functions are performed by suborganizations controlled and serviced—in various ways and at a variety of levels—by higher-order organizations. The higher-order organization is sometimes called an "administration." In the business case it is usually called the "firm," whereas the technical organization is called the "plant."

In the field of government, "bureaus" are mainly technical organizations, while the "political" parts of government are, literally, the "policy-making" parts (in our system, principally legislative¹ and higher executive). Perhaps a good name for this level of organization is, as suggested above, a "managerial" system.

The relations between such a managerial system and the technical system can be divided into two categories: mediation between the organization and the external situation, and "administration" of the organization's internal affairs. Both involve the "decision-making" processes which have been the center of so much recent attention.

At the level I have in mind, there are two main foci of the external reference and responsibility. The primary one is to mediate between the technical organization and those who use its "products"—the "customers," pupils, or whoever. The second is to procure the resources necessary for carrying out the technical functions (i.e., financial resources, personnel, and physical facilities).

In one set of connections, decisions made in the management system control the operations of the technical system. This is certainly true for such matters as the broad technical task which is to be performed in the technical system—the scale of operations, employment and purchasing policy, etc. But, as in other cases of functional differentiation, this is by no means simply a one-way relation, for managerial personnel usually are only partially competent to plan and supervise the execution of the technical operations. The managers present specifications to the technical subsystem, but vice versa, the technical people present "needs" which constitute specifications to the management; on various bases the technical people are closest to the operating problems and know what is needed. Perhaps the most important of these bases is the technical *professional* competence of higher personnel in technical systems, a professional competence not often shared by the administrative personnel who—in the line sense—are the organizational superiors of the technicians.

¹This legislative function may, however, be placed mainly at the still higher level, which I call "institutional" and which will be discussed below.

In its external relations, the managerial system is oriented to the "markets" for the disposal of the "product" and for "procurement" of the resources required by the organization to perform its functions. But these "lateral" external relations do not exhaust the "external" problem foci of a managerial system. The organization which consists of both technical and managerial sub-organizations never operates subject only to the exigencies of disposal and procurement from other agencies (which stand on an approximately equal level) as "customers" or as sources of supply. There is always some "organized superior" agency with which the organization articulates.

A formal organization in the present sense is a mechanism by which goals somehow important to the society, or to various subsystems of it, are implemented and to some degree defined. But not only does such an organization have to operate in a social environment which imposes the conditions governing the processes of disposal and procurement, it is also part of a wider social system which is the source of the "meaning," legitimation, or higher-level support which makes the implementation of the organization's goals possible. Essentially, this means that just as a technical organization (at a sufficiently high level of the division of labor) is controlled and "serviced" by a managerial organization so, in turn, is the managerial organization controlled by the "institutional" structure and agencies of the community.

The ways in which the managerial system fits into the higher-order institutional system vary widely according to the character of the managerial system's functions and the organization's position on both the "lateral" and the "vertical" axes of the larger social system. But it is a cardinal thesis of this analysis that no organization is ever wholly "independent." In terms of "formal" controls it may be relatively so, but in terms of the "meaning" of the functions performed by the organization and hence of its "rights" to command resources and to subject its "customers" to disciplines, it never is wholly independent.

As noted, this third level of organization, which articulates with the managerial, may take many forms. In the educational field, for instance, I would put school boards with their representative functions in the local community in this category;


similarly with trustees of the various types of private, non-profit organizations and, indeed, under the fully-developed corporate form, with the boards of directors of business corporations.² These, and possibly other agencies, are the mediating structures between the particular managerial organization—and hence the technical organization it controls—and the higher-order community interests which, on some level, it is supposed to “serve.”

Without attempting to be more circumstantial and formal at this stage, I may merely suggest that the foci of these higher-level controls which stand “over” the managerial organization are of three main types, which often appear in combination. One control is universal: the operation of the organization is subjected to generalized norms, valid throughout a wider community. These range from the rules formally codified in the law to standards of “good practice” informally agreed upon. So far as control is of this type, the distinctive thing is that no organized agency continually supervises the managerial organization; intervention is likely only when deviant practice is suspected—such control is exerted, for example, through litigation or by law-enforcement agencies, trade and professional associations, and relevant “public opinion.”

The second type of control mechanism is some formal organization which is interstitial between the managerial structure and a more diffuse basis of “public interest.” The fiduciary board which supervises the typical private non-profit organization is the type case, though in many respects the directors of business corporations also belong in this category.

Finally, the third type is that which brings the managerial organization directly into a structure of “public authority” at some level. In our society this is usually “political” authority, i.e., some organ of government; but in the past, religious authorities have also performed this function, and even now, for example, the Catholic school system should be treated as belonging to this type.

²For the business case one may thus designate the three organizational levels as plant, firm, and corporation. The “central office” may be thought of as the “plant” of the administrative organization of the firm.



THE POINTS OF ARTICULATION BETWEEN THE
THREE SYSTEM-LEVELS

I have emphasized these *three* different levels of the organization hierarchy because at each of the two points of articulation between them we find a qualitative break in the simple continuity of "line" authority. School boards, boards of directors, or trustees and political superiors do not, in the nature of the case, simply tell the people at the next level down "what to do." This is essentially because the people "lower down" typically must exercise types of competence and shoulder responsibilities which cannot be regarded as simply "delegated" by their "superiors." This again is because the *functions* at each level are qualitatively different; those at the second level are not simply "lower-order" spellings-out of the "top" level functions.

In the case of the technical organization, I illustrate this by the case of the higher-level technical functions. When the personnel of the technical organization reach a full professional level of competence, a crucial problem of organization appears. For no matter how far removed these professionals may be from certain levels of concrete "operations," they must necessarily have the last word in planning and evaluating these operations (i.e., setting the *criteria* of effective operation in technical terms), simply because their managerial superiors are seldom, if at all, equally competent in the technical field. Organizational arrangements are extremely varied; sometimes such people have important positions in the "firm" or other managerial organization, and they should be regarded, like the foreman, as interstitial. In any case, their position cannot be a simple "line" position. Nor, indeed, is it adequate to assign them to the "staff" and say that their function is to "advise" the "lay" executive. This implies that it is the executive who *really* makes the decisions. But this is not correct. The technical expert must, in the nature of the case, *participate* in the technically crucial decisions. He does not simply lay the alternatives with their consequences before his "boss" and say, "Take *your* choice." The technical expert takes responsibility for *his* judgment, and when the decision has fallen a given way, he must assume his share of responsibility for the consequences. Hence, if he feels that he cannot take this responsibil-

ity, his recourse is to resign, exactly as in the case of an executive. A decision is arrived at not by the executive's deciding in the light of the expert's advice but by a process of weighing the considerations for which each is responsible and then reaching some kind of a balance of agreement. Because of the functions of the managerial organization, the executive has some kind of "last word." But this is a veto power, not a capacity to implement, because the executive is powerless to implement or plan implementation without the competence of the expert. The most the executive can do is to fire one expert and hire another in his place.

This leads to another crucial point. The technical expert at the professional level may be a member of the managerial organization, and of the technical system under it, but his allegiance is never exhausted by these two. Though degrees of formal organization vary greatly, the expert is typically a member of one or more collectivities of specialists sharing a type of competence which cuts across the structure of managerial and specific technical organizations. Thus no one industrial firm employs all the engineers, nor one hospital all the doctors, nor one school system all the teachers. The "reference group" to which the expert looks in connection with his competence and the definition of its standards is not his "managerial" boss but his professional peers and colleagues.

Similar considerations apply at the point of articulation between the managerial and the institutional system. But the qualitative break in line authority at this point is obscured because we have tended to describe organizational situations according to one of two extreme types. One is exemplified by the business firm where the "top man" is thought of as beholden to no one; he is "on his own." He is thought of as responsible only to his own conscience, and everyone else in the organization is under his orders. The other type of organization is that in which the managerial unit is incorporated in a "political" structure, so that the nominal head of the unit is thought of merely as a subordinate of his political superiors.

The essential focus of the qualitative break in line authority I have in mind here is the managerial *responsibility* assumed by

the executive and the managerial organization which he, in many cases, heads. This also is not a mere "delegation" where the executive is commissioned to carry out the "details" while his superiors decide all the "policies." This is because it is not possible to perform the functions of focusing legitimation and community support for the organization and at the same time act as the active management of it—that is, when the differentiation of function in the structure has gone far enough. The "board," or whatever structural form it takes, is a mediating structure between the affairs of the organization at the managerial level and its "public." It can become absorbed in the managerial structure only at the expense of its primary function.

Of course the degree to which legitimation and support are essential functions varies from case to case. In some cases, most nearly approached but by no means reached in the business world, the "automatic" institutional controls constitute the main regulatory mechanism. Perhaps near the extreme in the other direction is the case of the school board in a community where a great many issues touching the operation of the school system are politically "hot." Then the superintendent may be sorely in need of a buffer between himself and various "pressure groups" in the community, but by the same token the board itself may be "bent" by the pressures of these groups. Its failure to protect the "professional"³ element in the school system is not, however, an adequate measure of its dispensability.

Not least of the reasons why the board does not merely delegate functions to the managerial executive is the type of relation the latter must maintain with the technical personnel. The same holds, however, for the executive's external responsibilities. The essential point is that the executive must perform his functions by coming to terms with categories of other people—experts, customers, and resource people—who are in a position (within limits) to exact their own terms independently. Therefore, to be effective, the executive must have considerable freedom to use his own judgment as to what terms are good for the organization. He can be reasonably bound by broad policies and rules laid

³Note the ambiguity of the term "professional." Ordinarily I use the term in a sense denoting *technical* competence. When used otherwise, I shall put it in quotation marks.

down from above, but these cannot be too restrictive. Certainly he cannot be regarded as the mere implementing agent of other people's decisions. Furthermore, he must be in a position to present *his* problems to his board and to negotiate with them from a position of relative strength, not just to go to them for "instructions."

I may generalize about the nature of the two main breaks in line authority which I have outlined by saying that at each of the two points of articulation between subsystems there is a *two-way* interchange of inputs and outputs. What has to be "contributed" from each side is qualitatively different. Either side is in a position, by withholding its important contribution, to interfere seriously with the functioning of the other and of the larger organization. Hence the *institutionalization* of these relations must typically take a form where the relative independence of each is protected. Since, however, there is an actual hierarchy, since in some sense the "higher" authority must be able to have some kind of "last word," the problem of protection focuses on the status of the lower-order element. Accordingly, we find that such institutions as tenure serve, in part at least, to protect professional personnel from pressures exerted by management—pressures that are often passed on down from board levels.

THE DISPOSAL AND PROCUREMENT FUNCTIONS

Let us now take a brief look at the second main topic in my outline: the relation between each of these systems—the technical, the managerial, and the community—and the "lateral" elements of the society with which they have to deal. First, what I have called a "technical" process must be carried out in relation to some "materials" or to an environmental situation; facilities are required to do this, and many of these resources must be secured from outside the organization.

With respect to what I have called materials, the first important distinction is whether they are or are not "physical" objects whose "motivations" do not need to be taken into account. Physical production in the sense of modern technology is the type case involving the physical object. Complex organized co-operation is generally necessary to carry out the technical process

of production, but it is not necessary to secure the "co-operation" of the raw materials or of the partly finished products at any stage. Nor is it necessary to get the consent of the finished product to dispose of it to users outside the organization in any way the management sees fit. In economic terms this is the type case of a "commodity."

In another very large class of cases the "materials" on which technical operations must be performed are human individuals, or collectivities. This is pre-eminently true of education, but also of health services, of the practice of law, and of "administration," which may be defined as the processes by which persons and collectivities and categories of them may be brought actually to fulfil the obligations imposed by the decision of a "legitimate authority"—e.g., paying taxes, teaching the classes assigned, or observing traffic regulations. Here the conditions under which the "objects" of the technical process will co-operate satisfactorily and the kind of social relationship structure required under these conditions become matters of paramount importance.⁴

The important point to which I wish now to call attention is that the second case, where the object is a "social" object, necessitates a special link at the managerial level between the technological process and the disposal process. In the physical cases the technical production process can be completed and then, quite independently, those responsible for sales can take over; the customer need have no relation at all to the technical production process, though of course there are cases of "custom" production where he supervises phases of it quite closely.

In the case of the social object, however, a *prior* relation to the recipient or beneficiary of the "service" is a prerequisite for undertaking the technical process at all. Teaching presupposes pupils in the school, and therefore settlement of the terms on which pupils go to school is a prerequisite for the teaching

⁴There is a third category, namely, where the technological problem concerns attainment of results in a cultural realm, the solution of scientific problems through research being a type case. The valued result is in this case neither a physical object or class of them, nor a state of social objects, i.e., of persons or collectivities, but an addition to the body of *knowledge*, which is a cultural object. This may, of course, impose very special exigencies upon the technical process. For simplicity's sake I shall ignore this third case in the discussion which follows.

process. Similarly with the practice of medicine and law—there have to be patients or clients “on whom” to practice, and there has to be a basis on which they have “come to” the doctor or lawyer. In the case of administration, finally, the law or policy which has to be administered must designate the categories of persons or collectivities to which it applied, and only when this has been specified can the administrative agency even *begin* to administer.

Even within the category where the object of processing is a “social” object, a wide range of variation is found. At one extreme is the case where a rule simply forbids certain actions; then the administrative agency is involved only when the prohibition is violated; its only “customers” are offenders. At the other extreme is the case where the organization, or agency, must establish a long-continuing and in some sense “intimate” relation which affects the most vital interests of the recipients of the organization’s service. Education belongs in this category. There must be a long-standing relation between a pupil and a succession of teachers, and both the structure of the pupil’s personality and his future position in the community depend heavily upon the process of education.

In this type of case it is common for the recipient of the service to be taken into an important kind of *membership* in the technical organization which provides the service. The school class is a social system with an important degree of integration between teacher and pupils. Teaching cannot be effective if the pupil is simply a “customer” to whom the “commodity” of education is “turned over” without any further relation to its purveyor than is required for settlement of the terms of transfer—as in the case of the typical commercial transaction. An even further stage of variation is given by the case of the boarding school or residential college where the main focus of the recipient’s everyday living is brought within the organization. The same is true of hospitals, but of course for periods of different duration.

From one point of view, the *technical* necessity of establishing a prior and special link between the organization and its recipient imposes an important set of constraints on the managerial system. It is not free to “bargain” with its “customers” in ways which

might jeopardize the conditions essential for carrying out the technical functions of the organization. Circumstances such as these strengthen the position of the technical personnel vis-à-vis the managerial, because the former are in a position to insist upon the conditions they think essential for doing the job adequately if management, in turn, *wants* it done adequately.

Looked at from a slightly different point of view, the performance of "services" requires the *co-operation* of the recipient of the service. This co-operation cannot always be taken for granted; it has to be motivated. Witness, for example, the problem of truancy in schools, to say nothing of passive resistance to learning and the commonness with which patients leave hospitals contrary to medical advice. Since sheer coercion is not adequate, the service-performer must *offer* something to induce adequate co-operation, and the readiness to do this has to be included in the terms by which the co-operative relationship is set up in the first place. But the physical producer does not have to offer his raw materials anything.

This difference between the processes of physical production and various types of "service" has much to do with the fact that the *products* of physical technology in our society tend to be disposed of through the process of commercial marketing, while services—with many variations, of course—are much more frequently purveyed within different kinds of non-profit contexts.

These problems also have been an important relation to the problems of "payment" for the products of organization function, and hence to the procurement side at the level of financing the operations. Again it is no accident that it is the business firm—an agency most frequently concerned with physical production—which is expected, in the long run, to finance its operations *wholly* from the sales of its products—in the long run, because borrowing for investment purposes is common and essential. Some services are provided on this same basis, but examples range from these cases to those where the service is provided to the recipients entirely without charge, and the organization must therefore be financed from other sources, notably private contributions or taxation.

One aspect of the "meaning" of the payment emerges from the above discussion: in the commercial case, all the "contribu-

tion" to the process of production has been made by the producing organization; the customer has typically "done nothing" to make the result possible. But in cases like education, the pupil and his parents have obviously done a great deal; without their co-operation, the result would not have been possible at all. Probably along with the problems of equality in access to benefits, this is the principal reason why "full payment" is not expected for many services. If payment is expected, it may well be a matter of "noblesse oblige," as in the case of medical patients at the upper end of the sliding scale paying considerably *more* than the service costs to provide. They are contributing to a worthwhile societal function in proportion to their financial capacity to do so.

THE MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL FUNCTION

If there is a meaningful set of interchanges between the output of "technical product" and what is in some sense "compensation" for that output—on the model of the sale of the commodity and full payment for it—we may now ask whether this account of things is adequate to account for the importance of the *managerial* level of organizations in its relation to the lateral aspect of its external situation. Is the managerial organization, then, nothing more than a "facilitator" of the process of technological production?

I am conceiving the problem in direct relation to its formulation for purposes of economic theory. It has seemed possible on the levels already dealt with to relate the prototypical economic case to others in a fairly specific way, and I should like to attempt this for the managerial level. Here the point of reference is the "double interchange" which has served as a central paradigm for treating problems of equilibrium in the economy and hence in its suborganizations.⁵

One of these two interchanges is the one just reviewed, the output of commodities or goods in exchange for money payment. In the case of the business firm, this payment is expected—in the

⁵See Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), chap. ii, for a more formal discussion of this interchange.

long run—to cover the whole cost of production. But in the economic paradigm there is a second interchange, that of the wage output of the firm for labor input from outside. In part this duality is necessitated by the division of labor and is facilitated by the monetary mechanism. The typical customer of a firm is not also an employee.

But there is not merely a difference of agency; there is also a difference of level. We might say that the firm “pumps” purchasing power into the market system. This is not an instrumentality of consumers’ “want-satisfaction” but of *control* in the allocation of resources within the community. In return, the firm receives a share of an essential societal resource—what in technical terms I have called the “performance capacity” of the community. Some economists have called it “labor power.” This performance capacity represents the human agent’s commitment—within the limits of his competence and skill—to co-operate in the productive process: By treating performance capacity as an input to the firm, we mean that *this* firm has been allocated this share of commitment through the contract of employment.

The next question is whether the firm’s output of purchasing power in the form of wage payments is more than an instrumentality for securing an indispensable facility for its operations. Of course it is such a facility, but it is also more. It is a contribution to the total pool of purchasing power in the community. The firm “makes money” in a double sense; it is the recipient of the proceeds of sales, but it also contributes to the flow of commodities and to the community’s purchasing power. This is the main mechanism for the *generalization* of facilities, for increasing the community’s level of economic effectiveness. This has been a commonplace to economists since Keynes.

In the system as a whole there must, of course, be a balance between the flow in marketing commodities and the output of purchasing power; imbalance in one direction results in deflation; in the other, inflation. But the main point here is that the output of purchasing power is not merely an “instrumentality” for purchasing labor; it is an essential part of the functional *contribution* of the firm, and of course the same is true on the consumers’ side. The famous oversaving is the counterpart of undue hesitancy about production commitments.

The output of commodities is primarily the work of the technical subsystem of the organization—of the plant. But the output of purchasing power is the work of the managerial organization. Hence this distinction of “levels” in the structure of organizations corresponds to the differentiation between the two interchange processes which have figured so prominently in economic theory.

This set of relationships is not peculiar to organizational contexts where the primary technical output is commodities. In many respects education is the antithesis of the commodity case. Here the technical output is the change in the character, knowledge, and skill levels of *individual* pupils. But the school *system* may be treated as responsible for another category of output: its contribution to the general level of performance capacity in the community. Just as “wealth” is not a simple aggregate of physical commodities but one which includes the specifically *economic* element of generalized disposability through the mechanisms of purchasing power, so the capacity of a community to get valued things done is not, so far as it depends on the performances of individuals, simply an aggregate of the individual qualities of its members; it includes a factor of allocation relative to need and generalized disposability—through the “labor market.” Through such decisions as what to teach to what categories of pupils, the school system decisively influences this pool of usefully disposable performance capacity in the community; it adapts the technical education process to the conditions of the community; how effectively is, of course, an empirical question in the individual case. These decisions are the result of “ideas” and “plans” on the part of school authorities and of the “demand” for trained performance capacities in the community—not, of course, only in an economic sense of demand.

The “input” at this higher level from the community may be said to consist in the community’s *support* for education as a function, in its commitments to the maintenance or improvement of the capacity-level of its population. Here, in a sense parallel to the economic case, the effectiveness of a particular individual’s education is a function not only of what he has acquired in the process but also of the educational *level* of the community as a whole. Hence various units in the community, but particularly families and interest groups oriented to educational goals, are

concerned with this *level*. What I am speaking of here is a set of relationships focused not on the community as a whole, but rather on those members who are direct "clients" of the educational system. But this is one of the essential foci of responsibility for the managerial subsystem in education.⁶

A few words about the parallel in the political field may extend the picture a little. Here the technical process is the administrative implementation of "decisions" reached at higher levels. "Compliance" or the necessary "co-operation" is perhaps the relevant input category. This compliance must, however, be "motivated" by some sort of "demands" in the community that the measures in question be carried out; if this is in deficit, the administrative process runs into all sorts of difficulties (such as, shall we say, tax evasion) which coercive powers alone are often not adequate to cope with. But there is also a higher-level output of political systems which may be called the assumption of leadership responsibility. This is the system's contribution to the community's general level of political effectiveness; this involves more than satisfying particular interests and demands for decisions.

For this generalized contribution to take place, there must be a counter-input to the political organization from outside. The primary mechanism seems to be that the citizen, especially through his vote but in other ways also, contributes to the *generalized support* without which effective leadership in the political system would be impossible. In a democratic system this operates above all through the mechanism of parties. Only a party supported by a majority of the electorate can take the leadership responsibility required for making important decisions and can implement them over a wide enough range. The support on which a party depends cannot be specific to a particular issue or interest, except in a limiting case. But without both generalized support (at least at the party level) and the assumption of leadership responsibility, the political system's capacity for effective action in the public interest is impaired.

⁶This should be distinguished from the superordinate (e.g., "political") support of education to be discussed later.

THE PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL

In discussing the functions of the "managerial" level of organization in mediating the organization's relations to the external social situation, I have concentrated on the "disposal" function. Its monetary aspects have necessitated some discussion of the "procurement" functions because of the relation between them. There is, however, one part of the procurement function which requires special discussion because it is so fundamental to all types of modern organization: namely, the procurement of personnel. It is fundamental to modern society that a large range of its functions are performed in *occupational* roles by persons who have no ascriptive or associational connection with the organization but are *employed* by it through a formal or informal contract of employment.

From one point of view, the contract of employment is a special case of the settlement of terms for the selling of a service. Its distinctive feature is that the service is performed in the context of organization, and the "customer" is the organization in a managerial capacity. Of course, the kind of contract and the expectations of the occupational role will vary enormously as a function both of the kind of organization and of the type of role within it. There is thus the closest sort of link between the procurement of personnel and both the technical functions and the internal organization of the employing unit. Very broadly indeed, it may be useful to distinguish three basic types of role, and hence of personnel: "operative" at the technical levels; "administrative" or "executive," having special responsibilities for the functioning of the organization at the managerial level; and "professional," characterized by some special competence which roots in a generalized cultural tradition focused outside the organization as such. These are "ideal types," and there are plenty of mixtures among them.

Economists have long discussed the standard of "marginal productivity" for determining the rewards available to an employee of an organization. Similarly, most economists tend to assume that the "reward-value" of a job will be exhausted in

monetary terms.⁷ This reference is to an equivalence between the economic value to the firm of an employee's contribution to its functioning and the value to the employee—which really means to his household—of the goods and services which can be purchased with his money wage. This also tends to go with a form of "contract" according to which the relation is terminable at will on both sides, with no "justification" needed for discharge or "laying off" other than that it does not seem profitable for the firm to continue the employment. Of course this actually is not the typical pattern for employment at operative levels by business firms, but it is more closely approximated there than elsewhere. Variations from this pattern may be looked at under three headings: first, the pattern of monetary reward itself—whether it focuses on what the service is "worth" in monetary terms; second, the balance between monetary and non-monetary components in the reward; and, third, the terms for continuance or termination of the relation.

The closest approach to this marginal-productivity, terminable-at-will pattern seems to be the operative technical role in the business firm, namely, the ordinary industrial worker or clerical employee. This seems in turn to be closely related to the fact that such firms to such a large extent produce commodities. This circumstance minimizes the non-economic element in the firm's relation with its customers and eliminates overlap between the customer role and the employee role. This relatively unobstructed orientation to the market facilitates internal cost accounting and exerts a pressure toward maximizing the use of cost criteria in contracting for the factors of production (in terms of what he is *worth* to us, not of what we can afford). Accordingly, the terminability of the contract at will protects management's freedom to rationalize its employment procedures from a cost-accounting point of view.

This pattern has been both an ideological ideal for the businessman and a highly convenient reference point for the economist; if this pattern were tenable, it would greatly simplify the economist's problems. But it has in fact been greatly modified,

⁷Alfred Marshall was an exception to this tendency, since he insisted on the importance of "activities" valued "for their own sake." See *Economy and Society*.

most conspicuously by the development of trade unions. The union seems to modify the situation in two directions. First, and most obviously, it greatly restricts the employer's freedom to hire and fire. Unions in general do not impose formal rules of tenure; "layoffs" are permissible for purely economic reasons, e.g., when the company, for market reasons, "needs" to cut down its scale of operations. But these cuts must be made according to well-formulated rules, not simply at the employer's discretion. Furthermore, the closed shop ideal of unionism would restrict hiring to members of the union or would at least require union membership of all who accept employment. The second main focus of the union's effect is to compress the spread of wage rates among its members, so that in unionized industries there is a greater concentration near the average.

The union seems to root in two circumstances that are predominantly non-economic in significance. The first of these is the power discrepancy between the employing organization and the individual employee, particularly when so much is at stake for the employee both as an individual and as the representative of his family. Here the union has not only acted on its own but has also been supplemented by the government in assuring workers a measure of "social security." The second context is the associational solidarity of union members, to some degree constituting a company of equals banded together for mutual benefit and protection. There is some inhibition on their differing too much from each other in individual performance or interest because of the impact this differentiation would have on the structure of the union. Of course, patterns such as strong emphasis on seniority also enter into union practice.

But the farther the function of an organization moves away from the production of commodities for a market, the more the pattern of employment and remuneration of "operatives" tends to move away from the "marginal productivity" standard. The largest-scale example of a very different type is provided by the civilian operative employees of governmental agencies. Here two patterns are particularly conspicuous, namely, the seniority principle and the institutionalization of tenure. More generally, there is regulation by a complicated civil service code. Within the limits of effectiveness, it may be said that one main emphasis is

on security. Negatively, this seems to be associated with the virtual impossibility of effective cost accounting, since the value of the service provided by the agency is generally not measurable in money terms. Furthermore, the code protects a group in a weak power position from arbitrary action by administrative superiors and from "political" intervention. Positively, however, in a field where achievement cannot usually be very high, the code seems to be related to the need for enlisting loyalty to the employing organization by emphasizing the sense of "belongingness." In general, a direct appeal to "self-interest" does not accord well with the "public service" orientation of government.

It is of great importance that government stands in competition with private employment for personnel. There is, however, a persistent lag between the salary levels for civil servants and of those for comparable jobs in the business world. This may mean that there are non-financial components of the reward pattern in government which are not present in business to the same degree. Security is probably one of them, but the sense of contributing directly to the public welfare may well be more important than much of our current ideology would allow.

Among different types of organizations we find a wide range of policy about administrative personnel, especially in regard to remuneration and tenure. However, we can identify the practice in two main types of organizations. At one end of the range is the American business executive. Here the pattern is to emphasize very high financial rewards but to minimize anything like tenure. The executive assumes his responsibilities at his own risk, as it were. He is highly rewarded if he is regarded as successful, but he is subject to being cashiered if he fails to satisfy his organizational superiors. The other type is found in most non-profit organizational contexts, including government.⁸ Here the pattern is one of very moderate financial reward, much less than in business and comparable to many professional levels. On the other hand, such positions generally contain elements of security which the business executive does not enjoy. This security is either explicitly recognized by the organization itself, or—as in

⁸Elective office is, however, too special a case to be considered here; it is not technically "employment."

the case of "policy" level political appointees—is provided by the cushion of the party's indebtedness to them, if not through tangible recognition of this indebtedness.

These two types of practice for administrative personnel—for the business executive and for the government executive—may be considered alternative reactions to the assumption of *responsibility* in the sense discussed above and to the meaning of its assumption for those agencies on whose "behalf" it is done. The relevant agencies are usually not "customers" but the super-ordinate organization on the institutional level; i.e., a business executive is "responsible" in the most direct sense to his board.

In the case of the managerial executive of a business firm, I think that his high salary-bonus remuneration is not to be interpreted mainly in terms of the marginal productivity of his services, as many economists would argue, and much business ideology too. Nor is it primarily entrepreneurial profit, e.g., in Schumpeter's sense. It is rather the "wages of responsibility," the symbolic recognition of the importance of executive responsibilities. Since the success of the firm tends to be measured in terms of its "profits," it is *symbolically* appropriate for managerial responsibility to be remunerated in terms cognate with the measure of the firm's success. This is not, in the sense that economists have used this concept with reference to entrepreneurial profit, primarily a reward for "risk-taking," since it is fundamental to the structure of modern business that the typical executive does *not* risk his personal property. He takes responsibility in situations where other people risk their property, which is a very different thing.⁹

The executive in a non-profit organization, on the other hand, receives a different order of financial remuneration in the first instance because profit is not the primary measure of the success of his organization, be it governmental or private. On the contrary, money to finance the organization's operations has to be

⁹The aspect of executive remuneration I have just discussed cannot be the result of a sheer assertion of "power" on his part. There is a power factor in this as in all other cases of remuneration, but there is an institutionalized factor as well. Business executives as a group are far less organized than either operative employees or professional people; they are clearly neglecting an opportunity to assert their power.

"raised" in whole or in part. Hence it becomes a question of what remuneration, usually a salary, is "fair" in terms both of the resources of the organization and of the interests of the individual. (These interests include an adequate standard of living and status-dignity.) In this case there are other components of reward than the financial; recognition of service is in some sense a very important component. The non-profit executive is also likely to have some form of tenure.

In the society as a whole there is a delicate balance between these high-remuneration and low-remuneration sectors of the administrative class. I think it likely that in recent times the balance has tipped unduly in favor of the business group and that a readjustment is likely to come, indeed is already in process.

In the case of professional services, a convenient point of reference is the sliding scale which typically operates in the situation of individual fee-for-service practice. Here the practitioner can cover his total expenses and make a good living from professional fees. But his patients or clients pay by "capacity," not by the value of the service as if it were a commodity. I have noted above that professional service very generally (not, for example, for engineering) involves establishing a co-operative solidarity between performer and recipient. From this point of view, the fee is a "contribution" to the *joint* performance of the valued function.

When professional services are performed in the context of organization, the sliding scale principle does not disappear, but it is typically moved up either one or two organizational levels in the focus of its application. This is to say that recipients pay the *organization*, not the practitioner, on a sliding-scale principle. Thus in the case of college or university, though there are standard tuition fees, "needy" students are given scholarships, and well-to-do alumni are expected to contribute to the college in some sort of proportion to their resources. Or, where support is by taxation, a still "higher" organizational level is involved, in which case the assessments to support the organization are made on a "progressive" principle. But in this instance the service is a public responsibility independent of whether the individual taxpayer is or has been a recipient of the particular service.

The professional practitioner in an organization, however, typically works on salary. Salary levels, then, are typically those prevailing in non-profit organizations and are usually below executive salaries, but not too much. Special problems are raised by professional personnel employed in business firms; there clearly is a tendency to lift their remuneration levels up toward those of executives in the same organization. But with the exception of this and of certain elite private-practice groups, the level of remuneration for the professional practitioner is similar to that for the non-business category. Again, this suggests the importance of a non-financial component in the rewards of professional workers.¹⁰

Along with government employees, professional workers in organizations—notably teachers—provide the type case of the institution of tenure. I interpret this, above all, as a mechanism for protecting these workers from pressures by the administrative authority to which they are necessarily subject. This gives them some assurance of professional independence and integrity.

The marginal productivity model of economic theory and the "liberal" ideal of a contract of employment governed by simple mutual advantage of the moment ("freedom of contract" in one version) thus provide a convenient reference point. But this model is more nearly descriptive of an industrial than, say, of a feudal society. However, this pattern of employment is only approximated even for the operative employees in a business firm; as we go to other types of organization and to other types of occupational role that cut across organization types, we find increasing deviation from this pattern. It is a *limiting* type of employment contract, not a model type for the general occupational structure, even within an industrial society.

DISPOSAL AND PROCUREMENT AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

To complete this review of the principal set of factors that account for differences between types of formal organizations, we

¹⁰Some component of this kind must provide part of the explanation for the well-known findings of the North-Hatt study that professional occupations tend to outrank business in prestige in the community, with physicians ranked in the highest regular category of all. It also has something to do with the pressure by many marginal groups to secure recognition as "professionals."

need to examine further what happens at the "institutional" or "community" level. So far, I have dealt with this level mainly in its relation to the managerial level—particularly, I have noted how the institution or community provides legitimation and support to management and why management cannot secure this support through its relation with the recipients of its product—whether commodity or service—or through its relation with its sources of procurement. It should be clear that the importance of these legitimation and support functions mounts rapidly as we move from the case of the "pure" commodity to those categories of service which require a strategic, long-term relation of solidarity between performer and recipient.

It should also be clear that where financial resources must be "raised" in order to finance the function of the organization, the responsibility for this generally rests either at the institutional level or, as in the case of many tax-supported functions, at a still higher level in the organizational scale. In this respect, the administrative head of a non-profit organization (like a university) often has a key role in money-raising. However, a university president, like an industrial foreman or a non-commissioned officer in the military, occupies an interstitial position between two organizational system-levels. He is *both* the top executive of the managerial subsystem of the university *and* a member and representative of the trustees. In his role as money-raiser, he acts predominantly on behalf of the trustees, not as manager of the university.¹¹

An institutional system, however, has not only vertical relations to the managerial subsystem for which it takes some order of responsibility, but also lateral relations. It has a "product" to "sell," and it has procurement problems. Of course it also must be integrated with still higher levels of organization, of which just a word presently.

What order of "product" can an institutional organization be conceived to "sell" which is not already covered in the previous

¹¹Similarly, it is significant that most universities have a treasurer or chairman of the finance committee who clearly acts as a member of the governing board, and this office is clearly distinguished from that of the bursar or comptroller, who is an *administrative* officer at the managerial level.

discussion? The answer lies in the proper use of the concept of function at different levels in the structure of society as a system. The economist's typical commodity is a contribution to the functional needs of the consuming unit, which is typically though by no means exclusively the household. The same is true of the types of service which have been reviewed above. For example, education, especially elementary, and medical practice are, at the *technical* levels, services to the family household. This is why there is a "parent-teachers' association" but no teacher-prospective employers' association of comparable significance, and why the doctor who is treating an adult male may deal directly with the patient's wife but seldom, if ever, with his employer.

At the managerial level, I have argued that there is also a function, namely, contribution to the *generalized* capacity of the society to perform that category of function. For example, the economic process produces both commodities and wealth; the educational process, both character, knowledge, and skills of individuals, and generalized performance capacity at the societal level. However, the production, even of the generalized capacity to perform the relevant function effectively, does not settle the *position* of that function in the society, does not in itself determine the "public's" evaluation of it, nor the proportions of resources which are to be devoted to it in comparison with and hence in competition with other functions. It is in this sphere that the outputs or products of institutional organizations are to be found.

A striking example is the business corporation's policy on what proportion of income will be distributed in dividends and what proportion will be "ploughed back" into the company. This is a decision between two alternative uses of financial resources, consumption¹² or economic investment. In the classical theory of the corporation this was a decision made by the *owners* of the property rights in the business, but this position has become radically unrealistic. The decision has tended to become the responsibility of a *fiduciary* board who, to a degree, represent owners, but not simply in the sense of the owners' financial

¹²Consumption refers to any use of funds *other* than investment. Of course, the stockholders are free to invest their dividends in other lines of production, too.

"self-interest." (Similarly, the *institution* of property itself is not, as one ideological version would have it, a simple matter of protecting the right of an individual to "do what he will with his own.") Insofar as individual owners have ceased to be primary,¹³ these decisions have tended, in the "private" sector, to be shared between banks (and other fiduciary financial organizations) and producing corporations. But in the latter case it is above all at the board level that such decisions focus: they are not, in the sense of this paper, "managerial" prerogatives.

Cognate things can be said in the case of education. The teacher's role is primarily to educate in the *technical* sense. That of the school administration, i.e., the superintendent's office and the principal's, typically is to *organize* the educational process in the community, to make it, within the framework of community commitments to education, as effective as possible and thereby to contribute to the level of performance-capacity in the community. But the superintendent is not the focus for determining the community's commitments to education in relation to other competing demands on its total resources. In community terms this is a "political" problem. In organizational terms this problem focuses on the school board; in the case of the university, the trustees. In this context it is essential that the membership of such bodies should not consist predominantly of "professionals,"¹⁴ since their role is to *mediate* between the "professionals" and the more diffuse community. To constitute such boards principally of "professionals" would be to make the profession judge in its own case, a privilege which a pluralistic society obviously cannot grant as a general rule.

From this point of view, then, the primary "disposal" function of the institutional organization is to contribute to the *integration* of the higher-order system within which the function at the managerial level is placed. Its role is to mediate between the claims of this function on community resources and legitimation, and the exigencies of effective performance of the function on the "lower" levels. Of course, just as the university president is generally involved in financial responsibilities, so is the school super-

¹³They have usually represented *kinship* property interests.

¹⁴Here by "professionals" I mean persons with a full *occupational* commitment to the function, in this case, of education.

intendent involved in "politics," because he also occupies an interstitial status.¹⁵

On the procurement side, something has been said of the financial responsibilities of institutional organizations. The salience of this responsibility is a function of the failure of "automatic" market mechanisms to provide for the problem through generating adequate proceeds. But even the business corporation is not, as I just tried to show, a case of full "automatization" because decisions have to be made about the allocation of proceeds—presuming the firm is "in the black"—between further investment and consumption, and the investment decisions of the board hence are—in our sense—procurement decisions at the institutional level. On the other hand, where the financial question becomes too difficult, there is a tendency to shunt it to the next higher level of organization, as in the case of financing public education through taxation (but, it should be clearly noted, so far mainly through *local* taxation). In the middle is the case, typical of private non-profit organizations, where the proceeds, if any, are clearly inadequate to finance the essential services, and hence the responsibility for meeting the deficit rests squarely at the board or trustee level. The function here is essentially that of persuading those who control financial resources in the community that what the organization is doing is important enough to merit their financial support (this includes the self-persuasion of wealthy trustees¹⁶).

The prominence of the financial aspect of the procurement responsibilities of institutional organizations is in the first instance a result of the fact that money is the generalized facility par excellence. It is also particularly prominent in a society so heavily oriented to economic values and functions (properly understood) as the American is. But it is by no means the only relevant input at the institutional level. Perhaps second in im-

¹⁵See Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York: John Wiley, 1958).

¹⁶The number of dunning letters in the mail of persons who by no current standard could be considered wealthy is an index of the great importance of this factor in American society. There is almost as intensive a competition for the citizen's contributory dollar as there is, through advertising and other aspects of salesmanship, for his consumer's dollar.

portance in most cases is the factor of power, in a technical political sense which cannot be fully explained here. The essential point is the "subsumption" of organization goals under the more generalized goal-structure of the still higher-level social structure and therefore the explicit or implicit "authorization" to embark on the organizational activities in question and to "take them seriously" to the degree to which that is done. A very important aspect of what is sometimes called the struggle for power in a society consists in this competition for support and authorization among the many different organized interests of the society.

"Organized" here, as so often, has a double reference. One is to the organizations which have interests in their power position in the larger society. The other is to the ways and extent to which units with common interest in this sense have organized to promote their interests. I suggest two primary points about this situation. First, the unit of the *organization* of "interest groups" in the political sense is not the managerial system but the institutional system. The "board" must have the primary concern for the position of the *category* of organization for which it is responsible within the power system of the community as a whole. Second, the category of interest group is on quite a different level from that of economic interests; to identify them is the "Marxian fallacy." The Catholic church is an interest group par excellence, as is the National Association of Manufacturers. The point is that there is a problem of allocating power to *all* significant organized units in the society, *whatever* their primary functional significance. The assertion and mediation of the claims of this interest necessarily focus at what I have called the institutional level.

What I have said about wealth and power applies equally to other societal resources. To give only one more illustration, what above I have called performance capacity is a resource which has to be allocated among different fundamental functions in the society. Given a high level of differentiation, perhaps one of the worst tendencies of organizational practice is for trustees or boards to attempt to control specific appointments in the organizations under their trusteeship. This function rests between the managerial and the technical aspects of organization. But trustees

must be concerned with the question of how far and under what conditions their organization (and, at the next level up, their type of organization) has access to the type and quantity of performance capacity which is essential for the proper functioning of the organization. To take a current example, the concern of university trustees with faculty salaries is not a simple "financial" problem. Discrepancy between salary levels in the academic profession and those in other occupations in competition with it—and the same goes for teachers—can be a serious threat to access to the essential capacities without which the fiduciary responsibilities in question cannot be discharged. It is therefore important to distinguish two levels of the financial responsibilities of institutional organizations. The first of these is the responsibility for adequate financial resources to perform the function of the organization. The second is the policy about the kind and amount of performance of capacity which, in the societal interest, *should* be made available for this function and hence the price, financially speaking, which *should* be paid for this performance capacity. For instance, thinking of university trustees only as "businessmen" interested in driving the best bargain they can in the labor market ignores the importance of the second financial responsibility. They cannot escape a responsibility for the *level* of faculty salaries as well as for the conservation of the university's necessarily inadequate funds.

It is directly in the logic of our whole analysis that the institutional organization, as well as the managerial and the technical, will necessarily have connections and interchanges "upward" as well as laterally and "downward." These "upward" connections fall above all in the area of legitimation and support. One context in which these problems have repeatedly come into the discussion here is where the function is treated as a "public" or political responsibility, most conspicuously, where the organization responsible is made an integral part of governmental structure itself. Here not only the responsibility but also, conversely, the claim to legitimation and support is sharply focused for the collectively organized segment of the society—i.e., from local to national levels of government. So long as the responsibility is accepted as a *public* responsibility, there is an obligation on government to "do justice" to the exigencies of discharg-

ing it effectively. From this case, there is a shading-off to the ideal type of the purely laissez-faire sectors of economic organization, where public responsibility is confined to protecting the freedom to produce for the market and reap the rewards, setting up the necessary regulatory system of legal rules, etc. This is clearly a limiting case and is really only approximated. But even here it is essential to note that this is a mode of organizing and institutionalizing societal responsibility for effective economic production. This case does not reflect the absence of any such responsibility. Else why should a President of the United States continually emphasize the duty of the government he heads to facilitate the functioning of a private-enterprise economy? The clear implication is that the welfare of the society, not just of individual businessmen or firms, is thought to be dependent on this system.

THE VARIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL TYPES

Co-ordinate with the heavy emphasis on the unbroken continuity of "line" authority which I noted at the beginning of this chapter, there has been a tendency to think of "bureaucracy" as a kind of monolithic entity which can vary in degree of development but not significantly in type. A major purpose of the present discussion has been to question this assumption and to help lay the basis for a more sophisticated analysis of the variation we find in types of formal organizations and in the factors on which these variations depend. All the essential considerations I have in mind—at the present stage of development in my knowledge of the field—have already been brought up. However, it may be useful to try to pull some of these together in summary fashion.

Perhaps the appropriate type of organization will be determined by the type of function the organization performs in the system of which it is a part. But though true, this formula by itself is wholly inadequate, for it fails to discriminate the various levels of differentiation from subsystem to subsystem which inevitably exist in a complex society. What is by a conventional designation, like "economic" or "educational," the "same" function does not lead to the same type of organization at all levels. This is obvious—no one would seriously suggest that the United

States Office of Education can be treated as if it were a classroom, though both this office and a classroom have educational functions—but the point is often overlooked. My distinction between technical, managerial, and institutional levels of formal organization has been designed to help make discriminations of this order in a useful fashion. I have argued that there are important uniformities which are primarily a function of the *level* at which the organization or suborganization operates but which are independent of the functional *content* of the organization at any level. In general, the theory of bureaucracy has concentrated at the managerial level and has emphasized the uniformities most appropriate to it, across the board.

Another equally important and independent set of considerations, however, are those which differentiate organizations according to their functional type. In a sense, the most obvious of these concern the technical functions themselves and the exigencies to which they are subject. But these considerations are so various that there is a great temptation to jump to the managerial level and talk as if the imperatives of good organization—whatever the function in technical terms—are always the same. I hope I have adequately indicated that this is not true; a good organization for the physical production of goods at the technical level would inevitably be a bad one for the educational process.

I have then attempted to show that organizations at all these levels are subject not only to technical exigencies but to those of disposal and procurement at each level and that these exigencies—even at the same level—are sources of profoundly significant differences in organizational type. Thus I think it safe to say that no organization dependent on highly trained professional personnel can employ them typically on the basis of a marginal-productivity, terminable-at-will contract of employment. Or, on the other side, the organization which produces commodities for a market must be very different in structure from the residential college which takes its “customers” into a special type of membership status.

Next, I have emphasized the relative independence of the three level-types of organization, an independence that constitutes my main objection to the continuous line-authority picture of formal organization. This relative independence means that

there is, at each linkage point, a range of possible *different* types of articulation. Thus the professional personnel of military organizations are much more rigidly subjected to line authority than are those with the same professional qualifications in, let us say, the professional faculty of a university. There are limits to how far the military can press its professional personnel into the line pattern, but it does not follow that the university pattern is the only possible one. Similar considerations hold at the articulation point between managerial and institutional systems. An important special case of this problem is the very top of the three-stage hierarchy with which I have been working, namely, the articulation of the institutional system with the still wider society.

This is not the place to attempt a classification of types of formal organizations. If such were to be attempted, however, it would be necessary to build into it many of the distinctions that I have reviewed and illustrated here. Even within the same society—to say nothing about a comparative perspective—the range would be wide and the significantly different types numerous. Only along such a path as this, however, can even the structural aspect of a theory of organization reach a modicum of scientific maturity. And a sophisticated understanding of the range of structural variation is essential to any high-level attempt at analyzing the dynamic processes that take place within organizations.

I do not mean this last note to be one of discouragement. Much fine work has been done in this field. But as Thompson¹⁷ has indicated, its range has been rather severely limited. There are many insights which social scientists have developed in this field which can be highly useful to the practical administrator here and now. But the field is one of immense complexity at the scientific level and is only at the beginning of its scientific development. An immense amount of work will be required before we can have anything that deserves to be called a theory of formal organization. We have, however, made some very important beginnings. For administrators, the great importance of social science theory lies in the future, when these beginnings will have grown into a mature science.

¹⁷See chapter ii of this book.

CHAPTER IV

A Theoretical Framework for the Study of Behavior in Organizations

CARROLL L. SHARTLE

In the study of administrative behavior it seems important to consider the environmental setting in which the administrator works as well as his personal performance. Thus, this paper outlines a framework for the study of human behavior in organizations. It includes variables which may have their origins in several disciplines, including engineering and physiology on the one hand and social science and the humanities on the other.

The reason for the breadth of the framework is the author's point of view that organizational and individual behavior can be better understood and more reliably predicted when promising concepts, variables, and methodology are drawn from several disciplines rather than from a single science. Human behavior is so complicated and the human being reacts with such a great number of environmental conditions that concepts and variables selected from a narrower band would have less significance.

This chapter grew out of a series of seminars, over a two-year period, at the Ohio State University. The seminars reviewed many of the concepts and findings of the Ohio State Leadership Studies, which covered a ten-year period. Leader behavior and group behavior were studied in military, business, and educational organizations, and the results have been reported in a number of monographs and other publications.¹ Most of the studies were concerned with *describing* individual and organizational behavior rather than with *evaluating* it; the principal

¹A list is available from the author upon request.

disciplines involved were economics, psychology, and sociology. In general, the studies followed a paradigm developed by the interdisciplinary group, a paradigm in which leader behavior was the central factor.

A word of explanation should be given concerning the interdisciplinary aspects of the present statement. In an earlier form it was read by and discussed with representatives from several disciplines. This chapter itself, however, is not a joint endeavor; it was prepared by one author. While there is agreement among two or more persons about most points, the material has not been developed to represent a consensus; it does, however, have certain characteristics which reflect its interdisciplinary aspects.

1. This statement is open-ended to the extent that in pursuing research it can be altered as concepts and methods are added, revised, or deleted. In the Leadership Studies, for example, the paradigm was revised in the last monograph to show the changes that had occurred during the ten-year period.²

2. The statement is "thinner" and "broader" than one reflecting a single discipline. It has a framework character rather than one of theory. Details can come later as investigators undertake various phases, and many concepts are omitted which will later emerge.

3. It is written in less technical language than most theoretical statements. This is necessary to enhance communication not only among those who have offered suggestions but likewise for persons who have not seen the material and later may join in a project.

4. There is little, if anything, new in it from the standpoint of any one discipline. A sociologist, for example, will probably see nothing startling or new from sociology although some other aspects may be new.

ENERGY CHANGE, EVENTS, AND BEHAVIOR

In order to explore human behavior from a wider perspective,

²The original paradigm is found in Richard T. Morris and Melvin Seeman, "The Problem of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVI (1950), 149-55. For the revision ten years later, see Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (eds.), *Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement* (Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, The Ohio State University, 1957), p. 3.

it is necessary to have a certain commonality in regard to what is being studied. We shall use energy change as the basic activity that is being considered. Energy change in many situations can be perceived, it can be described, and it can be recorded. Furthermore, even though it is not perceived, described, or recorded, it can be inferred as having occurred or not occurred, or it can be predicted as something that will or will not occur.

Energy change has wide applicability for both theory and empirical research. Kinetic energy, potential energy, and entropy concepts may be used. Miller³ in his theory develops system levels of the cell, organ, individual, group, and society.

Energy changes can be counted, and their extent and frequency can be estimated and measured in accordance with various standards. Energy changes are also called events. When the events are concerned with human beings, they may be called acts. Acts singly (or in multiple) are human performance or behavior. Organizations such as a school also can be described as acts, performance, and behavior. In this chapter an organization is considered as an arrangement of related functions in which persons perform tasks that contribute to one or more common objectives.

In studying the behavior of persons in organizations, events with various reference points are considered. These include (1) individual behavior (acts of a particular person, such as an administrator); (2) organizational behavior (events occurring within the organization); (3) environmental events (events outside the organization, such as those that occur in the community); and (4) interactions of 1, 2, and 3.

No clear and absolute differentiation can be made among these three categories of events; however, it is possible to deal more specifically with one category than with another. For example, the behavior of one person can be studied, but such behavior has a past or present relationship to events in an organization and outside of it. Likewise, events within or without organizations involve acts by individual persons. Also, an observed event is not an energy change in isolation but an observed instance in a complex of many other events.

³James G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for Behavioral Sciences," *American Psychologist*, X (1955), 513-31.

Figure 1 illustrates these relationships. The individual, for example, person I_1 among persons $I_2 \dots n$, performs in an organization A . He interacts with events within this organization. He also interacts with events outside the organization which also represent the environment of the organization. This environment B might be a community, for example. A larger environment C could be the state; D could represent the nation; and E , outside the nation. Events in A , B , C , D , and E can have an effect on I_1 . In attempting to predict the behavior of I_1 in A , it would seem advisable to include events of probable significance in B , C , D , and E . For example, in predicting whether or not I_1 will remain




FIG. 1.—The relation between the individual and several environments.

a member of organization A for a specified period of time, events in B , C , or D may be as significant as events in A .

A rise in living costs or new opportunities for employment in B , C , or E may be important events in such a prediction. Yet in attempting to predict the behavior of persons in an organization, we often exclude such events. Furthermore, we may attempt to predict events in B , C , or D and fail because events within one

or more of the other environmental areas were not included. For example, in 1949 the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicated that "... so many [engineers] will be graduated in the next few years that many graduates will be unable to get engineering jobs."⁴ Within a few months, and since that date, quite the reverse has been true.

ACTS

Human behavior, as mentioned earlier, can be described in terms of energy changes called acts. Acts may be described orally or in writing; they may be photographed, predicted, recorded, measured, and evaluated. An act may be the reporting on another act. This is called a reported act. Two or more persons may state having seen John Jones enter a specific room at ten o'clock in the morning. Such a reported act (from the standpoint of the reporter) is called a fact. It is simply relating the occurrence of an act or event. In this instance the person, the location, and the time were given.

Whether or not an event occurred is frequently unclear. One person may report that it did occur; another may state that it did not. There are also problems of perception and language involved in reporting an event. The same event may be described differently by various observers, and instruments used in recording an event may show variations.

An act which is an evaluation of another act, a series of acts, or of an object may be called a value act. A person may perform value acts in written or oral form, such as in a questionnaire or an interview. He may report his evaluations in such personal criterion terms as good, poor, worthwhile, beautiful, correct, approved, or disapproved. An observer may infer the value acts of a person by observing him directly or by studying his recorded acts. Thus, an observer may report that individual I_1 places a high value on hard work for its own sake or that he thinks that working for a large organization is better than working for a small one.

⁴"Employment Outlook for Engineers," Wall Chart No. 10 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, 1949).

Value acts can be classified according to various scientific concepts. Groups of value acts may be scaled and called value dimensions. A combination of value dimensions is called a pattern. An individual, such as an administrator, may be described in terms of his value pattern, and an organization, a nation, or a culture can also be described quantitatively in terms of value patterns. The recent studies of Morris and Jones⁵ and of Carter⁶ are illustrations.

An attitude is a value act. However, for this chapter, the terms "value dimension" and "value pattern" are used to represent the more stable responses whereas an attitude is considered as being at the less stable end of the reliability continuum.

The subject matter areas for the study and classification of both reported acts and value acts are varied. They include:

1. *Historical*.—Acts may be noted or inferred in a time setting from documents and other data. They may be classified, and they may be studied as hypothetical dimensions and patterns. Their derivations can be analyzed and their development related to other events and to concepts. (The "frontier hypothesis" as an explanation of American values is an example.) Methods of content analysis have also been developed.⁷

2. *Socioeconomic*.—Acts may be described and grouped within the framework of sociological concepts, economic theory, class structure, stratification, utility theory, culture, group dimensions, organizational behavior, and the like. Kluckhohn,⁸ for example, uses a social action theory and presents several dimensions of values including content, intent, generality, intensity, explicitness, and extent. Hyman⁹ mentions class differences in

⁵Charles Morris and Lyle V. Jones, "Value Scales and Dimensions," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LI (1955), 523-35.

⁶Ralph E. Carter, Jr., "An Experiment in Value Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (1951), 156-63.

⁷Ralph K. White, *Value-Analysis: The Nature and Use of the Method* (New York: Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1951).

⁸Clyde Kluckhohn et al., "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in *Toward a General Theory of Action*, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).

⁹Herbert H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes: A Social Psychological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," in *Class, Status, and Power*, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953).

values, and Boulding¹⁰ uses values in his theory of "eiconics."

3. *Psychological*.—Acts may be described and classified in terms of psychological concepts, such as ability, aptitude, interests, needs, personality, self, learning, leadership, goals, and motivation. There are many studies in this area. Dimensions of ability, aptitude, interests, and personality have been developed empirically. The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey study of values has been related to interests¹¹ and to perception.¹²

ACTS AS PREDICTORS

Persons show individual differences in behavior in organizations, and we assume that part of individual behavior can be accounted for by the more stable or more repetitious events that occur in the organization. For example, if the organization performs in a highly structured fashion, one would assume that, other things being equal, a person would perform in a fashion to conform to this organizational characteristic. It is also known that individual performance patterns exist.¹³ Work habits are formed which tend to be repeated. Thus, there is some stability in both organizational behavior and individual behavior.

The Situation

The difficulty in prediction comes, however, when the situation changes. No two days, no two problems, and no two issues are exactly alike. Events are continually occurring which change the picture and throw off the prediction. It is therefore necessary to study, describe, and classify various situations and to develop a rationale that will include these new or changed situations.

¹⁰Kenneth Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

¹¹Jacob W. Getzels and Egon G. Guba, "Interests and Value Patterns of Air Force Officers," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, XVI (1956), 465-70. See also Theodore R. Sarbin and Ralph F. Berdie, "Relation of Measured Interests to the Allport-Vernon Study of Values," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, XXIV (1940), 287-96.

¹²Leo Postman, Jerome S. Bruner, and Elliott M. McGinnies, "Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLIII (1948), 142-54.

¹³Ralph M. Stogdill *et al.*, *Patterns of Administrative Performance* (Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1956).

A situation may be defined as a complex of events occurring at any time. The events are thus components of the situation. No two situations are exactly alike; two persons placed in the same physical environment—say, an office—may agree on certain events that form the situation and disagree on others. An observer may present a third picture, describing the situation that both persons are in. In predicting the behavior of a person, we may find that certain events are useful as independent variables, while others have no significance for prediction. Situations can be described and studied as dependent variables. The events which form them can be classified, and the dimensions of situations can be developed. These may be shown in patterns and treated quantitatively in research.

Value Patterns

One may assume that an individual will tend to perform acts that he considers worthwhile or more worthwhile than other acts that he could perform at a given time. He acts within his framework of values and modifies his behavior in the light of the situation at hand. For example, an administrator may hold an American value that, other things being equal, bigness is a good and desirable thing. If asked whether he would like his personnel budget increased, he would gladly accept. However, in this instance the situation in the organization is such that to accept would probably create a serious morale problem in his division. He values the personal job satisfaction of his staff highly and turns down the offer to increase the size of his unit.

Other Measures

While it is assumed that value patterns and situational patterns are important in understanding and predicting behavior, it is likewise necessary to have measures of human skill, capacity, interest, and personality to aid in predicting the behavior of the individual person or the organization. Figure 2 illustrates the model for behavior prediction in organization structures. Some of the variables assigned to the dependent category can be assigned, in another context, to the independent variable category, for organizational performance at a stated time can also be




FIG. 2.—Illustrative variables in a model for predicting organizational behavior

used to predict subsequent changes in selected dependent variables.

This model may be described in symbolic terms. Let us assume that E_{it} represents the total events that are considered as independent variables at a given time. They are events that have hypothetical significance for understanding behavior and for predicting other events. Their total is one, and the various classifications of events can be treated as proportions of the total as follows:

$$E_{it} = E_{1t} + E_{2t} + E_{3t} + \cdots + E_{nt} = 1,$$

or

$$E_{1t} + E_{2t} + E_{3t} + \cdots + E_{nt} - 1 = 0.$$

The predicted events can also be construed as proportions of the total events represented as dependent variables:

$$E_{td} = E_{1d} + E_{2d} + E_{3d} + \cdots + E_{nd} = 1.$$

E_{1t} might, for example, represent a value pattern and E_{2t} the situational pattern. If an attempt is made to predict the behavior of one individual, the value pattern would be of that individual. The situational pattern might include the value patterns of other persons with whom the individual will react. By expressing variables as proportions, a wide variety of functional relationships can be developed.

E_{1d} might represent the description of the decision that is anticipated and E_{2d} the prediction of the superior's rating of the individual's competence. Both the decisions and the ratings of competence can be classified and described quantitatively. For example, decisions may be classified as correct or incorrect, or they may be grouped according to what objectives of the organization they are judged to favor.

In predicting organizational behavior E_{1t} might be the value pattern of the organization as represented by combined descriptions given by trained observers or by persons in the organization who are assumed to be well versed in its over-all operation. E_{2t}

could be the quantitative description of the situation confronting the organization; this would include events outside the organization as well as those inside (see Figure 1). Such events would be selected by trained observers who would then hypothesize about those events which they believed to be most significant for prediction. The dependent variables might include the decision made by the organization or a rating or measure of subsequent performance.

While predictions are difficult indeed, encouraging results in predicting the individual work performance of persons in non-supervisory roles in military and civilian organizations can be found. For persons in supervisory or administrative roles the evidence is slight. Stogdill and Shartle¹⁴ tried to predict the behavior of naval officers by studying the situations to which they were being transferred. Some of the predictions were significant. Attempts to predict organizational behavior—except in the case of laboratory studies—have seldom been successful.

VALUES

Now, let us return to a more specific discussion of values. In studying value acts in organizational behavior we may use a number of methods. It seems appropriate that the organization should provide the framework for measuring individual values. In this method the individual describes his ideal of organizational behavior. This method has the advantage of some degree of indirectness; it allows for the projection of personal values in a particular setting. Also, in the Ohio State Leadership Studies it appeared that there were fewer stereotyped responses in describing group behavior than in describing self-behavior or the behavior of other individuals.

Another advantage in using the organization as the frame of reference is that in this method the value patterns of organizations as well as those of the individuals can be indicated. Both the desired and the actual value pattern of the organization can be measured in terms of the responses of its members and of out-

¹⁴Ralph M. Stogdill *et al.*, *A Predictive Study of Administrative Work Patterns* (Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1956).

side observers. Also, a person may describe the ideal organization in which he might serve before he becomes affiliated with it. He may also describe what he would expect to find if he did join and later could describe the actual values of this organization as he perceived them. Thus a school system, a factory, or a city government could be described and compared with other organizations. In education we need to know the value patterns of other organizations as well as those of our own.

In studying the behavior of small groups, we may compare value patterns for the different members and make predictions concerning the behavior of each individual and of the group when confronted with a specific problem. Bipolar groups can be created and their behavior likewise studied. In one unpublished study at Ohio State, bipolar and unipolar groups were established on a single value scale. Predictions were made about the length of time it would take for the group members to reach consensus. A significant relationship was found between actual and predicted time. In decision-making the individual value patterns of participants can be arranged to form a part of the situational framework which should represent a significant factor in predicting the outcome.

In developing the measures for determining value patterns, a large number of statements describing organizational performance are being prepared. Source materials from several disciplines and data from industrial and military organizations are being used. Certain tentative dimensions of values have been considered. These are being restudied by the interdisciplinary project group and a revised list of dimensions will be hypothesized. We have tentatively posited several organizational value dimensions; these include:

1. *Size*.—It is hypothesized that a prevailing American value is that a bigger organization is a better one. Larger budgets are better than smaller ones, etc. However, it is likewise assumed that individuals vary and that a continuum in the form of a dimension can be developed.

2. *Achievement*.—It is better to accomplish, to get somewhere, to show progress.

3. *Rate*.—It is better to be fast than slow. To reach a decision in one hour is better than to do it in two hours.

4. *Quality*.—Higher quality is better than lower quality. It is better to give a high-quality service than a lower one. A school with higher standards is a better school.

5. *Effort*.—Effort for its own sake is good. It is good to try.

6. *Satisfaction*.—It is better to be happy than unhappy. The happy school is a better one. The play that ends happily is the better play.

7. *Efficiency*.—The more efficient organization is a better one.

8. *Security*.—It is better for an individual or an organization to be secure in its existence.

9. *Newness*.—New ideas and things are better than older ones. The newer office, for example, is the better one.

10. *Changefulness*.—Frequent changes are better than infrequent ones.

11. *Independence*.—It is better to be self-sufficient and independent than dependent. To be able to go it alone, if necessary, is good.

12. *Competition*.—It is good to compete against others.

These values have been expressed in positive terms, but we believe that with proper item construction and scaling, we can identify individual differences. The principal criterion in selecting a value as a dimension is its usefulness for predicting behavior.

Some of the specific items that we will include in our questionnaires are:

The organization expands at every opportunity.

The organization emphasizes high standards of work.

Keeping everyone happy is given more importance in the organization than almost anything else.

The organization will give a staff member a break even though it costs a lot of money.

The organization meets its objectives regardless of cost.

Getting things done quickly is strongly emphasized.

The organization stresses the importance of competition.

For describing an ideal organization, each item will be rated

according to a criterion of value. A pilot study will be made to determine this criterion so that a sufficient range of value judgments can be developed. One such criterion list that may be tried is: excellent thing to do; very good practice; no feeling about it; not a good thing to do; bad thing to do.

According to our present plans, we will compile a large number of short statements rather than a smaller number of longer ones—as was done by Morris and Jones. Items will be selected according to the value concepts proposed by representatives of several disciplines. Some items will fit more than one concept. Preliminary planning indicates that many of the items identified through a selection based upon social status or needs are the same as those identified through economic utility concepts. Initially, items will include all possible significant aspects of organizational behavior: goals and objectives, history, structure, plans, policies, procedures, practices, and work environment. We plan later to measure the values of groups according to age, educational level, cultural patterns, personality characteristics, and other classifications, and to use the value dimensions, along with other measures, for predicting individual and organizational behavior in a number of categories.

SITUATIONS

The development of the dimensions of situations is a difficult task, but there have been sufficient studies of organizations so that a large number of events can be listed and classified. The classifications can be used in describing a number of situations and the results can be analyzed to develop relatively unique dimensions. It is believed that this work should proceed simultaneously with the development of value dimensions. The two aspects should reinforce each other, and they should be coordinated to keep the concepts clear and to avoid possible overlap.

Situations include a wide range. An attempt will be made to cover future possible situations that may result from technological and social change. Developments in atomic energy and space travel are examples. Engineers working on new developments

have participated in some of these discussions on how situations may change in the future.

Situations present a challenging problem for theory and for empirical test. However, the term "situation" is often mentioned in the literature¹⁵ and is also used in day-to-day administration. In common dictionary usage "situation" means place, location, or site. Within the framework of this chapter the situation is a location in time and space, and it can be described in terms of objects and events which are assumed to be relevant for predicting the behavior of an organization or of one or more individuals in it. Situations may be described by the persons involved or by outside observers. Situations may be described in physical, psychological, and social terms. Let us examine several possible components of situations.

1. *Distance*.—What is the physical distance of *I* (the person whose behavior is being predicted) from the problem that will be acted upon? Is it a problem, for example, in his own office or one in a distant office? It is hypothesized that a decision given by *I*, involving a problem far away, will result in less consideration for the persons concerned than similar decisions in which the members involved are close at hand.

2. *Duration*.—How long has *I* been in this described situation, and how long has the situation lasted, whether *I* has been in it or not?

3. *Frequency*.—How many times has *I* been in this or similar situations, and how many times has this same situation occurred in this organizational setting, whether *I* has been a part of it or not?

4. *Social Structure*.—How structured, in terms of group dimensions, is the situation in which *I* finds himself? It is hypothesized that a person whose value pattern is low on structure will have shorter tenure in highly structured situations than in less structured ones.

5. *Status*.—How high in status is the individual in the setting in which he will perform? Higher status may result in greater

¹⁵For a recent discussion, see Roald F. Campbell, "Situational Factors in Educational Administration," in *Administrative Behavior in Education*, ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

personal independence of action in performance and this action will be in closer accord with the individual's personal value pattern.

6. *Leadership Climate*.—What are the dimensions of leadership climate (as described by an observer or by superiors) in which performance takes place? It is hypothesized that in a climate high in a particular dimension—initiating structure, for example—performance is more likely to be high than low on that dimension.

7. *Value Climate*.—What is the prevailing value climate in the situation? It is probable that the behavior of an individual will tend to show positive relationship with the dominant group patterns for the setting in which his performance takes place.

8. *Supply-Demand Ratio in the Occupational Field*.—It is hypothesized that a low supply-demand ratio in the occupational area of which the individual is a member will be associated with decisions that are more likely to favor the individual than the organization.

9. *Threat*.—How threatening is the situation (as rated by an observer) to the person or the organization whose performance is being predicted? It is hypothesized that in situations that are of considerable threat, performance is more likely to minimize the threat.

These examples represent a very incomplete list of possibilities. Within each tentative dimension, relevant statements of specific behavior will be prepared. These will be tried out later in "live situations" to determine empirically the uniqueness of the measures and their power for reliably discriminating among various situations. We will revise these techniques and improve the measures so that we can use them later in prediction studies.

CHAPTER V

Administration as Problem-solving¹

JOHN K. HEMPHILL

In this chapter we shall outline a theory of administrative leadership in a framework of group problem-solving. The theory is limited in its range and is intended primarily to account for acts of leadership occurring within face-to-face groups, associations, or organizations. Because of its limited range, this approach does not consider many facets of the total administration problem, nor is it particularly oriented toward educational administration. However, it is suggested that leadership and group problem-solving are central concerns of administration. We will focus attention upon acts that we shall identify as *leadership acts* and upon the behavior, attitudes, and expectations of the members of groups. We shall begin by defining several key theoretical concepts. Once these key concepts have been introduced, we shall discuss certain relationships between them and shall identify the pertinent key processes in which these concepts are involved. Finally, we shall examine the interplay between leadership acts and several salient characteristics of groups.

KEY CONCEPTS

The Problem Concept

A problem is here defined as a state of affairs that is perceived with dissatisfaction. An individual is said to have a problem if

¹An earlier version of this paper, "A Proposed Theory of Leadership in Small Groups," appeared as Appendix A, in John K. Hemphill *et al.*, *Leadership Acts: I. An Investigation of the Relation between Possession of Task Relevant Information and Attempts to Lead* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Research Foundation, The Ohio State University, 1954). This research was conducted under contract with the Office of Naval Research, to which acknowledgment is made for permission to publish here the present revised form of the paper.

he is part of a situation in which there is a state of affairs which he views with dissatisfaction. Problem solution is the process by which such a state of affairs becomes one viewed as satisfying. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction (or the continuous variable, degree of satisfaction) may be given meaning by verbal reports of individuals and by inferences from specific observations of physical expressions or other behavior. It is the *perception* of the state of affairs as dissatisfying that determines whether or not it is to be classified as a problem. A state of affairs that an outside observer would consider obviously painful might, under certain conditions, be satisfying rather than dissatisfying to the participant and hence not constitute a problem situation for him.

Two major classes of problem situations may be distinguished. First are problems which involve the characteristics of the non-person environment. The second class of problems involves the person environment. The distinction between these two categories of problems is made on the basis of whether the dissatisfying state of affairs can become a satisfying one with or without the involvement of a second person. The first class of problems, called individual problems, can be solved without involving other individuals. The second class, called social problems, must involve one or more other individuals in the process of solution.

The general class of social problems may be subdivided by separating from other social problems a highly significant class: mutual problems. A mutual problem is a state of affairs existing within a situation of which two or more individuals are a part, each of whom perceives it as dissatisfying, and which requires some behavior on the part of the other if either (any) is to be satisfied.

Examples may help to clarify how we distinguish classes of problems. A man who has misplaced his cigarette lighter and is busily searching his pockets to locate it would have an individual problem. No other person is involved in this situation. A mutual problem would exist in the situation of two furniture movers loading a piano into a van, a task which requires the concerted action of both men in order that it can be accomplished. A social problem, but one not meeting the specifications of a mutual problem, would be illustrated by the situation in which a salesman

approaches a stranger who he hopes may become his customer. The salesman's problem involves the behavior of the stranger (i.e., to satisfy the salesman the stranger must eventually act favorably by buying the salesman's product), but at the time of the approach the stranger may not be dissatisfied (as would be required by the definition of a mutual problem) in not having in his possession the salesman's product. Of course, this sales situation may later become a mutual problem in which both the salesman and the potential customer are definitely involved.

This classification of problems is based on analytical distinctions. Although the categories are analytically exclusive, it does not follow that exclusive or pure "types" of problem situation are common in everyday life. Most examples of problems drawn from everyday experience will be mixtures of these different classes of problems.

It is important to distinguish clearly between the general class, social problem, and the subclass, mutual problem. Failure to differentiate these two concepts will result in confusion throughout the remaining discussion. A mutual problem is always also a social problem, but a social problem need not be a mutual problem. A mutual problem is distinguished from all other social problems in that both (all) individuals are dissatisfied with at least some part of the same state of affairs and both (all) must become involved if satisfaction is to be achieved, i.e., if the problem is to be solved.² It is important that we recognize certain conditions that are not implied as necessary by these two stipulations. It is not necessary that the individuals involved be dissatisfied about the same things. They need not share a common goal (although they may—in which case it can be said that they have a common problem). In fact, individuals are frequently dissatisfied with different parts of the same state of affairs or with the same parts but in different ways.

Let us look at an example of a mutual problem which does not involve a shared goal. After ten minutes of play, two excellent Ping-pong enthusiasts have each accumulated a score of

²These criteria have been used to distinguish "monadic" and "diadic" units of behavior. See Robert A. Sears, "A Theoretical Framework for Personality and Social Behavior," *American Psychologist*, VI (1951), 476-83.

twenty. They have a mutual problem because continuation of the game, which involves both of them, is required before either can be satisfied by winning. They do not share a common goal, however, inasmuch as a win on the part of one excludes a win by the other. Because of the importance of understanding what is meant by a mutual problem, the specific nature of this required area of behavior will be examined in some detail.

The most distinctive characteristic of a task or required behavior associated with a mutual problem is that its accomplishment lies outside the capabilities of a single individual. This characteristic may be a function of the relative complexity of the task, of requirements that impose physical demands beyond the scope of a single individual, or of the separation of task components in time or space. As a direct consequence of these properties of the task entailed by a mutual problem, the component parts are perceived as interlocked (or as Deutsch describes them, "are promotively interdependent"³). *The component parts of the task are seen to be dependently related to one another and to the solution of the mutual problem.* The behavior of the parties involved in such a task must be coordinated in a manner determined in part by the character of the interlocking component parts of the task. Co-ordination of the acts of the parties to a mutual problem is required for its solution.

The Concept of Interaction⁴

A concept of interaction plays a central part in most theories of group behavior. Since this concept has had a number of different definitions it is important that we be explicit about how we use it. Interaction suggests the prior concept of action. Action, in turn, implies concern with the act. Action may be regarded as referring to a process in which the unit act is the element of analysis. We must therefore first specify what is to be meant by the term "act."

An act is a sequence of behavior that occurs in the following three phases: the formulation of an intention, i.e., the recognition

³Morton Deutsch, "A Theory of Cooperation and Competition," *Human Relations*, II (1949), 129-52.

⁴The author worked directly with Dr. Harold Garfinkel, now at the University of California at Los Angeles, in developing this section.

Change in the environment

PHASES OF THE LARGER ACT




FIG. 3.—Phases of the larger act

of a state of affairs to be realized; an operation governed by the intention; and a comparison of the intended with the realized state of affairs (a monitoring process). The sequence of behavior to be designated as a unit act is bounded at the start by the formulation of an intention and at the end by a comparison of the two states of affairs (see Figure 3). Acts may extend over any conceivable time period and may represent any degree of complexity. One act may in itself include various subacts that occur within its operation phase.

The definition that has been given the concept of an act does not restrict the use of the term to small units of behavior. Behavior of an individual that is governed by his intention to "lead a Christian life" would constitute the operation phase of a single act, even though it extended over a period of sixty years. Units of action such as "building a home," "learning a trade," "going fishing," "throwing a dart," "pressing a button," or "moving a finger" all identify unit acts, provided there is an intention to govern a relevant sequence of behavior.

Two major points need elaboration. First, we must describe in greater detail each of three phases: intention, operation, and monitoring or comparison. Second, we must concern ourselves with how action is organized. An intention may be defined as a state of affairs to be realized at some future time. An intention may not be known directly by an outside observer. However, the observer may infer the presence of an intention, either from analysis of an introspective report or from observation of the operation phases of an act. It is not necessary to elaborate upon the way in which introspective reports can provide a basis for the inference of intention. Most directly, the observer can simply ask the actor, "What did you intend to do?" It is not equally obvious, however, that an analysis of behavior can lead to an inference of intention. Here we must show that the details of the operation phase of an act can be explained by the inference of a specific intention (e.g., "Reasoning from what I have observed, he—the actor—must have had such an intention").

An operation may be defined as a set of specific behaviors that change a specified state of affairs into a different state of affairs. Behavior, in turn, is defined as any change in an object

or organism with respect to its environment.⁵ The monitoring or comparison phase of an act involves the perception of discrepancies between a state of affairs that was to have been realized at some future time and the realized state of affairs at the time the comparison is made. These perceived discrepancies become information that can influence subsequent acts. An individual behaving in accordance with the definition of an act may be designated as an actor. The process of behaving in the manner specified by the definition of an act may be designated as action. Let us now consider the problem of how action is organized.

One characteristic of the organization of action is that acts frequently are composed of subacts. The operation phase of a "large" act may be described by a sequence of "small" acts. The intention phase of each of these subacts is directly influenced by the intention associated with the larger act. From the point of view of the actor, discrepancies noted between the realized and the projected state of affairs at any given time during the operation phase of an act can be fed back to the ongoing operation (through modifying the intentions associated with such acts); the actor can thus govern the sequence of his behavior. The organization of action is shown in Figure 3. The size of a unit act does not refer to its extension over time but rather to its position in the organization of action. One unit act is said to be smaller than a second only in that it is a part of the operation phase of the second act.

This paradigm makes provision for the continuity in action. Discrepancy information derived from the monitoring phase of an act is available for feedback to the intention phase of the following act. The actor uses this feedback information (in the form of discrepancies noted during the monitoring phase of a completed act) in formulating his projection of the state of affairs to be realized next (the intention phase of an act that is about to begin); in this way the actor relates the past to the future. The paradigm also allows for the influence of perceived environmental changes on the formation of intentions. The organization of action does not constitute a closed system but is

⁵This definition has been taken from Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Weiner, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology," *Philosophy of Science*, X (January, 1943), 18-24.

one in which the actor shapes his intentions by collating his experiences (the results of monitoring) with perceived environmental changes.

A single individual is said to be acting when he engages in operations monitored by reference to intention. If the intentions involved in the actor's actions are independent of those of other individuals, the actor may be said to be acting independently. But if his intentions depend upon the action or expectations of the action of another, and vice versa, the two individuals are in interaction. The action of the other need not be anticipated accurately in order that this anticipation affect or influence the actor's intention. The important consideration is that the state of affairs to be realized by each of the two actors must take into account the acts or expectations of acts of the other. Interaction is defined as a series of reciprocal acts involving at least two persons, where the intentions governing the acts of one are dependent upon acts, or expectations of the acts, of the other. A single act by a lone individual, even one greatly influenced by the expected behavior of others, cannot be classified as interaction. It is necessary that the parties to the series of acts be reciprocally influenced in forming the intentions which govern the operation phases of their action. The two key concepts of the theory which are discussed in the next two sections are properties of those series of acts in which interaction takes place.

Structure

Structure is used here in combination with the concept of interaction. The combination concept "structure-in-interaction" is defined as a consistency in behavior occurring during interaction that permits the prediction of the behavior that will occur in future interaction. The concept of structure-in-interaction entails prediction. Consistency of behavior occurring as part of interaction is implied by predictability. It is not necessary for the existence of structure-in-interaction that the prediction be made by a party to the interaction. An outside observer can be aware of consistent behavior occurring during the interaction that has not been perceived by the parties to the interaction. A number of important problems concerning the conditions and determinants of the perception of structure-in-interaction can

be investigated by noting the discrepancies between those consistencies perceived by outside observers and those perceived by the interacting parties, or between those perceived by the several interacting parties.

Special significance may be attached to those structures-in-interaction perceived by interacting parties. A prediction made by a party to an interaction may be based on a perceived consistency in the behavior of another. This prediction may involve an expectation that the other will continue to behave in the consistent manner noted and may prompt acts on the part of the actor that anticipate the predicted behavior of the other. These anticipatory acts may in turn furnish the basis for perceiving new consistencies in interaction on the part of the other, thus influencing through reciprocation the course of subsequent interactions. Because of the outside observer's relation to the interaction he observes, the structures-in-interaction he perceives may be unnoticed by the interacting parties and may be unrelated to the course of subsequent interaction. It should be noted, however, that interaction per se is not dependent upon the perception of consistency in behavior. An individual's intentions can be influenced by *any* expectation he has about the action of the other person with whom he is interacting.

Differentiation of Structure-in-Interaction

Differentiation is used here in conjunction with the concept of structure-in-interaction to form the concept "differentiation of structure-in-interaction." A "differentiation of structure-in-interaction" exists whenever the observed structures-in-interaction are distinguished by different predictions concerning future interactions. A consistency that would apply to each individual party to the interaction, in the same way, at all times, in all situations, etc., would meet conditions defining structure-in-interaction. A prediction made at one time would hold for all other times. However, whenever the observed structure-in-interaction is defined by a different prediction about future interaction from that which defines other structures-in-interaction, we recognize a "differentiation of structure-in-interaction." Differentiation is a process of perceiving which involves classification of experiences with respect to "sameness" and "differ-

ences." There are as many bases for making differentiations as the individual who perceives has the ability or ingenuity to recognize.

Although the points of reference (bases) for differentiation of structure-in-interaction are legion, not all are of equal significance. In many respects the determination of the principal points of reference for the differentiation of structure-in-interaction will rest on the results of empirical investigation. The question of what point or points of reference are used by an individual in interaction as the bases for his differential predictions about the future interaction of others can be approached empirically.⁶

Leadership Acts

Leadership has been defined in numerous ways.⁷ The definition proposed here derives its value primarily from its relation to the body of theory being developed. In some respects it is more comprehensive than other more usual definitions; in others it is more restricted.

To lead is to engage in an act that initiates a structure-in-interaction as part of the process of solving a mutual problem. Leadership acts do not include various acts of influence that occur outside mutual problem-solving. Also, a leadership act depends not upon the intent of one person to influence others but upon the demonstration of a relation between the act and

⁶The writer is indebted to Professor George A. Kelly for the general ideas expressed here on how the individual may construct his environment. See Kelly, *The Psychology of Personal Constructs* (New York: Norton, 1955).

⁷Leadership (or leader) has been defined, for example, as: "An individual who is moving in a particular direction and who succeeds in inducing others to follow him" (William H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, XXIII [1928], 144-57); "leadership is a process of mutual stimulation which, by successful interplay of relevant differences, controls human energy in the pursuit of a common cause" (Paul J. W. Pigors, *Leadership and Domination* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1935]); "... viewed in relation to the individual, leadership is not an attribute of the personality but a quality of his role within a particular or specified social system. Viewed in relation to his group, leadership is a quality of its structure" (Cecil A. Gibb, "The Research Background of an Interaction Theory of Leadership," *Australian Journal of Psychology*, XXVIII [1950], 19-42).

subsequent consistency in interaction. Acts that are governed by an intent to initiate structure-in-interaction (they need not produce the intended result) are called *attempted* leadership acts. Leadership acts may be engaged in by any party to a mutual problem. It is only when an individual is differentiated from others by the fact that he engages in leadership acts that we identify him as a leader.

Before turning to the analysis of the function of the leadership act in the solution of mutual problems and to various ramifications of this analysis, we must complete the introduction of the key concepts. The concept of group remains to be discussed.

The Group

The concept of interaction as defined earlier permits the analysis of action involved in the relationships between small numbers of actors. We have described how an actor in interaction draws inferences from his observations of the behavior of the other individual(s) and is influenced by these inferences when he forms intentions. Whenever an actor orients himself to the action of more than a very few other persons, it is not possible to account for his behavior by an analysis of the manner in which the action of each of the others influences his own intentions. There is reason to believe that a concept of "group" needs to be introduced to account for the large portion of action that derives from the relationship between an actor and a larger number of other actors.

Like leadership, the concept of a social group has had many different definitions. We shall use the term "group" in a general way to refer to either of two specific concepts. First, by a group we mean a set of persons who are engaged in mutual problem-solving. We shall also use the term "group" when referring to a set of attitudes that characterize a set of persons engaged in mutual problem-solving. The term "group" can have either referent: a set of persons or a set of attitudes.

Most frequently, when we refer to a group, we refer both to the set of attitudes and to a corresponding set of persons. Thus, the Yankees are a number of persons who play baseball but

also a set of attitudes that are associated with these players (irrespective of changing identity from year to year).

An actor's perception of a group may influence his intentions and, of course, his future behavior. Also, an actor's behavior may influence the characteristics of the group, especially (but not only) when he is a member of the group. Acts of the group members are not interpreted solely as attributes of these individuals but in part as characteristic of their group. It is not essential to the process of implying group characteristics that some behavior of all members of the group be observed. The characteristics of a group may be abstractions from the attributes and behavior of a limited number of members of the group.

The actor's relationship to a group need not be analyzed by resorting to a laborious least-squares solution of a multitude of functional equations which specify the influence of each group member upon the actor's interaction; the relationship can be analyzed directly by determining the actor's perception of the group to which he belongs. One or more members may be said to "represent" the other group members. Interaction of members of groups of sizes larger than those in which face-to-face interactions are possible is mediated through interaction with individuals who are perceived as representatives of the group. The "acts" of such an agent in interaction are impersonal in that they represent not his own intentions but those of the members of the group.

An individual may interact as a member of an indefinitely large number of groups, and the number of groups of which he may be a member is correspondingly large. Furthermore, since an individual may be a member of several groups, complicated overlaps in groups may exist.

We have now completed the task of introducing key concepts. The task which remains is to examine significant processes which involve these key concepts. In the next section several questions will be raised: How are mutual problems solved? What function do leadership acts have in the solving of mutual problems? What consequences does the solution of a mutual problem have for the interaction of members of a group?

KEY PROCESSES

A process is any manner or means by which a given state or condition changes into a second state or condition. The solution of a problem involves the processes by which a state of affairs viewed with dissatisfaction changes to a state of affairs viewed with satisfaction. Our primary concern in leadership theory will be with the processes used in solving mutual problems. Let us begin, however, by considering problem-solving in general and by indicating two principal ways in which a change in a state of affairs perceived as dissatisfying can occur. First, a change can occur in the group member's perception of the state of affairs without a corresponding change in the externally specified state. Second, a change can occur in the externally specified state of affairs and can then be perceived. These two types of changes must be distinguished. In the first instance, analysis of the problem solution involves investigation of the perceptual process only. The investigator would be concerned with factors that determine perception and the conditions under which perception changes. This type of problem solution, however, is not the primary concern when our focus is on leadership in the solution of a mutual problem. If a problem can be solved by perceptual changes alone (without any form of interaction) it does not meet the specification of a mutual problem which requires acts on the part of others for its solution.

Our focus on leadership in mutual problem-solving directs our concern to problem solutions of the second type and to the characteristics of the interactions and relationships between persons involved in solving problems. It is possible for a mutual problem to be solved without structure-in-interaction, differentiation of structure-in-interaction, or leadership acts. Such a solution of a mutual problem would be a chance or accidental solution and would have a probability determined by the probabilities of occurrence of the required acts. For example, let us assume that the solution of a mutual problem depends upon a specific interaction between person I and person II. The important characteristic of the required interaction is simply that two specific acts, one by person I and the second by person II, must occur at the same point in time if the problem is to be

solved. Further, let us assume that in completely random interaction (no structure-in-interaction) of persons I and II, act A of person I has a probability of occurring one time in one hundred interactions of the two. Likewise, assume that act B of person II has a similar and independent probability of occurrence (.01). The probability of the occurrence of the required interaction and of the solution of the mutual problem would be one in ten thousand interactions of the two persons. Although in actual life such accidental or chance solutions of mutual problems seldom, if ever, occur in pure form, the possibility of such solutions has important implications.

The possibility of a chance solution of a mutual problem through the interception of required acts provides a starting mechanism for the development of structure-in-interaction and for the development of other than random processes for mutual problem solution. Structure-in-interaction becomes established as a result of the reinforcement of interaction. An individual will tend to repeat an act that he associates with a change from a dissatisfying to a satisfying state of affairs; he thus introduces a consistency in his behavior. This consistency increases his opportunity to perceive and to make anticipatory responses to predicted future interactions. The probability of solving the mutual problem is thereby considerably increased.

It is necessary to examine several ramifications of the development of structure-in-interaction through reinforcement by the solution of mutual problems. It is unlikely that an individual's behavior in the presence of another will be made up of completely random acts except in the case of very young infants. (Even in this case it is possible that "instinctive" or prenatal patterning of behavior may be observed.) Some randomness, however, may characterize the behavior of adults in interaction, and this component of randomness may increase under certain circumstances, e.g., in the face of new problems, after frustration, or under stress. On the other hand, certain acts (for example, friendly acts) may be reinforced with sufficient frequency to have a very high probability of occurring as a part of most sequences of interaction. We find that individuals at a very early age display a high degree of consistency in their interacting behavior.

At this point we have considered only the most elementary process of solving a mutual problem, i.e., the chance occurrence of the required acts of two persons. Although such a process is of little significance in explaining the solution of most mutual problems, it does furnish a basis for the development of structures-in-interaction of much greater practical significance. Let us now turn to a more complicated mutual problem-solving process.

Two motorists are driving on a country road, one headed north and the other south. The road is relatively narrow, with a single track down the center and deep ditches on both sides. Both motorists are in the center of the road as they begin to approach one another. A few hundred feet before they would have met head on, the motorist headed north moves from the center of the road to the east (his right), and the motorist headed south moves to the west (his right), after which they pass without colliding. It is easy to point to the mutual problem in this situation. At the time the two motorists were (a) headed toward one another, (b) driving in the center of a narrow road, and (c) aware of the situation, this state of affairs was perceived by both as dissatisfying. A satisfying situation could be realized by a successful passing of one another and continuation of their respective journeys. The solution to this problem situation obviously demands interlocked acts by both. All the conditions required of a mutual problem are met by this example. What processes were involved in the solution of the problem?

The acts of both motorists of moving their automobiles to the right (not to the left or one to the left and the other to the right) reflect a structure-in-interaction that is embodied in the laws of the nation and which is learned during a driving training period (socialization?) to the point of a strong habit. This structure-in-interaction is accompanied by a high expectation of compliance of the other person (mechanisms of social control enforce this compliance) and by high confidence in predicting the behavior of the other. The process involved in the solution of this problem is essentially a conformity to a pre-established structure-in-interaction. It is worthwhile to note the characteristics of conformity to pre-established structures-in-interaction as a process for solving mutual problems.

Conformity to pre-established structures-in-interaction requires that behavior in interaction be patterned according to preformulated rules or regulations. Such conformity permits no freedom of behavior beyond the limits of the rules (the drivers have some freedom in selecting the exact point at which they alter their courses, i.e., whether they move to the right 250 feet before meeting or only 200 feet before meeting may be optional, but it is not optional to pass on either the right or the left). Such rules apply without regard to particular characteristics of the individuals involved. They are specific to a narrow range of problems and must be known and followed by the majority of individuals who become involved in the problems that the rules seek to solve.

Solution of mutual problems by the process of conformity to pre-established structures-in-interaction depends in part upon the existence of a group by which the action of persons involved in the problem are sanctioned. The maintenance of the structure-in-interaction requires that deviance be punished by the group members—or by the results of the deviating act itself. Predictions of interaction behavior from such structures-in-interaction can be made only where there is uniform compliance.

A third important characteristic of the process of conformity to pre-established structures-in-interaction lies in the inherent limitations of inflexible directions, rules, and regulations. A given pre-established structure-in-interaction can apply to only a limited range of mutual problems. Frequently, new problems or variants of old problems may be encountered that fall outside the range of the pre-established structure. If the old structure is complied with in such situations, the problem remains. In fact, it is not unusual that pre-established structures-in-interaction often hamper persons in their efforts to solve mutual problems.

Finally, it should be noted that conformity with pre-established structures-in-interaction is usually impersonal. The two motorists successfully solved their mutual problem without greater knowledge of one another than that they both belonged to a group (automobile drivers in the United States). Such impersonal mutual problem solution avoids many of the complexities introduced by more intimate contacts between individuals engaged in other types of mutual problem-solving.

The third process by which mutual problems may be solved

involves the leadership act. Leadership acts are acts that initiate structure-in-interaction. Such an act is defined by its effect upon subsequent interaction. Let us suppose that a co-ordinated action involving persons I, II, and III is required by the characteristics of the mutual problem and that this co-ordinated action has a very low probability of occurrence by the interception of the random acts A, B, and C. Further, let us assume that pre-established structures-in-interaction relevant to the required action do not exist. A mutual problem of this kind can be solved, for example, by a suggestion from person I to II and III specifying a sequence of behavior to be followed by them that would meet the conditions required for solving the problem. If I, II, and III subsequently engage in the suggested sequence of behavior, person I may be credited with a leadership act.

Leadership acts play an important part in the solution of many mutual problems. As the complexity of the mutual problem increases, neither the accidental interception of required acts nor a conformity to pre-established structures can insure a satisfactory solution.

Although leadership acts must occur in the process of mutual problem solution, it is not necessary that all leadership acts result in problem solution. A leadership act could initiate a structure-in-interaction later found *not* to correspond to what is required for solving the problem. Such an act would be a *successful* act of leadership (because of its relation to subsequent structures-in-interaction) but not an *effective* one. Let us pause for a moment to distinguish clearly three classes of acts pertinent to leadership.⁸

1. Attempted leadership acts are acts accompanied by an intention of initiating structure-in-interaction for solving a mutual problem.

2. Successful leadership acts are acts that have initiated structure-in-interaction during the process of mutual problem solution. An attempted leadership act may or may not become a successful leadership act depending upon subsequent observation of its effect upon the structure of interaction.

⁸Bass uses similar terminology in distinguishing classes of leadership behavior. See Bernard M. Bass *et al.*, "Situational Factors in Leadership among Sorority Women," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. LXVII, No. 16 (1953).

3. Effective leadership acts are acts that have initiated structure-in-interaction and that have contributed to the solution of a mutual problem. An effective leadership act is always also a successful leadership act, but a leadership act may be successful without being effective for solving mutual problems.

It also should be noted that an act may be effective in the solution of a mutual problem, but not be a leadership act. Acts that occur as part of the structure-in-interaction resulting from an effective leadership act (e.g., acts of following) can be effective for solving a mutual problem, but they, of course, do not meet the criterion of leadership acts.

Since leadership acts occur in the process of mutual problem-solving, their initiators become vulnerable to the reaction of group members because of realized and/or expected satisfactions or dissatisfactions associated with the probability of solving the mutual problem. This vulnerability is not simply a function of uncertainty as to whether the structure-in-interaction suggested by an attempted leadership act will result in solving the problem. The restriction of following one sequence of behavior rather than any one of all other possibilities also contributes to the vulnerability of leadership acts. An attempted leadership act carries both the promise (positive component) for solving a mutual problem and the threat (negative component) of restricting freedom in interaction. Such restriction must result when one sequence of behavior is followed in preference to all others. The conditions or variables that determine whether an attempted leadership act will be successful are associated with the conflict between these positive and negative components of attempted leadership acts.

At this juncture it is necessary to introduce an additional note of complexity into mutual problem-solving. Thus far, we have concerned ourselves with mutual problems of only the simplest type. We have assumed a state of affairs involving a single source of dissatisfaction, a state which can become satisfying through the occurrence of a single appropriate interaction. These assumptions have been useful for our purpose of presenting the three elementary processes of mutual problem solutions, i.e., chance or accidental interception of the required acts, conformity to pre-established structures-in-interaction, and leadership acts. But it

is rare, indeed, that we encounter mutual problems of this simple type. It will be impossible, and perhaps undesirable, to attempt to treat here many sources of complexity. However, there are two sources that, if ignored further, will handicap the development of the theory.

Most mutual problem-solving involves persons who have previously experienced the solution of many mutual problems. If we concern ourselves with these persons as individuals, we must consider, among other factors, their values, their traits, and their need-dispositions. Even in the case of group members facing a definite and clearly-seen problem, each person will be involved with the solution of problems other than the recognized or central mutual problem. Peripheral problems are almost always significant factors in the success of an attempted leadership act.

The social need-dispositions that an individual develops involve the responses of others. A need for love and affection, for example, may be inferred from the observation that an individual seeks situations in which friendly, supporting acts occur. Other social needs, such as recognition, dependence, and domination, are inferred in a similar manner. The common and important element associated with all such social need-dispositions is that they occur in social situations. Each member of each group with which an individual is associated has the potential of producing either satisfaction or dissatisfaction for this individual's social need-dispositions. Much of the behavior of individuals in interaction will be related to the strength of their different social need-dispositions rather than to the solution of the task which is presumed to be their central problem.

Valued structures-in-interaction also help to determine whether an attempted leadership act will be successful. An attempted leadership act that seeks to initiate a structure-in-interaction which has been effective in the solution of numerous mutual problems (i.e., is highly valued) will have a higher probability of success than one which attempts to initiate a structure associated with an opposite experience.

Thus far, we have not been in a position to specify the important variables that determine the success of leadership acts. We have not considered the problem of specifying the

variables that determine the effectiveness of a leadership act. We have not concerned ourselves with important questions about the motivational variables relevant to individual attempted leadership acts or with questions about the consequences of the acceptance or rejection of such attempts. We shall proceed now to discuss successful leadership acts, i.e., the probability that a suggested structure-in-interaction will be found acceptable by the others.

1. The probability of success of an attempt to lead is in part a function of the total satisfaction that the group members expect will result if they follow the suggested structure-in-interaction. The total satisfaction expected represents a subjective balance of expected satisfaction and expected dissatisfaction. It is important to indicate the variables significant in determining this balance. First among these is the degree of dissatisfaction created by the mutual problem. The greater this dissatisfaction (other variables assumed constant), the greater the acceptability of *any* attempted leadership act. Directly associated with the first variable is a second, the confidence of the group members in the promise implied in the attempted leadership act, i.e., that a solution of the mutual problem will result. This confidence in turn is a function of (1) the cognitive clarity of the relation between the suggested structure-in-interaction and the solution of the problem (the reasonableness of the proposed action), (2) the prestige of the suggester's position within the group and within other significant groups, (3) the esteem in which the suggester is held by the group members, (4) the relation between the suggested structure-in-interaction and the values of group members, and (5) the attitudes manifested by the individual who attempts the leadership. An example of the last variable is the individual who tends to decrease the confidence of other persons by his hesitant and halting speech.

A third major variable involved in the balance of expected satisfaction is the perceived relation between the suggested structure-in-interaction and the potential of the group to satisfy the social need-dispositions of its members. If the suggested structure-in-interaction is perceived to decrease the opportunity to satisfy an important social need-disposition, a component of dissatisfaction will accrue against the balance of total satisfaction.

Attempted leadership acts that promise the solution of a mutual problem at the price of severe restrictions on the possibility of satisfying social need-dispositions are likely to be unsuccessful.

2. The probability of success of an attempt to lead is in part a function of the individuals' perception of their freedom to accept or reject the suggested structure-in-interaction. The first theorem presented assumed that the group members possessed some freedom to accept or reject an attempted leadership act in accord with their subjective calculation of the resulting satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Complete freedom is an exception rather than the rule.⁹

A specific group may be characterized more by the consequence of its being part of larger groups than by its autonomy. Tradition, rules (pre-established structures-in-interaction), official purposes, status arrangements, and definite positions all accompany an individual's group membership. Freedom to join or leave such groups, while highly valued, may conflict with more potent influences, for example, the desire to earn a respectable living or the necessity to respond to a draft call into the army. The control, or restraint, a group has over its members' behavior is an important factor in the success of attempted leadership acts. Such control may determine who will attempt a leadership act and will set broad limits within which attempted leadership acts are always successful (e.g., if the theory of military organization were followed in practice, soldiers would accept any attempted leadership act of their superiors). In a later section of this paper we shall examine the concept of control in greater detail. It is sufficient here to point to the restrictions upon complete freedom of choice as a second area of variables related to the success of attempted leadership acts.

This analysis of the variables associated with the success of attempted leadership acts has not been exhaustive. However, it should provide a guide leading to more definite statements of the operation of various conditions and variables in determining the success of attempted acts of leadership.

⁹Probably an individual is never completely free to accept a leadership act in strict accord with his subjective analysis of the satisfaction-dissatisfaction balance. On the other hand, one would be in error if he underestimated the extent to which such considerations determine the acceptance of leadership acts even in highly controlled situations.

Since an effective leadership act is one that results in the solution of a mutual problem, the effectiveness of leadership cannot be said to be synonymous with the effectiveness of the group. There are at least two important sources of variance in the effectiveness of group members (or generally "group effectiveness") that have no bearing on leadership effectiveness. One of these sources is the contribution to group effectiveness made by group members' individual efforts. Individual group members may solve individual problems while interacting with other group members. The second source results from the solution of mutual problems either by the chance interception of required acts or by conformity to established structures-in-interaction. Determination of the effectiveness of a leadership act rests upon the demonstration that the act contributed to the solution of a mutual problem.

Assuming for the moment that we can satisfactorily classify leadership acts as effective or ineffective, let us turn to the variables or conditions that determine whether a successful leadership act will become an effective leadership act.

The probability that a leadership act will be effective is directly related to the difficulty of co-ordinating the acts required for solving the mutual problem. The difficulty in achieving the required co-ordination involves each of the following variables: (1) the novelty of the required co-ordination, (2) the number of individuals involved, (3) the spatial and temporal relations between the specific acts to be co-ordinated,¹⁰ (4) the variables

¹⁰Geographical and organizational relations among group members restrict or complicate the means of communication between them. For example, some sacrifice in speed of communication is frequently imposed by the geographical or organizational separation of members. In specific instances, speed may be the crucial variable in determining the effectiveness of the leadership act. Temporal factors in co-ordination involve (1) sequential ordering, and (2) pacing. The solution of a mutual problem may depend upon act A's occurring before act B, which, in turn, must precede act C. Sequential patterns may achieve a very high degree of complexity. Pacing or timing of the required co-ordinated acts may need a high degree of precision. One need only point to the precision of co-ordination occurring during the execution of a successful "play" of a professional football team, or to the complicated patterning of activities for which the manager of a large manufacturing plant is responsible, to illustrate the importance of spatial and temporal factors in determining the difficulty of co-ordination.

determining the group members' disposition toward engaging in the required co-ordination, and (5) variations in the ability of individual group members.

The factors determining the *disposition* of individuals to engage in the required co-ordinated acts include all the factors that were analyzed earlier as determinants of the acceptance of an attempted leadership act. In addition to dispositional variables, variables of group members' individual ability become important in the analysis of the probable effectiveness of a specific leadership act. If the required co-ordinated acts lie outside the range of ability of the individuals who are called upon to perform them, a successful leadership act will not become an effective leadership act. The group members may be motivated to attempt acts that they cannot perform. However, it is not unusual to find group members directing specific attention to the problem of developing their abilities.

Again, our analysis of the variables determining the effectiveness of a leadership act has been suggestive rather than exhaustive. The most important point to note is that an act of leadership may be successful in that it initiates a structure-in-interaction among group members but fails to lead to the solution of the mutual problem.

At this time we wish to shift the focus of analysis from the leadership act to the person who attempts leadership acts. We will be concerned with the major problem: what determines whether or not an individual will attempt a leadership act?

THE LEADER

It is appropriate to review three distinctions about leadership:

(1) A leadership act is any act that initiates structures-in-interaction in the process of mutual problem-solving. This defines a relatively restricted class of acts. (2) A leadership role is a differentiated structure-in-interaction in which the basis of differentiation is the occurrence of leadership acts. In other words, a leadership role is a consistency in the interaction of group members that is distinguished from other structures-in-interaction by the fact that leadership acts, rather than other classes of acts, are expected. Leadership roles, very frequently although not invari-

ably, have an associated high *prestige*, i.e., they are generally valued by persons (of our culture) more highly than other roles. (This may be related to experiences of satisfaction associated with the mutual problem-solving potential of leadership acts.) (3) A person is called a leader if he is differentiated from other persons on the basis of *successful* leadership acts. This definition of leader is rooted both in the process of differentiation of individuals and in observed or expected leadership acts. Of two individuals engaging with equal frequency in successful leadership acts, one may become recognized as a leader by virtue of striking attributes (such as status, age, dress) that assist his differentiation from others, while the second person, because of his possession of only ordinary attributes, may remain undifferentiated and thus may not be recognized as a leader.

There is a distinction between leadership acts and acts of leaders. Leadership acts have been defined to include a specific class of behavior. Acts of leaders would include all acts, both leadership acts and all other acts, in which a leader engages. The expectations associated with a leadership role may far exceed the range of acts that can be classed as leadership acts. This is an important consideration in determining the esteem in which a leader is held. Since esteem operates as a variable in the acceptance of attempted leadership acts, it bears an important indirect relation to the success of a leader.

We may return now to the central problem of this section—the analysis of variables that determine whether or not an individual in a specified situation will attempt leadership acts. Once a sound basis has been established to account for who *attempts* to lead, it becomes possible to examine a second problem: the emergence of leaders. This latter problem also involves the variables which determine the success of attempted leadership acts and those variables which provide a relevant basis for differentiating one individual from the other. The problem of *who*, among a newly formed group, will emerge as a leader must take into account not only those variables associated with who attempts to lead, but also the relevant social-control variables which determine the probability that a specific person will emerge.

The key to who will attempt leadership acts lies in the positive and negative components of such acts. We have pointed out

that every leadership act carries with it a positive component with its promise to solve a mutual problem. In addition, however, a leadership act has negative components that result from the consequence of its directing the behavior of group members along one (more or less restricted) course of action. The second consequence necessarily eliminates some other course(s) of action that *might* be more rewarding. Other courses of action *might* seem preferable, either because the suggested course of action could fail to solve the mutual problem or because the group's potential to satisfy social need-dispositions may be sacrificed. An individual who considers attempting a leadership act may see himself as responsible, and hence accountable, for the correlates of the course of action that may follow. His analysis of these probable consequences will influence his decision.

The variables that determine whether a given individual will attempt a given leadership act lie in two major areas. The first area involves motivational variables. Those most central to our problem are the strength of his dissatisfactions associated with the mutual problem and the strength of his social need-dispositions which the group has a potential for satisfying. The second area of variables involves the individual's cognitive estimate or expectation about the probable consequence (the state of affairs that may exist should his attempt be successful) of the act of leadership he is considering. Two important variables related to these estimates are the probability of solving the mutual problem, and the probability of increasing or decreasing the group's potential for satisfying social need-dispositions. We may express the probability of an individual's attempting a leadership act as a function of (1) whether he thinks the act will lead to mutual problem solution, (2) what effect he thinks the act will have on the group's potential for need-disposition satisfaction, (3) the degree of dissatisfaction he feels with the mutual problem, and (4) the strength of his relevant social need-dispositions.

To summarize this section, we may say that the determinants of an individual's attempting a leadership act may be found in the basic characteristics of the leadership act as these characteristics relate to the individual's expectations and motivations. However, this assumes that a series of significant variables associated with the demands and restraints of the social system

are held more or less constant. In the next section, we shall sketch in rough outline a few ways in which the leadership act is related to the characteristics of the group and to the more comprehensive characteristics of social systems.

THE LEADERSHIP ACT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF GROUPS

A group (both a set of persons and a set of attitudes) may be treated as an entity and may also be described and analyzed in respect to its attributes and characteristics. In this section we shall identify certain important group characteristics and shall indicate how these characteristics affect mutual problem-solving. We shall also suggest how these group characteristics influence leaders and determine the likelihood of leadership acts.

If an individual does not differentiate his personal attitudes from those that characterize a group of which he is a member, he may be said to be "involved" or "identified" with his group. A highly identified or involved group member expects to share all satisfactions or dissatisfactions of the group. Involvement is one of three factors that determine the power of the group to influence its members.

Group potency is a second factor related to the power of the group over its members. Group potency derives from two principal sources: dissatisfactions of group members with their mutual problems and the group's potential to satisfy group members' need-dispositions. Since individuals may be expected to differ in the strength of their dissatisfaction with a given mutual problem and also in the strength of their various need-dispositions, the potency of the group may differ for its members.

A third factor that must be considered in the analysis of the power of the group over its members is the relation between the given group and significant other groups in which the same people hold membership. The autonomy of a group is rarely complete. Established structures-in-interaction (laws, social norms, customs, traditions, etc.) common to a social system, may both direct and limit the power of a given group over its members. The members of the groups which are parts of larger groups are subject to detailed directions and limitations imposed by the larger group.

A group's influence over its members (control) has its roots in the expectation of satisfaction to be derived from mutual problem solution. This expectation is either modified or reinforced by other expectations associated with the group's potential to satisfy need-dispositions. The involvement may be expected to have considerable correlation with group potency but is not identical with potency. An individual can be an extremely peripheral (less involved) member of an extremely potent group. The consequence of his expectation of sharing little of the group's satisfactions or dissatisfactions may reduce the group's influence upon his behavior.¹¹ The absence of complete group autonomy also modifies the direct relation between group potency and the group's power over the individual.

The relationship between the group's influence over its members and the power of a leader will be traced after we have analyzed certain significant points about the differentiation of group members.

The primary characteristics of the tasks involved in mutual problems is that they are beyond the capabilities of a single individual. Co-ordination of individual effort, therefore, is likely to become a prerequisite of mutual problem solution. One of the most often used means of co-ordinating acts for solving complex mutual problems is "division of labor." Structures-in-interaction are established in respect to differences in the activities of various members of the interacting group. These differentiations can be referred to two major dimensions of the organization, the horizontal and the vertical.¹² Differentiations which are referred to as horizontal dimensions define roles, positions, and offices; vertical differentiations define influence, prestige, and power relationships among group members. The horizontal dimension exists by virtue of those differences in group members' activities that are *not* evaluated as superior or inferior to each other. The vertical dimension entails evaluation of those activities for which structures-in-interaction are differentiated. This evaluation is

¹¹This is related to group members' establishing membership requirements and induction rituals. A member with low involvement is difficult to control and may block mutual problem solution.

¹²Ralph M. Stogdill, "Leadership, Membership, and Organization," *Psychological Bulletin*, XLVII (1950), 1-14.

basically determined by the expected relationship between the activity defined by the differentiated structure and the probability of solving the group's mutual problems. The *stratification* of a group is determined by the range of evaluations made with respect to differentiated structures-in-interaction.

There is a positive, although not invariant, relationship between a differentiated structure-in-interaction's place in the stratification hierarchy and the influence over group members that is associated with this structure. Differentiated structures-in-interaction that are evaluated as superior to others tend also to be characterized by their greater influence over group members. The role of leadership is usually evaluated as indispensable to the solution of a mutual problem because of the relation between the leadership act and the process of mutual problem solution. Leadership roles are therefore accorded relatively high positions on the vertical dimension of the organization.

A group can be characterized by the extent to which the control of its members is mediated through pre-established structures-in-interaction. A flexible group is one which has a minimum number of pre-established structures-in-interaction. There are several significant relationships between leadership acts and pre-established structures-in-interaction that must be pointed out.

Both leadership acts and conformity to pre-established structures-in-interaction may lead to the co-ordinated behavior required for solving a mutual problem. But many mutual problems require a difficult and complex co-ordination in the activity of many persons over long periods of time. It is beyond the capacity of one individual to initiate, at one point in time, all the structures-in-interaction required to achieve and maintain such co-ordination. In such a situation, the leader has two ways for meeting the requirements of his leadership role. He can delegate part of his duties, but he thereby creates an administrative structure in which superiority-inferiority stratification takes on especial significance. Instead, he can establish structures-in-interaction that will remain in force without further acts of initiation. Policy, rules, and regulations, grow from this decision by the leader. The pre-established structures-in-interaction have the characteristics discussed earlier—application without exception, group sanction for enforcement, relative inflexibility (with the

accompanying limitation on the range of problems that these structures can solve), and impersonal application.

We shall confine our attention here to some implications of the impersonal characteristics of pre-established structures-in-interaction. A leadership act carries a promise of problem solution *and* a possible threat to the group's potential for satisfying its need-dispositions. The impersonal quality of pre-established structures-in-interaction serves to reduce the "visibility" of the negative component of the leadership act. In particular, a leader can make clear to his followers the difference between the restrictive characteristics of rules and regulations and his own personal predilections for consideration and friendliness. This type of differentiation seems reasonable because the followers know that the impersonal characteristics of established structures-in-interaction reduce the frequency of their personal contact with the leader; they can, therefore, blame this reduced frequency of personal contact on the system, i.e., the rules and regulations, rather than on the leader as a person.

In the final section of this paper, we shall analyze some group characteristics related both to the group's potential for satisfying need-dispositions of love and affection, and to the negative component of the leadership act.

Not all of the group members' energy is directed to the solution of mutual problems; an appreciable share is diverted to group maintenance, and the amount so diverted will vary from group to group, and from time to time with the same group. The most visible diversion of effort for the sake of group maintenance is found in the policing and inspection duties required to enforce pre-established structures-in-interaction. However, the greatest diversion of effort from mutual problem solution derives from conflicts between the use of the group for achieving the satisfaction of solving mutual problems and the use of the group for satisfying social need-dispositions, especially those of love and affection.

The problem of satisfying a social need-disposition is not a mutual problem, but one in which satisfaction can be achieved without involving acts by both parties. An individual treated with friendship may not reciprocate. An individual may be shown deference without deferring in return. In the case of many

social needs, no interlocked task has to be performed in order to achieve satisfaction. The same interdependence of activities that motivates individuals to stay together as a group to solve mutual problems is not present.

The group's potential to satisfy social needs develops independently of its success in solving mutual problems. Nevertheless, the satisfactions that accrue to the individual group member from such potential may far outweigh the satisfaction he comes to expect from mutual problem solution. In this event, if solving the mutual problem should be seen as signalling the end of the group's existence, the members of the group may tend to avoid solving the mutual problem. Any attempted leadership act that held promise of success would probably be rejected. Ineffective leadership acts would have a greater probability of acceptance. This may explain, in part, why mediocre individuals often emerge as the leaders of some groups.

In less extreme cases, we may find group members exerting considerable pressure on leaders in order to avoid actions that would lessen the group's potential for satisfying social needs. This pressure would, of course, direct the group members' activities toward group maintenance rather than toward group problem solution. Not only leadership acts but any act that threatened the group's potential for satisfying such needs would be subject to pressures of this same kind. Accordingly, a leader committed to solving the group's mutual problem has a definite interest in avoiding acts that threaten the social need-satisfying potential of the group. The effectiveness of the leader is, in large part, determined by whether his acts reduce the members' anxiety about the group's potential to satisfy its social needs.

This short discussion of the interplay among selected group characteristics, mutual problem-solving processes, and the leadership act, is in no way exhaustive. Many other group characteristics can be defined and should be examined for their relationship to leadership acts. In this paper, we have only briefly outlined one unified explanation of leadership and group behavior. We believe that this suggested explanation can be integrated into theories that are now developing in the behavioral sciences. This is simply one effort to move toward the development of theory in administration.

CHAPTER VI

Administration as Decision-making¹

DANIEL E. GRIFFITHS

The great task which faces us in educational administration in the coming years is the formulation of a theory of administrative behavior which will provide practicing administrators with a set of guides to action, will provide a guide for the collection of facts, will provide a framework within which researchers can find new knowledge, and will also describe the nature of administration. The foremost requirement is to provide guides for action. This should be the lodestar to those developing theory in educational administration. Although action must be the goal, careful concept development, systematic analysis, and logical organization cannot be slighted.

The practicing administrator should be able to use theory in much the same way as a practicing doctor is able to use the theory developed by researchers in biological laboratories. The doctor does not need to know the theory of mold growth to be able to use penicillin in curing a streptococcus infection; yet he would be a very poor doctor if he did not use the penicillin. In like manner, the educational administrator should be able to look to administrative theory for guidance in, for instance, a problem of faculty human relations. Reasoning of this sort places a heavy burden on those of us in educational administration or related areas who, as researchers and professors, are attempting to develop theory and to write and discuss it. We find ourselves

¹The research on the decision-making process reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the Esso Educational Foundation. This discussion was first presented in a paper for the Symposium on Sequential Decision-making held at Arden House, June 1-2, 1957, under the direction of Robert Teviot Livingston.

in a position where we are unable to communicate our ideas. This state of affairs has led Demerath and Thibaut to write:

If there is to be a scientific knowledge that makes administrative behavior more nearly predictable, it will be a knowledge ordered in terms of empirically substantiated general theories and concepts, which are the essence of scientific knowledge in any field. Until such theories and concepts of administration are developed, the gulf that presently exists between authors and administrators cannot be bridged.²

The purpose of this paper is to develop some concepts basic to a theory of administration and to relate these concepts to action in administrative situations.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A theory of administrative behavior must be concerned with the behavior of human beings in a social organization and therefore must be a subtheory of a more comprehensive theory of human behavior. The roots of such a theory grow in many soils, and one must look to many sources for his material. No one model, be it psychological, sociological, anthropological, or political, is apt to provide the complete substance for the desired theory. An adequate theory of administration must take into account the way in which individuals perceive their organization and their universe as well as the ways in which they communicate their perceptions. It must account for the power which moves men to act and the resultant structure of authority which emerges. The theory must account for the motives of men as individuals and for the dynamics of men in groups. The contributions of leadership studies, in particular, must be carefully considered.

In other words, the desired theory must deal with the *substance* of administration and not its *form*. The reverse has too long been the case in educational administration. An adequate theory must be concerned with the dynamics of human activity, not the mechanics of organization. While administrators must take account of finance, buildings, busses, and the like, these

²Nicholas J. Demerath and John W. Thibaut, "Small Groups and Administrative Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I, No. 2 (September, 1956), 140.

must be considered in their proper perspective; they are of secondary importance in determining how people behave in the educational system. To repeat, a theory of administration must be more concerned with substance than with form. This means that educational administration's preoccupation with the adjective rather than the noun must change. Not only have we been concerned almost exclusively with the adjective "educational," but we have been spending our time looking at, for instance, the field of secondary school administration and saying that it differs substantially from elementary school administration. It is not even uncommon to separate the administration of health and physical education programs from that of other high school departments such as English or mathematics. Now when one starts to compare the content of these various areas of administration, one finds almost complete duplication. In a study done at a large university, the dean reported that there were ten different departments and that they duplicated each other's offerings to the extent of 90 per cent. In all probability, the same situation exists at other universities, particularly at the one which the writer represents. We are very strongly of the opinion that no case can be made for the exclusive study of "adjectival" administration. With this background we will proceed to talk about administration and will use particular fields for illustrative purposes.

CONCEPTS

Any theory is based upon a set of concepts, properly defined and relevant to the major theme of the theory. Simon has pointed out: "The first task of administrative theory is to develop a set of concepts that will permit the description, in terms relevant to the theory, of administrative situations. The concepts, to be scientifically useful, must be operational; that is, their meanings must correspond to empirically observable facts or situations."³ Concepts provide the building blocks of theory, and a theory can be no stronger than its concepts.

The key concept in this discussion is decision-making. The

³Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 37.

position taken is that the central function of administration is directing and controlling the decision-making process. It is not only central in the sense that it is more important than other functions, as some writers have indicated, but it is central in that *all* other functions of administration can best be interpreted in terms of the decision-making process. It is becoming generally recognized that decision-making is the heart of organization and the process of administration. McCammy states this clearly and concisely, "The making of decisions is at the very center of the process of administration and the discussion of administration will be more systematic if we accept a framework for the analysis of decision-making."⁴ Simon caps his argument by stating that "a general theory of administration must include principles of organization that will insure correct decision-making, just as it must include principles that will insure effective action."⁵ Livingston, using the term "management" as "administration" is used in this paper, states:

If we expand the concept of decision-making to include, on the one hand, the process by which the decision is arrived at, and on the other hand, to include the process by which we implement or make the decision "work," and if we further recognize that this is a continuing, dynamic process rather than an occasional event, then decisioning means something quite different than heretofore and becomes the basis of all managerial action.⁶

Such a statement calls for an explanation of the concept of decision and a clarification of the extent and content of the decision-making process.

One approach to a definition is to use the one used by the dictionary. In this case we have: "A settling or terminating, as of a controversy, by giving judgment on the matter; also, a conclusion arrived at after consideration." Thus a decision is essentially a judicial proceeding; that is, a state of affairs is present, and a judgment is made about it. The judgment is such as to influence action which results from the decision. Action is im-

⁴James L. McCammy, "Analysis of the Process of Decision Making," *Public Administration Review*, VII, No. 1 (1947), 41.

⁵Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶Robert T. Livingston, "The Theory of Organization and Management," *Transactions of the ASME* (May, 1953), p. 659.

plicit in a decision, and the judgment is made so that a course of action will be influenced.

Practically every decision is one of a series. It is almost impossible to determine which decision on a certain state of affairs was the original decision; furthermore, it is almost impossible to determine which decision of all those made is a unique one, since each decision made appears to tie into a previous one. This view of decision-making as a sequential process is not in accord with the dictionary definition, which states that a decision terminates or settles a controversy; on the contrary, a decision may alter a controversy, may change its direction, or may sometimes prolong it. Probably the clearest illustration of sequential decision-making is found in English law. The essence of this judicial process is found in the "precedent." Each decision is based upon one or more previous decisions, and only the introduction of new knowledge of tremendous impact will cause a change in the direction which the sequence of decisions takes. The sequence of judicial decisions is of such a pronounced nature as to warrant being characterized as the "seamless web of the law."

Furthermore, decisions are closely interrelated with action. A decision may alter the present course of action, that is, change the direction of action to a noticeable degree. A decision may adjust a present course of action, merely correct it, or permit the present course of action to continue. Decisions are totally pragmatic in nature; that is, their value is dependent upon the success of the action which follows. Since all rational action is in terms of goals, the value of a decision is related to the degree to which the goals are attained.

The dictionary definition implies that a decision is a time-consuming matter. It is explicit that a decision follows a period of consideration. However, it is possible for the period of time to be minimal and for consideration to be fleeting. A decision does not, by its nature, have to be a long and painful process. In fact, if a state of affairs is judged very quickly and with little consideration, what would it then be called? The term "decision" is to be applied to all *judgments which affect a course of action*.

A consideration of the area of perception leads us to three concepts which are of importance to our theoretical configuration. The dictionary definition of perception as "awareness of

objects; consciousness" is of little help to a person who wishes to use the notion of perception operationally. We find it much more helpful to consider perception from the frame of reference of a recent study which uses what is called the *transactional approach*.⁷

In working toward a definition of perception, this study presents the major characteristics of perception, the central problem, and ways of studying the phenomena. According to Ittelson and Cantril, the three major characteristics of human perception are:

1. Perception can be studied only in terms of *transactions*, that is concrete individuals dealing with concrete situations.
2. Perception comes into the transaction from the unique *personal behavioral center* of the perceiver.
3. Perception occurs as the perceiver creates his own psychological environment by identifying certain aspects of his own experience to an environment which he believes exists independent of his own experience. This is called *externalization*.

Since the concept most difficult to understand is that of the transaction, we shall consider it for a moment. Ordinarily, the term "interaction" is used to describe what goes on between an individual and his environment. We say, "Man interacts with his environment and brings about a desired change." This assumes that "man" and his "environment" exist as independent entities and that when they interact, they do so without affecting their own identities. The concept of transaction uses the content of the interaction as the subject matter to be discussed.⁸ Ittelson and Cantril state:

Neither a perception nor an object-as-perceived exists independent of the total life situation of which both perception and object are a part. It is meaningless to speak of either as existing apart from the situation in which it is encountered. The word *transaction* is used to label such a situation. For the word transaction carries the double implication (1) that all parts of the situation enter into it as active participants, and (2) that they owe their very existence as encountered

⁷William H. Ittelson and Hadley Cantril, *Perception* (New York: Random House, 1954).

⁸A more complete discussion of this concept is to be found in John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, *Knowing and the Known* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949).

in the situation to this fact of active participation and do not appear as already existing entities merely interacting with each other without affecting their own identity.⁹

The concept of personal behavior means that the person enters into a transaction from his own unique position. He is different from all others in the transaction. We say, then, that each person enters a transaction from his own unique personal behavior center. To the extent that his perception is common with others, we have social activity. The concept of externalization is of recent historical origin. Early studies in perception were concerned with what the environment did to the individual. The Greeks started this chain of thought by formulating the concept that objects emitted small replicas of themselves which were received by the perceiver; the fact that different viewers received different replicas did not bother them to any great extent. Recently, there has been interest in what the organism does when it perceives. The concept of externalization describes but does not explain how we perceive; it states that when we perceive anything, we consider it as external to ourselves. As Ittelson and Cantril say: "When we perceive, we externalize certain aspects of our experience and thereby create for ourselves our own world of things and people, of sights and sounds, of tastes and touches."¹⁰

The concept of transaction is basic to the concepts of the personal behavior center and externalization. Each situation will be perceived differently by different individuals, and each individual will assume to be real that which he perceives. He will then act accordingly. This has been neatly summarized as follows: "These three major characteristics of perception can be summarized by saying that perceiving is that part of the process of living by which each one of us, from his own particular point of view, creates for himself the world within which he has his life's experiences and through which he strives to gain his satisfactions."¹¹ This set of concepts is relevant to decision-making, as we will see later.

All administration takes place within the context of an

⁹Ittelson and Cantril, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹*Ibid.*

organization. In the discussion of administration, organization is subsumed. It is a vitally important subtopic of the subject of administration, since administration is concerned with the control and direction of living in a social organization. What is meant by organization? First, we should recognize that we are concerned with two types of organizations, the *formal* and the *informal*.

Formal organization is construed to mean that system of roles which is arranged in a hierarchical manner and officially established to perform one or more tasks. Thus we have the business organization, the governmental bureau, the hospital, the public school. In each type of organization the task is more or less clearly understood by the general public. It is obvious that organizations result, in part at least, from the division of labor in society. It then follows that any *one* organization functions as a part of a larger social system. The task of the organization must have value for the social system if this system is to tolerate the organization's development.

Why is it that organizations take the form they do? Why is there so much commonality among organizations? Why, on the other hand, are there differences among organizations? Parsons gives us the insight which might answer these questions:

In its internal reference, the primacy of goal-attainment among the functions of a social system gives priority to those processes most directly involved with the success or failure of goal oriented endeavors. *This means essentially the decision-making process*, which controls the utilization of the resources of the system as a whole in the interest of the goal, and the processes by which those responsible for such decisions can count on the mobilization of those resources in the interest of a goal. These mechanisms of mobilization constitute what we ordinarily think of as the development of power in a political sense.¹²

Organizations take their common form from the decision-making process, and their differences occur in the modifications of the process required by the task and the way in which the public perceives the task. As illustrations: the monolithic nature

¹²Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations: I," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I, No. 1 (June, 1956), 66. Italics are the author's.

of the military organization is due to the narrow task and the absolute necessity for unilateral decision-making. There is no time for argument in the heat of battle. In hospitals we observe two lines of decision-making, one professional, through the doctors, the other semiprofessional, through the hospital administrator or manager. The need for two types of decisions gives form to the kind of hospital organization which we now have. In the public schools the decision-making process is almost wholly prescribed by state legislatures and arises largely out of prudential considerations. The primary difference between a business organization and a school organization is not that one is a profit-making enterprise; the difference resides in the decision-making process. This is a difference of substance, not form.

Let us note how the issues in organization can be resolved on the basis of the position we take about decisions. For instance, should an organization be tall or flat? This issue should be decided on the basis of what one believes about decision-making. If one wants decisions made on a decentralized basis, made by those close to the problems, then a flat organization is built. If one wants decisions made on a highly centralized basis, then a tall organization is preferred. The span-of-control issue can be resolved in much the same fashion. Rather than ask the question, How many persons should report to one administrator? we should ask, Who is responsible for what kind of decisions? Structure should be related to the decision-making process, not to the number of human relationships which a mathematician believes an administrator can remember.¹³ A small span of control is no doubt needed in the military, where the general makes decisions affecting the actions of all in his command. In a university the professor makes many decisions for himself which in the military would be made for him. Many more professors report to a dean than soldiers report to a military officer because of the difference in the nature and number of decisions made by the dean. An understanding of the decision-making process in a particular enterprise is the key to its organizational structure.

An informal organization is present in every formal organiza-

¹³Vytautas A. Graicunas, "Relationship in Organization," in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, ed. Luther Gulick and Lyndall F. Urwick (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), pp. 183-87.

tion; this is the system of interpersonal relations which forms to affect decisions made in the formal organization. This system is omitted from the formal scheme or is in opposition to it. The informal organization is a dynamic structure composed of special interest groups. In the past, the concept has been that of constant change—the informal structure being subject to continual revision as new decisions face the formal organization. For example, Barnard states:

Informal organization is indefinite and rather structureless, and has no definite subdivision. It may be regarded as a shapeless mass of quite varied densities, the variation in density being a result of external factors affecting the closeness of people geographically or of formal purposes which bring them specially into contact for conscious joint accomplishments. These areas of special density, I call informal organizations, as distinguished from societal or general organizations in its informal aspects. Thus there is an informal organization of a community, of a state. For our purposes, it is important that there are informal organizations related to formal organizations everywhere.¹⁴

Much the same pattern of informal groupings has been found in the political scene and has been described by Ernest S. Griffith:

One cannot live in Washington for long without being conscious that it has there whirlpools or centers of activity focusing on particular problems . . . There is nothing really mysterious about this sort of government. It is essentially "of men" and these men behave very naturally. "Who says what to whom and what is the reaction?" This question, if we could obtain enough answers, would capture the spirit, the genius of our own or any other government. It is my opinion that ordinarily the relationship among these men—legislators, administrators, lobbyists, scholars—who are interested in a common problem—is a much more real relationship than the relationship between congressmen generally or between administrators generally. In other words, he who would understand the prevailing pattern of our present government behavior, instead of studying the formal institutions or even generalizations in the relationships between these institutions or organs, important though all these are, may possibly obtain a better picture of the way things really

¹⁴Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 115.

happen if he would study these "whirlpools" of special social interest and problems.¹⁵

One can think of these areas of "density" or the "whirlpools" as being in constant change, as in the nebulae. The external force bringing the change is the decision. Two studies presently under way in different types of public school systems would lead us to believe that the informal structure has more permanency than Barnard suggests. It now appears that there are groupings among teachers which maintain themselves over a long period of time. They have the typical characteristics of small groups and generally form with at least one strong bond.¹⁶ Thus far it has been found that the dominant variables in group formation are age and length of service. Religion is a minor variable. It appears that the informal groups may be either of a passing nature or of a permanent nature. They all have in common, however, the purpose of altering the decision-making process of the formal organization.¹⁷

As people live within the framework of an organization, their lives are ordered in various ways. They move to behave in one manner or another, and it is necessary to explain the various types of behavior. Certainly, the way in which one perceives the situation in which he is placed offers one promising lead. There are others. The first of these is the concept of power. To many, this concept holds first place in a theory of organization. For instance, Parsons states: "Subject to the over-all control of an institutionalized value system in the society and its subsystems, the central phenomenon of organization is the mobilization of the power for the attainment of the goals of the organization."¹⁸

¹⁵Ernest S. Griffith, *The Impasse of Democracy* (New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, Inc., 1939), p. 182.

¹⁶For a further discussion of the structure of groups, see Daniel E. Griffiths, *Human Relations in School Administration* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), chap. viii.

¹⁷For a thorough discussion of the theoretical justification for this statement, see Conrad M. Arensberg, "Behavior and Organization: Industrial Studies," in *Social Psychology at the Crossroads*, ed. John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951), chap. xiv.

¹⁸Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization: II," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I, No. 2 (September 1956), 225.

concept of power helps to account for the control which an organization holds over those within it. We note that society has an ordered procedure for teaching its young. The relationship between the teacher and the young is an ordered one; it is institutionalized. Underlying the ordering of these interactions of teacher and the student is power. Bierstedt states this idea of power very well: "Power supports the fundamental order of society and the social organization within it, wherever there is order. Power stands behind every association and sustains its structure. Without power there is no organization and without power there is no order."¹⁹

A definition of power which has had general acceptance is Hunter's; he states: "Power is a word that will be used to describe the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things."²⁰ We do not regard power as the central concept in a theory of administration, since there appears to be a question as to *why* power is exercised. While there is some evidence that power is sought for the sake of power,²¹ there seems to be a more rational answer. Power is sought so as to control the decision-making process in the organization. While this is clearly apparent in the business and political world, it is less apparent in the public school or the university. However, it is still present. Control of the decision-making process is in turn the key to greater power—that is, the ability to make more decisions of greater importance to the power holder.

In continuing our analysis of administration to determine relevant concepts, we find that a consideration of power leads us to the concept of authority. Although many writers use the terms "power" and "authority" interchangeably, there is a distinct difference between the terms. Simon has used the definition of authority which states that "'authority' may be defined as the power to make decisions which guide the actions of another."²²

¹⁹Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," *American Sociological Review*, XV (December, 1950), 730-36.

²⁰Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), pp. 2-3.

²¹Alfred McClung Lee, "Power-Seekers," in *Studies in Leadership*, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), pp. 667-78.

²²Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

In discussing this concept, he points out that in every authority situation there is a superior and a subordinate. The superior frames decisions and anticipates that they will be followed. "The subordinate expects such decisions, and his conduct is determined by them."²³ Simon has made a formal operational definition of the concept: "A subordinate may be said to accept authority whenever he permits his behavior to be guided by a decision reached by another, irrespective of his own judgment as to the merits of that decision."²⁴

It is apparent that for decisions to be made and to be put into operation, co-operation and co-ordination of the activities of many individuals are necessary. Co-operation and co-ordination would be impossible without language. A recent study by Cherry gives new insights to the administrative theoretician; in an introductory essay entitled "Communication and Organization" he points out:

When "members" or "elements" are in communication with one another, they are associating, cooperating, forming an "organization," or sometimes an "organism." Communication is a social function. That old cliché, "a whole is more than the sum of its parts," expresses a truth; the whole, the organization or organism, possesses a structure which is describable as a set of *rules*, and this structure, the rules, may remain unchanged as the individual members or elements are changed. By the possession of this structure the whole organization may be better adapted or better fitted for some goal-seeking activity. Communication means a *sharing* of elements of behavior, or modes of life, by the existence of sets of rules.²⁵

Let us now see how these concepts are of use in analyzing the decision-making process.

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

There is a great, almost universal, belief that decisions of all kinds are made by going through a process of X number of steps,

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁵Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication* (New York: John Wiley & Sons and The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1957), p. 6.

usually described as five or six, depending upon the writer. These steps are considered to be almost mechanical in nature, and it is assumed that if several people proceed through these steps, seeking the solution to a specific problem, they will each arrive at the same conclusion. This is asking a great deal of any set of steps; yet it would appear that many people expect it. A more reasoned approach is needed and is attempted in this paper. Simon points the direction of this inquiry: "Two persons, given the same possible alternatives, the same values, the same knowledge, can rationally reach only the same decision."²⁶ Note the tremendous restrictions placed upon the decision-makers. Not only are the alternatives restricted, but also the values and knowledge of the decision-maker are limited. In addition, Simon does not rule out the possibility that a person can make an irrational decision. The limits of rationality are great in themselves, for Simon states:

... when the limits to rationality are viewed from the individual's standpoint, they fall into three categories: he is limited by his unconscious skills, habits, and reflexes; he is limited by his values and conceptions of purpose, which may diverge from the organization goals, he is limited by the extent of his knowledge and information. The individual can be rational in terms of the organization's goals only to the extent that he is *able* to pursue a particular course of action, he has a correct conception of the *goal* of the action, and he is correctly *informed* about the conditions surrounding his action. Within the boundaries laid down by these factors his choices are rational-goal-oriented.²⁷

If it could be conceived as possible that two persons were alike in all of the above variables, then it is entirely possible that they would make the same decision on a problem.

In practically any discussion of the process of decision-making, steps similar to the following will be presented and described: (1) Recognize, define, and limit the problem. (2) Analyze and evaluate the problem. (3) Establish criteria or standards by which a solution will be evaluated or judged as acceptable and adequate to the need. (4) Collect data. (5) Formulate

²⁶Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

²⁷*Ibid.*

and select the preferred solution or solutions. Test them in advance. (6) Put into effect the preferred solution. The preparation for making a particular decision begins in the past of the decision-maker, before the first formal step in the process. In the first step the problem becomes known, and the decision-maker goes through a process of defining and limiting the problem. He attempts to state the problem in terms of either his goals or the goals of the enterprise, and he also attempts to state the problem in such a way that he can grasp its significance.

Not all problems are problems to all people. Neither are problems of the same magnitude to all people. When some people say that the ability to recognize problems is a characteristic of a good administrator, they are saying that certain administrators have the ability to perceive more accurately and completely than do others and that this skill in perception helps their companies to be more successful. We have had good illustrations of this in many fields. The chairman of an eastern university's department of education delighted in telling the story of his annual visits with the principal of a large urban high school. After a few opening remarks, he would ask, "Well, what problem are you working on this year?" The answer invariably was, "We don't have problems, we have answers!" It is interesting to note that in the year following the retirement of the principal, the high school was completely reorganized and its purpose changed drastically. The principal was able to screen out of his perceptual field all of the problems which threatened him.

A discussion of the recognition of problems is not a matter to dismiss lightly. Murphy states the dilemma in its full difficulty:

There is a rather bewildering mass of evidence, both clinical and experimental, relating to the ability to shut out of clear awareness those stimuli which threaten us; some of these studies seem to indicate that, as vague awareness of a situation tends to become defined, we can arrest the process, so that sharp and explicit awareness does not follow; and perhaps that, after reaching this critical point and effecting this rejection, we actually demolish (repress?) what has begun to take place.²⁸

²⁸Gardner Murphy, "Knowns and Unknowns in the Dynamics of Social Perception," in *Group Relations at the Crossroads*, ed. Muzafer A. Sherif and Melbourne O. Wilson (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 148.

So we see that the administrator who gets an inkling of a situation which threatens his security *may* repress the perception and not see it at all. On the other hand, the administrator may perceive the problem, not be threatened, accept the situation, and act upon his perception. Some interesting research at the University of Kentucky points out that administrators who can do this have a personality structure which allows them to "accept their own worth and believe that other people are equally or more accepting of their worth."²⁹ These are contrasted with the administrators who "accept themselves and believe that other people are less accepting of themselves."³⁰ The latter are the administrators who constantly change or screen their perceptions. The above research may account for the need to change executives felt by most corporations in trouble. The present executives have not perceived the "right" problems and so have failed to change their course of action. New executives are more secure in that they cannot be blamed for the present mess, perceive the problems clearly and accurately, and act on the basis of their perceptions.

The ability to perceive problems is also related to knowledge of the area in which the problem resides. For this reason it is not possible to develop skill in decision-making *per se*; instead, one must develop skill in making decisions about something in particular. Consider, for example, the airplane captain who has "lost" an engine five hundred miles out of Gander on his way to Shannon. Should he continue, or should he turn back? In the first instance, some of the passengers will not even recognize the problem. Certainly they will not recognize the problem with its full ramifications. The captain's knowledge of his airplane, its load, the weather conditions at Gander, the probability of restarting the engine or the probability of keeping it feathered, all of this substantive knowledge helps the captain first to recognize the problem and then to define and limit the problem.

There is also a semantic dimension to this step. The way in which the decision-maker verbalizes the problem during the definition and limiting stage is of importance. If our captain

²⁹Robert L. Hopper and Robert E. Bills, "What's a Good Administrator Made of?" *School Executive*, LXXIV, No. 7 (March, 1955), 94.

³⁰*Ibid.*

verbalizes the lost engine as "a blazing fireball" or "an overheated cylinder," the verbalization will condition the reactions of both himself and his crew. The problem should be verbalized as accurately as possible, using words with the most appropriate referents.

Once the problem is recognized, defined, and limited, there should follow an analysis and evaluation. Such questions as these should be asked: What does the problem mean to me? What does the problem mean to the organization? What can I do about it? What do I want to do about it? What do we want to do about it?

It should be apparent at this step, just as in the steps above, that there is a matter of perception which must be considered. In addition, the value system of the decision-maker must be taken into account. These values give significance to the problem and determine the degree and nature of the action to be taken. It is at this stage, very often, that the "decision to make a decision" is made. If, in evaluating the situation, one decides to go no further, then the decision to make no decision is made. In determining future action it is as important as any other decision. Let us look at a short case which illustrates this point.

The Gilder Central School is a fast growing suburban school district. It is fiscally independent in that it sets its own budget, fixes the tax rate and collects its own taxes. The district includes one large town and small parts of several other towns. In the state where Gilder Central is located, the power to assess property is in the hands of local assessors, so there are several people assessing property in the school district. These are political positions and they generally owe their positions to an elected official known as a supervisor.

The school officials have had to raise taxes constantly over a period of time. The tax rate has risen from 20 mills to 60 mills in five years. This has brought about much complaining, particularly on the part of the new people who have recently come into the district. Their homes are assessed at a higher rate than the older homes. The school district officials have been urged to encourage the supervisor to do two things. 1. Reassess property so that everyone will pay on the same basis. 2. Encourage industries to settle in the community. Thus far the school officials have not done either.³¹

³¹Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

Why have the school board officials not moved in either direction? Why have they made a decision to do nothing? It is clear that the school board members have recognized the problem; they have defined and limited it. However, in analyzing and evaluating, they saw several other aspects of the problem which were not seen by the citizens of the school district. They noted an injustice being done to the new residents but observed that they were not as powerful as the old residents. A reassessment of property would alienate the old residents and so create a larger group of antagonists. This was also the argument for not encouraging industry. Most of the older residents had come to the area to escape from the more industrialized areas. In evaluating the problem, the board saw the power structure clearly and thus decided as it did.

The next concern is with the criteria by which the proposed solutions to the problem will be evaluated. This is a crucial stage in the decision-making process because here is where the value system and the aspirations of the organization or individual are built into the process. At the present time we have an excellent example of this in the debate in the New York State Legislature on a bill which would prevent the Public Service Commission from changing its base for computing profit for utility companies. The New York Telephone Company had applied for a \$55,400,000 rate increase. This would have been a justifiable increase had the base on which rates are computed been changed from the amount of money originally invested in plant, less depreciation, to replacement value at the present time. In a sense, a decision on criteria and standards must be made prior to the major decision. This, again, indicates the sequential nature of the decision-making process.

Next, data are collected on the basis of which the decision is to be made. Collect data, yes, but what data? More data than can be used are usually collected. Briefly, data should be relevant, that is, either free from bias or with the bias clearly indicated, and repeatable, that is, others using the same data will find them the same as does the decision-maker.

The selection of the preferred solution is the point of decision. All that has gone on before culminates in a decision. Actually, this step has three subsections: formulating several solutions or

decisions, weighing the consequences of each solution (assigning probabilities), and selecting a single solution as the one most likely to succeed. Formulation of several solutions calls for the use of inventiveness, so that all possible solutions will be considered. At this point the wise administrator will enlist the aid of his staff and of other groups in order to broaden the number of proffered solutions. Prominent among these should be the decision to do nothing, since it is as much a decision as any other.

At this phase of the process there also occurs a weighing of the consequences of each solution. The decision-maker says, "If I do this, then this will happen." He predicts the consequences on the basis of what he knows of the solution's probabilities of success. Some of these probabilities can be stated mathematically, but more often they must be approximated. This is certainly true in school administration, where the superintendent can only approximate in a very rough way the probable success of a chosen path of action. Schematically, the situation at this point is illustrated by Figure 4.³²




FIG. 4.—Probability event chain (after Bross)

This should be read as follows (proceeding along the top line): X represents the decision, A_1 the action, and $Y_1 | A_1$ the predicted consequences of following A_1 . A diagram like Figure 4

³²Irwin D. J. Bross, *Design for Decision* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), p. 25.

is called a *probability event chain*, since it depicts the probability of the consequences attending each action.

The third phase calls for the selection of *one* solution. Just how one solution is arrived at as *the* solution is not clear. It should be obvious, though, that subdecisions have been made in each of the preceding steps and that these circumscribe the nature of the solution to be selected and tested. In other words, the preferred solution is not likely to be a bolt out of the blue; it is more likely to be a sequential outgrowth of other decisions made earlier in the process. Penelope Mortimer says this well when speaking of her two leading characters in *The Bright Prison*. They were people "who did things not because they were right or wrong, pleasant or unpleasant, but because there was no alternative."³³

While there has been much speculation as to why one decision is made rather than others, much work needs to be done in this area. However, one non-statistical approach is presented here. This approach is based upon the concept of valence and has been used primarily by field psychologists to explain decisions.³⁴ The valence concept as the basis for a theory of decision-making has been developed by Cartwright and Festinger³⁵ and recently has been elaborated by Gyr.³⁶ His basic model describes the relationship among force, valence, and potency and is expressed by the formula:

$$f_{PG} = (V_a G)(P_o S)$$

where:

- f_{PG} is the force (f) on the person (P) toward the goal (G),
 $V_a G$ is the valence of G , and
 $P_o S$ is the potency of the situations.

This expresses a single situation with one valence. A more common situation with two valences is represented by:

³³Penelope Mortimer, *The Bright Prison* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1957).

³⁴For an elementary description of valence and its application to choice, see Griffiths, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-44.

³⁵Dorwin Cartwright and Leon Festinger, "Quantitative Theory of Decisions," *Psychological Review*, L (November, 1943), 595-621.

³⁶John W. Gyr, "A Theory of Interpersonal Decision," *Ph.D. Abstracts*, XIII (1952), 895-96.

$$f_{PG} = (V_a R)(P_o S_R) + (V_a C)(P_o S_C)(P_o S_R)$$

where:

- $V_a R$ is the valence of the goal to "be right,"
- $V_a C$ is the valence of the goal "to co-operate,"
- $P_o S_R$ is the potency of the situation in relation to the goal to be "right," and
- $P_o S_C$ is the potency of the situation in relation to the goal to co-operate."

Gyr found he was able to predict decisions with a frequency far better than chance, but he found that assigned probabilities needed revision and that there was difficulty in measurement. Non-quantitative approaches to predicting decisions seem to be fruitless attempts. While quantitative approaches have not been completely satisfactory, they hold much promise.

We can well understand the decision made through a succession of steps as described above, because we have seen the unfolding of the decision through many smaller ones. What is difficult to understand is the maverick decision, that is, one which appears to break the sequence. This is illustrated by the story of the executive who was selecting a new secretary. He interviewed three in the presence of a friend. Aside from the usual questions, he asked each, "What is 2 and 2?" The first replied, "4," the second, "22," and the third said, "Either 4 or 22." The executive then explained to his friend that the first girl was rather rigid and would work according to rules; the second was creative; while the third was very flexible and could see many points of view. "Well," said the friend, "I suppose you will hire the third?" "Oh no," said the executive, "I'll hire the first; she had the biggest eyes!"

Putting the solution into effect is the last step in the decision-making process, and it involves both implementing the decision and modifying it in terms of conditions which occur as the decision becomes operational (known as feedback). Even though a major decision is to be put into effect, this does not mean that the decision-making process ceases. In the implementation there are numerous minor decisions which need to be made; this further emphasizes the sequential nature of the decision process.

It is at this point that the concept of "initiating structure-in-interaction" so well described by Hemphill³⁷ comes into play.

LIMITS ON DECISION-MAKING

All decision-makers operate within a set of limits. Sometimes the limits are broad—as with the President of the United States—sometimes extremely narrow—as with a young child—but regardless of the position or status of the decision-maker, there are limits. The chief purpose of setting limitations on decision-making power is to improve the caliber of decisions made. When limitations are set up, ways and means of making decisions, as well as the content of the decisions, are prescribed. The usual way of doing this in an organization is through the setting of policy. An effective set of policies should indicate *who* is to make a decision, *what* the decision is to be concerned with, and some information as to *how* the decision is to be made. Members of an organization should have the security which well-written policy affords them. One of the chief causes of confusion in the network of human relationships in an organization is the lack of clear policy.

For purposes of discussion six limits on decision-making are presented: definition of purpose, criterion of rationality, conditions of employment, lines of formal authority, relevant information provided, and time limits.³⁸ The first limit on decision-making power is the definition of the purpose of an organization. When the purpose is set forth clearly, the members of an organization are prevented from making certain decisions and are channeled toward making certain other decisions. Definition of purpose is not easy, as is demonstrated by an examination of any organization in actual operation. Consider this case:

A midwestern firm has always specialized in the manufacture of the founder's basic invention. It has always conceived of its business as doing the best it could with that one product. Changing conditions now force it to consider merging with another company making a related but quite different product. By merging it can make more money—but

³⁷See chap. v of this book.

³⁸Adapted from Robert Tannenbaum, "Managerial Decision-making," *Journal of Business*, XXIII, No. 1 (January, 1950), 33-37.

management will have to divide its attention among several different lines of manufacture. Does its strength lie in manufacturing one kind of product—or what? Will its business security be enhanced by merger? Is a larger return on its investment a true measure of its business success?³⁹

The definition of the purpose of the organization is a function for top management to perform. Only it has the information and understanding which is necessary for making this judgment. The clarification of the purpose provides a definite limit on the decisions made within the organization.

As Simon has pointed out, "The individual can be rational in terms of the organization's goals only to the extent that he is *able* to pursue a particular course of action, he has a correct conception of the *goal* of the action, and he is correctly *informed* about the conditions surrounding his action."⁴⁰ Many procedures are used to insure the rationality of the actions of members of an organization. Attempts are made to select individuals who have an inclination to accept the goals of the enterprise; they are submitted to an intensive program of indoctrination (commonly called orientation); they participate in continuing programs of indoctrination over long periods of time (commonly called in-service education); they perform according to standard operating procedures or written rules and regulations or teachers' handbooks, whatever the organization may be. At the same time, the organization man's wife has undergone a similar program of selection and indoctrination. Modern organizations leave little to chance in insuring that decisions made by subordinates are made in conformity with the goals of the organization.

A very simple illustration will show how the establishment of a criterion of rationality facilitates the handling of a certain type of decision. The following is an excerpt from the *East Greenbush Central School Teachers' Handbook*: "All students who become ill during school hours should be referred to the nurse who will make the decision regarding disposition of the case. No child should ever be excused to go home due to illness until he has been seen by the nurse. Parents must be contacted

³⁹Bruce Payne, "Steps in Long-Range Planning," *Harvard Business Review*, XXXV, No. 2 (March-April, 1957), 99-100.

⁴⁰Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

and transportation provided." This regulation illustrates the point that who will make the decision, on what subject they will make it, and how they will make it is not left to chance. Teachers and principals work within a single frame of reference. Although individuals are restricted in the areas in which they can make decisions, there is a strong tendency to increase the rationality of behavior of the individuals.

When an individual is employed by an organization, he is employed for a particular position. In effect, the conditions of employment are a limitation upon the decisions which he can make. The foreman of the crankshaft department, for instance, is not expected to make decisions about the internal operation of the assembly department.

By establishing lines of formal authority and having them clearly understood by all, the administration insures that each individual knows who will make those decisions that will affect him directly. This prevents problems which arise when individuals are accountable to more than one person, when lines are not clear, and when several people believe themselves responsible for a single area.

The providing of relevant information can be looked upon in three different ways. First, if the administration wants to involve others in the decision-making process, it can aid good decisions by providing a wealth of information. It can send bulletins, hold meetings at which relevant data are presented and discussed, and make announcements. It can make certain that the members of the staff get pertinent information, get it first—ahead of outsiders—and get it in a manner which shows that the administration is pleased that they do get it.

Second, the opposite result can ensue if the administration withholds information. It is sometimes the practice for administrators to keep all relevant information to themselves and still expect that there will be willing participation in decision-making. A group from whom information has been withheld will not only not participate but will resent being asked to.

Third, administrators who wish to give the appearance of co-operating with their staffs, of being democratic, yet who do not believe that a decision arrived at with the full participation of the staff is a better one than that arrived at by the adminis-

trator alone, use still another method. They dole out bits of information and in this way manipulate the group, as indicated by the following case:

In an elementary school building the faculty had been vitally concerned with the problem of noon hour supervision. After a month of controversy the faculty seemed to have arrived at a decision concerning rotation of playground supervisors. This decision was one in which the principal had little faith and it was obvious that he opposed it. The faculty appeared as though it would support the decision regardless of the principal's views. On the morning prior to the faculty meeting which would decide this issue each teacher received a notice which read, "In view of the fact that the Central Office will shortly consider the problem of noon hour supervision on a system-wide basis I believe it would be wise to drop all consideration of the matter," signed by the principal.⁴¹

Needless to say, the dropping of this information at this strategic time stopped the faculty from further discussion of the issue. It can be concluded that the free flow of information of concern to the members of the organization increases the rationality of the decisions which are made. The decision-making ability of the members of the organization is abridged when no information is forthcoming or when the information is distributed in a manipulatory manner.

Setting a time limit is a method of forcing action on the part of subordinates. It is particularly effective when used with individuals who are not sufficiently self-motivated to act on a particular issue. They may lack motivation for at least two reasons: having a strong interest in another area which precludes interest in the area under consideration, and never having had the opportunity to make a decision and so tending to dally under new freedom. When the authority to make a decision is delegated, there should always be a time limit indicated. This, of course, should not be of such short duration that it will result in a shoddy job.

THE OCCASIONS FOR DECISION-MAKING

When should a decision be made? The decision-making process is not one which should be initiated without thought.

⁴¹Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

Executives are busy people and need to have some guide in order to systematize their work. Barnard offers one generalized key to the occasions for decision-making: "The fine art of executive decision consists in not deciding questions that are not now pertinent, in not deciding prematurely, in not making decisions that cannot be made effective, and in not making decisions that others should make."⁴²

Barnard suggests that each executive answer several questions before he makes a decision. If the answer to any question is "yes," then he should not make the decision. Either someone else should make it, or it should not be made at that time. While Barnard intended that his admonitions be pointed at executives, they hold true generally. As an example, the small-group leader who makes a decision which cannot be carried out loses tremendously in status and prestige.

Barnard's statement indicates when not to make decisions, but what are the occasions for *making* decisions? He indicates three: authoritative communication from superiors, cases referred for decisions by subordinates, and cases originating in the initiative of the executive concerned.⁴³ For the sake of brevity these will be referred to, respectively, as intermediary decisions, appellate decisions, and creative decisions. They are discussed in order of frequency and not necessarily of importance.

The intermediary decision is a very common one in any organization. These decisions arise whenever orders, commands, or policies are handed down by superiors to subordinates. In the public schools, for instance, the superintendent of schools is the executive officer of the board of education. The board makes policy (often with the aid of the superintendent), and the superintendent is expected to administer the policy. He may do this by delegating the matter to one or more building principals or by handling the matter himself. In any event, the matter must be attended to and cannot fall under the several admonitions for not making a decision mentioned by Barnard.

Because of the position of the executive who must make intermediary decisions, many difficulties are encountered. These

⁴²Barnard, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 189-92.

have been very capably discussed in general by Roethlisberger,⁴⁴ but to note some of the difficulties involved, let us look at a case in which a superintendent must make an intermediary decision:

One of our buildings had been declared unsafe for school use. A new building had been erected to take its place. Before sidewalks could be completed the rainy season set in. The board decided that since the old building had already been in use six months after it was declared unsafe, it would not hurt to use it a few months longer and thus save the new building from damage from the mud.

But the parents became anxious. They protested the delay in occupying the new building to me and some of the faculty. They said: "We voted bonds for the new building because you declared the old one unsafe; why jeopardize the lives of the children any longer?" My reply was made too hurriedly and was prompted by a self-protective impulse. I said we only waited the authorization of the board of education to move. I was properly reminded, when the time came, by one of the board members that I had been disloyal to the board. I had not backed up the policy the board had adopted for protecting the building by explaining the reason for the delay.⁴⁵

The most apparent point illustrated by the case is the "man-in-the-middle" nature of this sort of decision. In this case, the board had made an obviously unpopular, if not immoral, decision. The superintendent was expected to make the necessary administrative decision to implement the decision of the board. Faced with the angry parents, he reneged and indicated that he was not a party to the act. Those who must make intermediary decisions have a difficult role to play, but play it they must at the risk of losing their position.

The making of intermediary decisions requires great human relations skill, since these decisions are essentially of an implementing nature and call for a change in the behavior of individuals who are affected. While this would seem to require participation on the part of those involved, care must be taken to warn those involved that they are not really making the decision; they are being conditioned to accept the decision, since the adminis-

⁴⁴Fritz J. Roethlisberger, "The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk," *Harvard Business Review*, XXIII (Spring, 1945), 285-94.

⁴⁵Ralph V. Hunkins, *Superintendent and School Board* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1949), pp. 75-76.

trator is putting into operation the decision of his superiors. This is the type of situation reported by Levine and Butler⁴⁶ and Lewin⁴⁷ in which a decision has been made and studies done to determine how to get people to accept the decisions. Analysis of their studies indicates that the best procedure is to use small discussion groups under the guidance of a skilled discussion leader.

Appellate decisions are referred to the administrator from his subordinates for a number of reasons. One category of appeals stems from incompetence—a staff member has been delegated the authority to make a decision and finds that he is incapable. A building principal, for example, finds that he cannot construct a class schedule (dependent upon a large number of decisions), or a plant manager cannot improve a production schedule. Another category of appeals is that which has its genesis in novel situations. Subordinates find that they cannot act under present policy because it does not cover the novel situation that has arisen. Another area of appeals has its roots in the incompetence of superiors. Communications containing decisions are not understood by the staff, and it becomes necessary to issue new instructions. The most common type of appellate decision is concerned with settling disputes between two or more subordinates. Disputes between line and staff officers, heads of two divisions, and the like, illustrate this type of decision.

The number of appellate decisions an executive is called upon to make is an indication of an organization's state of health. A relatively small number would indicate that decisions were being made in accord with standard operating procedures, that competent personnel had been placed in key positions, and that interpersonal relations were smooth. Barnard summarizes this point succinctly: "The control of the number of appellate cases lies in adequacy of executive organization, of personnel, of previous decision; and the development of the processes of informal organization. The test of executive action is to make these de-

⁴⁶Jacob Levine and John Butler, "Lecture vs. Group Decision in Changing Behavior," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, XXXVI, No. 1 (February, 1952), 29-33.

⁴⁷Kurt Lewin, "Studies in Group Decision," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1953), pp. 287-301.

cisions when they are important, or when they cannot be delegated reasonably, and to decline the others."⁴⁸

While the two types of decisions discussed above originated outside the person of the administrator who ultimately made the decision, creative decisions originate within the person of the administrator. The key concept of origination has led some, including Livingston, to call these "originative decisions." *Creative* is preferable, since it denotes more clearly the nature of this type of decision.

The creative decision-maker makes a decision which changes the direction of the activity of an organization. While other decisions are largely made within a framework of policy, the creative decision breaks with established policy. This type of decision calls for new policy, for a change in the thinking and activity of the members of the organization, and often for a change in the organization itself—occasionally calling for the demise of the organization.

Since the creative decision is accompanied by much criticism on the part of those affected, it is the type of decision which is difficult to make and relatively rare. The making of creative decisions indicates dissatisfaction with the status quo. Those affected tend to protect themselves, and the struggle is on. By their very nature, creative decisions are not easily made in groups and are almost invariably the product of an individual. It is also difficult to get acceptance through the group approach, although this is the only way in which acceptance can be gained. Ability and desire to make creative decisions is the mark of a top executive. These decisions cannot be delegated and can only rarely be shared; they must be shouldered by the executive himself. He must work the decision through, even though there is certain to be opposition.

Is it possible to postulate any propositions at this stage of the development of a theory of administration? Since a theory of administration *should* be action-oriented and since new knowledge is most apt to result when there is something to shoot at, we are suggesting some tentative formulations. No pretense of

⁴⁸Barnard, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

a full-fledged theory is being made, yet we must get on with the job. The following propositions are a summary of this chapter.

Major proposition.—The decision-making process is the central process of administration. Previous formulations such as Litchfield's⁴⁹ or Gulick's POSDCORB⁵⁰ are in essence descriptions of the total decision-making process. The decision-making process, as elaborated upon in this paper, is sufficient to describe the nature of administration.

Major proposition.—The decision-making process determines the structure of the organization. The issues of organization can more readily be resolved if viewed as the outgrowth of a concept of decision-making. The type of decision-making process followed in an organization determines the structure to be built.

Minor proposition.—An individual's rank in an organizational structure is directly related to the degree of autonomy he exercises in decision-making. Another way of stating this proposition is in terms of the limits of decision-making. If few of the limits apply, then the individual has a high rank; if they all apply, then he has a low rank in the organization.

Minor proposition.—Differences in the organizational structure of military, industrial, educational, business, and public administrative institutions can be accounted for in terms of different concepts of decision-making to a much greater degree than can be done by such conventional concepts as private enterprise.

Major proposition.—If the formal and informal organization approach congruency, then the total organization will approach maximum achievement. This proposition indicates the belief that the informal organization which is found in all institutions must approach the formal in its perception of the task of the institution *and* in the way the group behaves in achieving the task if there is to be maximum achievement.

Converse proposition.—If the total organization is not ap-

⁴⁹Edward H. Litchfield, "Notes on a General Theory of Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I No. 1 (June, 1956), 3-29.

⁵⁰Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Gulick and Urwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-45.

proaching maximum achievement, then, in all probability, the formal and informal organizations are divergent. This proposition suggests that the major reason for failure to achieve in an organization is the divergency of perceptions and resultant behaviors between the formal and informal organizations.

Minor proposition.—Informal organizations form so as to influence the decisions of the formal organizations. This is apparent in studies made of school units as well as other institutions. The most profitable procedure for the study of informal organization appears to be to identify a decision made by the formal organization and then to identify the individuals as they group themselves in accordance with their perception of the decision and their interest in it.

It appears that it is extremely profitable to consider decision-making (as a total process) as the central process of administration. Not only does this give guides to action, but it enables us to account for what we can observe and provides leads for research and new knowledge.

CHAPTER VII

Administration as a Social Process

JACOB W. GETZELS

In this discussion of administration as a social process, I plan to do two things: First, I shall present a model of social behavior that seems to me to have particular relevance to administration. This model will be described in psychological and sociological terms. Second, I shall mention a number of hypothetical derivations from the model and will indicate, however briefly, some of the research that has been generated by these ideas. Derivations that have already been made, and for which some research exists, include interpersonal perception and superordinate-subordinate consensus; the nature of institutional and individual conflict; the problems of effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction; and the nature of differential leadership-followership styles.

Clearly, however, I shall not have time to discuss all of these in detail, and accordingly I shall focus on the hypotheses and research relevant to just two of the derivations—actually the first two—as illustrative of the application of the model to research issues in administration. For in the long run, the best test of the usefulness of a theoretical formulation is whether or not it generates research and inquiry.

Perhaps it might be well to say something first about our intention in constructing the model. The model was constructed with three specific criteria in mind: (1) the model must provide a set of integrated concepts and relations capable not only of answering questions already asked in administration but of posing questions that still need to be asked; (2) the concepts and relations must be operational in that they not only give

direction to our understanding but simultaneously provide blueprints for investigation; (3) the model must be able to handle as many of the commonplaces or familiar issues in administration as possible within a single set of concepts and relations. In short, we sought a model that was at once heuristic, operational, and that had the elegance and power of parsimony. It goes without saying that we did not altogether succeed in our intention. But I cannot help adding that the very attempt may be of interest and perhaps even of some value.

Just one more introductory word, if I may: I would like to take this opportunity to make two acknowledgments—first to Talcott Parsons, whose influence will be apparent throughout the paper, although he may want to disown what I say specifically, and second to Egon Guba, who collaborated with me on many of these formulations.¹

THE MODEL

Let us begin with a general conception, if not a definition, of administration. Not that I think we are able to provide an entirely satisfactory conception, but at least a statement of a conception in explicit terms will give us something to agree with or depart from meaningfully.

Let me say then that we may conceive of administration *structurally* as the hierarchy of subordinate-superordinate relationships within a social system. *Functionally*, this hierarchy of relationships is the locus for allocating and integrating roles and facilities in order to achieve the goals of the social system. It is here, in these relationships, that the assignment of statuses, the provision of facilities, the organization of procedures, the regulation of activity, and the evaluation of performance takes place.

Of course, these functions are the responsibility of the superordinate member of the hierarchy, but each function becomes effective only insofar as it "takes" with the subordinate member. It is this circumstance, that is, that administration always operates in an interpersonal—or, if you will, *social* relationship—that

¹See Jacob W. Getzels and Egon G. Guba, "Social Behavior and the Administrative Process," *School Review*, LXV (Winter, 1957), 423-41.

makes the nature of this relationship the crucial factor in the administrative process.

We may begin the description of our model with a consideration of the most general context of interpersonal or social behavior, i.e., a given social system. The term "social system" is of course conceptual rather than descriptive and must not be confused with society or state, or as somehow applicable only to *large* aggregates of human interaction. So within this framework, for one purpose a given community may be considered a social system with the school a particular organization within the more general social system. For another purpose, the school itself or even a single class within the school may be considered a social system in its own right. The model proposed here is applicable regardless of the level or size of the unit under consideration.

We conceive of the social system as involving two classes of phenomena which are at once conceptually independent and phenomenally interactive. There are first the institutions with certain roles and expectations that will fulfil the goals of the system. And there are second the individuals with certain personalities and need-dispositions inhabiting the system, whose observed interactions comprise what we generally call "social behavior." We shall assert that this social behavior may be understood as a function of these major elements: institution, role, and expectation, which together constitute what we shall call the *nomothetic* or normative dimension of activity in a social system; and individual, personality, and need-disposition, which together constitute the *idiographic* or personal dimension of activity in a social system.

To understand the nature of observed behavior—and to be able to predict and control it—we must understand the nature and relationship of these elements. We shall briefly make four points of definition in this connection:

1. The term "institution" has received a variety of definitions, and nothing will be gained from a review of all possible meanings. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that all social systems have certain imperative functions that come in time to be carried out in certain routinized ways. These functions—say,

governing, educating, policing within a state—may be said to have become “institutionalized,” and the agencies established to carry out these institutionalized functions for the social system as a whole may be termed “institutions.”

2. The most important analytic subunit of the institution is the role. Roles are, to use Linton's terminology, the “dynamic aspects” of the positions, offices, and statuses within an institution, and they define the behavior of the role incumbents or actors.²

3. Roles are defined in terms of role expectations. A role has certain normative obligations and responsibilities, which may be termed “role expectations,” and when the role incumbent puts these obligations and responsibilities into effect, he is said to be performing his role. The expectations define for the actor, whoever he may be, what he should or should not do as long as he is the incumbent of the particular role.

4. Roles are complementary. Roles are interdependent in that each role derives its meaning from other related roles in the institution. In a sense, a role is a prescription not only for the given role incumbent but also for the incumbents of other roles within the organization, so that in a hierarchial setting the expectations of one role may to some extent also form the sanctions for a second interlocking role. Thus, for example, the role of sergeant and the role of private in the army cannot really be defined or implemented except in relation to each other. It is this quality of complementarity which fuses two or more roles into a coherent, interactive unit and which makes it possible for us to conceive of an institution as having a characteristic structure.

So far we have examined the elements constituting the nomothetic or normative aspects of social behavior. At this level of analysis, it was sufficient to conceive of the role incumbents as only “actors,” devoid of personalistic or other individualizing characteristics—as if all incumbents were exactly alike and as if they implemented a given role in exactly the same way. This is not, incidentally, by any means to derogate the power of this

²Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936), p. 14.

typical sociological level of analysis. Indeed, for certain gross understanding and prediction of behavior this is exactly the right level of abstraction. For example, if I know the roles in a given military or educational institution, I can make some rather accurate predictions of what the people in these institutions do without ever observing the actual people involved.

But roles are of course occupied by real individuals, and no two individuals are alike. Each individual stamps the particular role he occupies with the unique style of his own characteristic pattern of expressive behavior. Even in the case of the relatively inflexible roles of sergeant and private, no two individual sergeants and no two individual privates fulfil their roles in exactly the same way. To understand the observed behavior of *specific* sergeants and *specific* privates, it is not enough to know the nature of the roles and expectations—although, to be sure, their behavior cannot be understood apart from these—but we must also know the nature of the individuals inhabiting the roles and reacting to the expectations. That is, in addition to the nomothetic or normative aspects, we must consider also the idiographic or individualizing aspects of social behavior. We must, in addition to the sociological level of analysis, include the psychological level of analysis.

Now just as we were able to analyze the institutional dimension into the component elements of role and expectation, so we may, in a parallel manner, analyze the individual dimension into the component elements of personality and need-disposition. We may turn to a brief consideration of these two terms.

The concept "personality," like the role or institution, has been given a variety of meanings. For our purposes, personality may be defined as the dynamic organization within the individual of those need-dispositions that govern his *unique* reactions to the environment (and we might add, in the present model, to the expectations in the environment). The central analytic elements of personality are the need-dispositions, which we can define with Parsons and Shils as "individual tendencies to orient and act with respect to objects in certain manners and to expect certain consequences from these actions."³

³Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 114.

Returning to the example of the sergeant and the private, we can now make an essential distinction between two sergeants, one of whom has a high need-disposition for "submission" and the other, a high need-disposition for "ascendancy," and a similar distinction between two privates, one with a high need-disposition for "submission" and the other for "ascendancy," in the fulfilment of their respective roles, and for the sergeant-private interaction.

In short, as we have remarked before, to understand the behavior of specific role-incumbents in an institution, we must know both the role-expectations and the need-dispositions. Indeed, needs and expectations may both be thought of as motives for behavior, the one deriving from personalistic sets and propensities, the other from institutional obligations and requirements.

One troublesome facet of the model to which it seems to me insufficient attention has been given—and which I should like to take this occasion to remedy to some extent if I can—is the problem of the dynamics of the interaction between these externally defined expectations and the internally determined needs. To put the problem concretely, we may ask: How is it, for example, that some sergeants and privates—or to generalize the case, some complementary role incumbents—understand and agree at once on their mutual obligations and responsibilities, while others take a long time in reaching such agreement and quite frequently do not come to terms either with their roles or with each other at all?

The essential relevant concept I should like to propose here is *selective interpersonal perception*. In a sense, we may conceive of the publicly prescribed normative relationship of two complementary role incumbents—the prescribed interaction as set forth in, say, a table of organization—as being enacted in two separate private situations, one imbedded in the other. On the one hand, there is the prescribed relationship as perceived idiosyncratically and organized by the one role incumbent in terms of his own needs, dispositions, and goals; on the other hand, there is the same prescribed relationship as perceived idiosyncratically and organized by the other role incumbent in terms of his needs, disposition, and goals. These private situations are

related through those aspects of the existential public objects, symbols, values, and expectations, which have to some extent a counterpart in the perceptions of both individuals.⁴

When we say that two role incumbents—e.g., a subordinate and a superordinate—understand each other, we mean that their perceptions and private organization of the prescribed complementary expectations are congruent; when we say that they misunderstand each other, we mean that their perceptions and private organization of the prescribed complementary expectations are incongruent. As we shall show in the first of our derivations from the model, the functioning of the administrative process depends not only on a clear statement of the public expectations but on the degree of overlap in the perception and private organization of the expectations by the specific role incumbents. Indeed, the relevant research suggests that congruence in the perception of expectations often takes priority over actual observed behavior or even accomplishment in determining which outcomes of administrative interaction will be reported favorably by the participants in the interaction, and which unfavorably.

By way of summarizing the argument so far, we may represent the general model pictorially as indicated in Figure 5.




FIG. 5.—General model showing the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions of social behavior.

The nomothetic axis is shown at the top of the diagram and consists of institution, role, and expectation, each term being the analytic unit for the term preceding it. Thus, the social system is defined by its institutions, each institution by its con-

⁴See Jacob W. Getzels, "A Psycho-sociological Framework for the Study of Educational Administration," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXII (Fall, 1952), 235-46.

stituent roles, each role by the expectations attaching to it. Similarly, the idiographic axis is shown at the lower portion of the diagram and consists of individual, personality, and need-disposition, each term again serving as the analytic unit for the term preceding it.

A given act is conceived as deriving simultaneously from both the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions. That is to say, social behavior results as the individual attempts to cope with an environment composed of patterns of expectations for his behavior in ways consistent with his own independent pattern of needs. Thus we may write the general equation: $B=f(RxP)$, where B is observed behavior, R is a given institutional role defined by the expectations attaching to it, and P is the personality of the particular role incumbent defined by his need-dispositions.

There is a crucial difference between this formulation and the famous equation given by Lewin,⁵ i.e., $B=f(PxE)$, where P is personality and E is environment, which highlights better than anything I know the specific character—for good or ill—of the model we are presenting. In Lewin's formula, P and E are not independent, since one defines the other; i.e., environment is defined by the perception of the person. In the formula we are presenting, R and P are independent, since P is defined by the internal determinants within the role incumbent, and R is defined not by the role incumbent but by external standards set by others. Thus, in Lewin's formula E represents a personal life space that cannot be specified apart from the personality of the specific perceiver; in the present formula R , which is of course E defined in terms of expectations, must be specified apart from the personality of the specific perceiver. The role expectations are the "givens" in the situation prior to any idiosyncratic role-perceptions or role-behaviors of the actual role incumbents. Although the expectations may be misperceived or may serve only as points of departure for the actual role incumbents, the crucial significance of the expectations as "blueprints" for what should be done is not thereby nullified. Indeed, we could not recognize the misperception or misbehavior if there were not

⁵See, for example, Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935), chap. iii.

these prior "givens." To cite but one example, the fact that people assume that judges take graft, or for that matter the fact that many judges do indeed take graft, does not alter the expectation for the role of judge that he will not take graft.

The proportion of role and personality factors determining behavior will of course vary with the specific act, the specific role, and the specific personality involved. The nature of the interaction can be understood from another graphic representation, as indicated in Figure 6.

$$B = f(R \times P)$$




FIG. 6.—The interplay between role and personality in a behavioral act.

A given behavioral act may be conceived as occurring at a line cutting through the role and personality possibilities represented by the rectangle. At the left, the proportion of the act dictated by considerations of role-expectations is relatively large, while the proportion of the act dictated by considerations of personality is relatively small. At the right, the proportions are reversed, and considerations of personality become greater than consideration of role-expectation. In these terms, we may, for example, have on the one hand the behavior of an army private conforming almost entirely to role demands and on the other the behavior of a free-lance artist deriving almost entirely from personality dispositions. In a given milieu, administration always deals with proportions of both these components. It would incidentally be interesting to see where this line would be drawn for university professors in various institutions.

In any case, however, whether the proportion tends toward one end or the other, behavior insofar as it is *social* remains a function of both role and personality, although in different degree. When role is maximized, behavior still retains some

personal aspect because no role is ever so closely defined as to eliminate all individual latitude. When personality is maximized, social behavior still cannot be free from some role prescription. Indeed, the individual who divorces himself from such prescription is said to be autistic, and he ceases to communicate with his fellows.

The relevance of the general model for administrative theory and practice becomes apparent when it is seen that the administrative process inevitably deals with the fulfilment of both nomothetic and idiographic requirements within the context of a particular social system.

SOME DERIVATIONS AND RELEVANT RESEARCH STUDIES

There is little point in general models if they do not give rise to specific conceptual derivations and empirical applications. I think we had better stop spinning out these models unless we can show some results, however modest, either in illuminating day-to-day practices or in raising significant issues for research investigations. Accordingly, I should like to turn now to a number of specific derivations and applications.

1. *Interpersonal perception and superordinate-subordinate consensus.*—We may mention first a very simple derivation, that is, that the administrative relationship always functions at two levels of interaction. The first level derives from the particular offices or statuses in the social system and is determined by the nature of the roles involved in the interaction. This is, of course, the nomothetic dimension of our model. The second level of interaction derives from the particular people or individuals in the social system and is determined by the personalities involved in the interaction. This is, of course, the idiographic dimension of our model. You will recall that we said that the publicly prescribed nomothetic relationship is enacted in two separate private idiographic situations—one by the subordinate and one by the superordinate. The functioning of the administrative process will, we said, depend on the nature of the overlap—i.e., on the relative congruence or discrepancy—between the separate perceptions of the expectations in the two situations.

I should like to mention very briefly here some empirical

work bearing on this formulation. Stated in extreme terms, the basic hypothesis underlying the investigations was that when the perceptions of the expectations of participants in an administrative interaction overlap, the participants feel satisfied with the work accomplished no matter what the actual behavior or accomplishment; when the perception of the expectations does not overlap, the participants feel dissatisfied.

Ferneau studied the interaction of consultants and administrators in a school setting.⁶ A problem-situation instrument was constructed in which varying expectations for the consultant role could be expressed. The instrument was given to 180 administrators who were known to have had consultant service and to 46 consultants who were known to have provided this service. Each administrator and each consultant was also asked to evaluate the outcome of the consultation. It was then possible to compare the expectations for the consultant role held by the consultant himself and by the consultee and to analyze the effect of the congruence or discrepancy of these perceptions on the evaluation of the actual interaction.

The results were clear-cut. When an administrator and a consultant agreed on the expectations, they tended to rate the actual consultation favorably; when they disagreed, unfavorably. Here, then, is one explanation of the success or failure of a typical administrative interaction. And note that the success or failure was apparently independent of the specific character either of the expectations or of the manifest behavior—provided that the participants' perception of the expectations, whatever their character, overlapped.

Moyer, in a second study along similar lines, investigated by Q-sort the relationship between the expectations of teachers and administrators for leadership in the educational setting and the effect of congruence or discrepancy in this relationship upon teacher satisfaction.⁷ Again, the results were consistent with the derivation from the model: the greater the agreement between

⁶Elmer Ferneau, "Role-Expectations in Consultations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1954).

⁷Donald C. Moyer, "Teachers' Attitudes toward Leadership as They Relate to Teacher Satisfaction" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1954).

teacher and principal on the expectations for leadership, the more favorable the attitudes toward the work situation.

2. *The genesis and nature of institutional and individual conflict.*—Conflict may be defined simply as the “mutual interference of reactions.” The model points to three primary sources of conflict in the administrative setting: role-personality conflict, role conflict, and personality conflict. *Role-personality conflicts* occur as a function of discrepancies between the pattern of expectations attaching to a given role and the pattern of need-dispositions characteristic of the incumbent of the role. Recall our example of the army private with a high need for “ascendancy” and the army sergeant with a high need for “submission.” There is a mutual interference between nomothetic expectations and idiographic dispositions, and the individual must choose whether he will fulfil individual needs or institutional requirements. If he chooses to fulfil the requirements, he is in a sense shortchanging himself; if he chooses to fulfil his needs, he is shortchanging his role. In either case, there is conflict. In practice, of course, we most often find compromise, but in any event, the nature of the forthcoming behavior is quite different when the expectations and the dispositions are discrepant than when they are congruent.

Role conflicts occur whenever a role incumbent is required to conform simultaneously to a number of expectations which are mutually exclusive, contradictory, or inconsistent, so that adjustment to one set of requirements makes adjustment to the other impossible or at least difficult. Role conflicts in this sense are situational givens and independent of the personality of the role incumbent. They are evidence of disorganization in the nomothetic dimension and may arise in several ways: (a) from disagreement within the referent group defining the role; e.g., the principal of the school may be expected by some teachers to visit them regularly for constructive help and by others to trust them as professional personnel not in need of such supervision; (b) from disagreement among several referent groups, each having a right to define expectations for the same role; e.g., the university faculty member may be expected by his department head to emphasize teaching and service to students but by his academic

dean to emphasize research and publication; (c) from contradiction in the expectations of two or more roles which an individual is occupying at the same time; e.g., an individual may attempt at once to be a devoted mother and a successful career woman.

Personality conflicts occur as a function of opposing needs and dispositions within the personality of the role incumbent himself. The effect of such personal disequilibrium is to keep the individual at odds with the institution either because he cannot maintain a stable relationship to a given role or because his autistic tendencies cause him to misperceive the expectations placed upon him. Existential objects and events have minimal representation in his private world, and there is little correspondence between his private world and the private worlds of other role incumbents with whom he must interact. In a sense, no matter what the situation, the objective role is detached by the individual from its institutional context and function and used by him to work out personal and private needs and dispositions, however inappropriate these may be to the social system as a whole.

In the terms of our model, these three types of conflict represent incongruence in the nomothetic dimension, in the idiographic dimension, or in the interaction between the two dimensions. Such incongruence is symptomatic of administrative failure and leads to loss in individual and institutional productivity.

We may turn now to the relevant empirical work in this area. Although there are a number of more recent studies, I should like to cite the investigation that Egon Guba and I did at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, several years ago, since it deals simultaneously with several of the types of conflict derived from the model.⁸ Moreover, you will observe that it is not a laboratory test of the hypothetical formulations but a test in an ongoing educational situation.

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⁸Jacob W. Getzels and Egon G. Guba, "Role, Role Conflict, and Effectiveness: An Empirical Study," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (April, 1954), 164-75; "Role Conflict and Personality," *Journal of Personality*, XXIV (September, 1955), 74-85.

lon air force officers; it is modeled on a civilian graduate school. At the time the research was undertaken, the university consisted of what they called nine "courses" but which we may call "schools." The institution was staffed by officers, chiefly of field rank, and the study was initiated because of certain strains in the institution and dissatisfaction among the personnel. An analysis of the existing social system in the terms of our model—and such application of the model is exactly one test of its usefulness—revealed that each officer-instructor occupied two roles which were in fundamental conflict along a number of dimensions. On the one hand, there was the officer role with certain military expectations and, on the other, the instructor role with certain opposing educational expectations. In addition to stimulating the over-all study, the model suggested the following specific hypotheses for empirical test:

1. With respect to differences in conflict among the nine schools, the extent of such conflict will vary as a function of certain identifiable characteristics of the schools, and more specifically as a function of the ratio of civilian to military subject matter. For example, the faculty in the schools teaching essentially military subjects, say, the "field officers" or "logistics" course, should experience fewer role conflicts than the faculty in the schools teaching essentially civilian subjects, say, the "comptroller" or "adjutant general" courses.

2. With respect to individual differences among the faculty in felt conflict, the intensity of such conflict will vary as a function of certain emotional characteristics. For example, officer-instructors who are "rigid," "defensive," "extrapunitive," and so on, should be more conflicted than other officer-instructors.

The first hypothesis represents what we have called "role conflict" in our derivation from the model, and the second hypothesis, what we have called "personality conflict." Data regarding possible conflicting expectations were obtained by a fifty-six-item questionnaire, containing such items as:

The mixture of democratic and military procedures at Air University leaves the instructor in the ambiguous position of never knowing when to act on his own initiative and when to be guided by Standard Operating Procedures.

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The mixture of democratic and military procedures at Air University leaves the instructor in the ambiguous position of never knowing when to act on his own initiative and when to be guided by Standard Operating Procedures.

The recognition given an instructor at Air University may depend more on the insignia on his collar than on his knowledge of the subject matter or his teaching efficiency.

Although an officer is trained in military planning, it does not follow that he is equipped to do the kinds of educational planning, such as curriculum making, which Air University requires of him.

The full complement of two hundred officer-instructors answered each item on a six-point scale with reference to two separate inquiries: To what extent does the situation described in the item represent the state of affairs in your school? How troubled are you personally by this situation?

Personality data were obtained by three standard instruments: the Guilford-Martin Inventory GAMIN and STDCR, the California E and F Scales, and the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Study. The analysis and the results were straightforward. Regarding the first hypothesis, with respect to differences in role conflict among schools, the field officers and logistics schools, both teaching military-type subjects, had the lowest mean conflict scores; the comptroller and adjutant general schools, both teaching civilian-type subjects, had the highest mean conflict scores. The findings were statistically significant and entirely in keeping with the hypothetical formulations.

Regarding the second hypothesis, with respect to differences in personality conflict among instructors, the quartile of officer-instructors scoring highest in felt conflict was compared with the quartile scoring lowest in felt conflict on each of the personality variables provided by the three experimental instruments. Significant differences were found on seven of the ten factors of the Guilford-Martin, on both the E and F sections of the California Scale, and on five of the six variables of the Rosenzweig—and in each case, the results were in the direction predicted by the model. For example, those high in felt conflict were found on the Guilford-Martin to have greater "feelings of inferiority," to be more "nervous," "introverted," "depressive," and "cyclical in temperament"; on the California E-F Scale to be more "rigid" and "stereotyped"; and on the Rosenzweig to be more "extra-punitive" and "defensive."

So much for the sampling of empirical studies. The point we

are making here of course is not so much the significance of the substantive findings. This is another matter. What I want to emphasize is the usefulness of the model in proposing fruitful dimensions for examining Air University as a social system and in making clear the difficulties the administration was encountering in attempting to administer an educational institution along civilian lines but by using military personnel as faculty.

To summarize, we have tried to show that the process of administration deals essentially with social behavior in a hierarchical setting. We have presented a model of social behavior that seems to have special relevance to the administrative process. We have argued that the best test of a model is the extent to which it generates research, application in practice, and inquiry. Accordingly, we have presented a number of derivations from the model, have described some of the research already done, and have indicated what might yet be done. Finally, we should like to make clear that the model presented here is not, of course, the only possible framework or, indeed, that it is even a good one—whatever the term “good” means in this context. We suggest, however, that it is at present useful for stimulating and guiding what seems to be a fruitful line of inquiry into the administrative process.

CHAPTER VIII

What Peculiarities in Educational Administration Make It a Special Case?

ROALD F. CAMPBELL

The request that I examine the peculiarities of educational administration that purportedly make it a special case came as something of a shock to me. Ten years ago I would have embarked upon such a task forthwith. More recently, I have been much impressed with the common elements found in all administration. Whether one looks at administration from the standpoint of its purpose, its task, its situational milieu, or its process, he will find much that is common in the management of business, government, education, and other organizations. But the development of this position is not my assignment; rather, I am to suggest what there is about educational administration that is unique.

As this discussion proceeds, it may appear that I emphasize the educational more than the administration part of the term. This has concerned me, for one might conclude that education is unique but that the administration of education is not. In practice, however, I find no way of making such a separation. This dilemma appears to be tied to the level of discussion. For instance, at one level one might speak of human behavior of which all administration is but a part. At a more specific level, human behavior in formal organizations might be examined. This would appear to be the province of administration, including educational administration. At a still more specific level, the

administration of different institutions might be studied. The peculiarities of educational administration appear to be found at this third level of specificity.

Any attempt to differentiate educational administration from all other administration runs into other difficulties. Other administration, even upon cursory examination, is found to be not entirely a homogeneous thing. For instance, it may be somewhat easier to distinguish between military and educational administration than between the city managership and the school superintendency, both of which are in the public realm. In spite of this difficulty, an attempt will be made to suggest ways in which educational administration seems to differ, at least in degree, from other administration.

While educational administration encompasses more than the public schools, this discussion is actually oriented toward the administration of public education. Justification for this may be found in the fact that almost 90 per cent of the elementary and secondary pupils and more than half of the college students of the nation attend public institutions. This is not to suggest that the administration of private or parochial education is vastly different from public school administration; nor is it to depreciate the place of the private school or college in America. Neither is this an attempt to ignore educational administration as found in many governmental agencies and in many business organizations. It does seem, however, that any uniqueness of educational administration ought, in this paper, to deal with a major segment of that administration.

One other introductory note seems necessary. Educational administration is an emerging, not an established, profession. Its practice varies, by whatever criteria one may employ, from excellence to failure. Under these circumstances it is difficult to speak only of what *is* in educational administration. Inevitably, some of what *ought* to be will creep into this discussion.

With these preliminaries disposed of, let me proceed with the assignment. The peculiarities of educational administration, as I see it, stem from the function of education in our society, the nature of the educational enterprise, the character of the school administrator's major reference groups, the semi-professionalism

of educational administration, and the dual role of the educational administrator.

THE FUNCTION OF EDUCATION IN OUR SOCIETY

Our Public Pronouncements

Administrators in education are called upon to manage an enterprise which is critically related to the well-being of our society. This position was taken by our founding fathers and has been continually reiterated. Jefferson, in 1779, in his famous "Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge," said in part:

Whereas it appeareth that however certain forms of government are better calculated than others to protect individuals in the free exercise of their natural rights, and are at the same time themselves better guarded against degeneracy, yet experience hath shewn that even under the best forms those intrusted with power have, in time and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny; and it is believed that the most effectual means of preventing this would be to illuminate, as far as possible, the minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them knowledge of those facts which history exhibiteth, that, possessed thereby of the experience of other ages and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purpose.¹

To implement such a purpose, Jefferson proposed a comprehensive system of common school education. His plan did not see fruition, but a few decades later Horace Mann and other leaders succeeded in crystallizing such convictions into action, and the common school system of Massachusetts and other states emerged from earlier, halfway measures.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in the now famous Brown case, has set forth the place of the public schools in our society in the following language:

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education in our demo-

¹As quoted by Edgar W. Knight, *Readings in Educational Administration* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1953), pp. 8-9.

cratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.²

The White House Conference on Education, meeting at President Eisenhower's invitation and made up of two laymen to each professional educator, reaffirmed the point that widespread education is critical to the survival of our kind of society. The conference said, in part:

The schools have become the chief instrument for keeping this Nation the fabled land of opportunity it started out to be. In other decades, the opportunities of America lay primarily in escape from the rigid class barriers of Europe, the availability of free land at the frontier, and the excitement of a violently growing nation, where farms often became villages and villages became cities within the span of one human life. When the frontier was closed, it would have been easy for opportunities to dry up in this Nation, and for rigid class barriers to develop. It has been primarily the schools which have prevented this from happening. As long as good schools are available, a man is not frozen at any level of our economy, nor is his son. Schools free men to rise to the level of their natural abilities. Hope for personal advancement and the advancement of one's children is, of course, one of the great wellsprings of human energy. The schools, more than any other agency, supply this hope in America today. By providing a channel for ambition, they have taken the place of the frontier, and in a highly technical era, have preserved the independent spirit of a pioneer nation. The schools stand as the chief expression of the American tradition of fair play for everyone, and a fresh start for each generation.³

²Brown *et al.* v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

³Committee for The White House Conference on Education: A Report to the President (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 4.

Recently, scholars in eight social science disciplines were asked to relate their sciences to the educational enterprise. In attempting to interpret these statements, Thelen and Getzels noted:

But education as a system is also unique in certain respects. It is a system whose major functions seem to be delegated to it by the other systems, and, to a degree, the effective functioning of the other systems depends directly on the effective functioning of the educational system. Our geographer, for example, wants education to prepare us for the wise utilization of natural resources; in this sense the school is very much a part of the geographer's domain. Our political scientist wants education to prepare us for the wise exercise of political power; in this sense the school is part of *his* domain. Our economist wants education to prepare us for the wise selection of economic alternatives; in this sense the school is also part of *his* domain. In short, the educational system seems unique in the range of its functions and the centrality of its relationship, at least theoretically, to the other social institutions. It is the institution that is charged with responsibility for the "socialization," "politicization," "acculturation," and so on, of the child (and other newcomers) in our society.⁴

The statements noted above appear to epitomize the values for schools held by thoughtful Americans. Such values are reaffirmed by millions of citizens each year when they go to the polls to pass operating levies and bond issues in thousands of school districts. Reaffirmation is found again in the actions taken by the respective state legislatures. And finally, state and federal courts have repeatedly taken the position that public education is so important to the general welfare that no child is to be denied this opportunity.

Some Implications

While the discussion to this point gives the schools a grand charge, the rhetoric probably needs to be submitted to some analysis. With the importance of the school firmly established in the minds of the people, the school has been continually asked

⁴Herbert A. Thelen and Jacob W. Getzels, "The Social Sciences: Conceptual Framework for Education," *School Review*, LXV (Autumn, 1957), 346.

to take on new functions. Again the language of the White House Conference seems appropriate:

The basic responsibility of the schools is the development of the skills of the mind, but the over-all mission has been enlarged. Schools are now asked to help each child to become as good and as capable in every way as native endowment permits. The schools are asked to help children to acquire any skill or characteristic which a majority of the community deems worthwhile. The order given by the American people to the schools is grand in its simplicity; in addition to intellectual achievement, foster morality, happiness, and any useful ability. The talent of each child is to be sought out and developed to the fullest. Each weakness is to be studied and, so far as possible corrected. This is truly a majestic ideal, and an astonishingly new one. Schools of that kind have never been provided for more than a small fraction of mankind.⁵

I take the position that if the school is to perform its unique function acceptably, there must be some priority of purposes. The public school, it seems to me, should place first the following purposes: the teaching of literacy, the teaching of critical thinking, and the facilitation of social mobility. This is no place for a detailed treatment of these purposes, but each one can be amplified briefly. If the public school does not concern itself with literacy, many people will remain illiterate. But literacy at best is a tool and not an end; in our kind of culture, literacy is necessary to critical thinking but not synonymous with it.

Critical thinking is the highest purpose the school can serve. In the final analysis, this is what Jefferson meant, and this is what the White House Conference said. But why must the school play a role in the development of most people's critical thinking? Simply because the school, despite all its limitations, is the best hope we have for most people to get experience in the definition of problems and the examination of objective evidence bearing upon those problems. No other agency in our society, whether political, religious, or economic, can approach controversial issues with as little bias as can the school.

I would be the first to acknowledge that many schools are operating rather feebly at this point, and perhaps few are oper-

⁵*The White House Conference on Education, op. cit., p. 9.*

ating at a desired level. Moreover, for many people experiences outside the school may contribute much to the development of their own power of critical analysis. But I would still stand on the point that our society must expect substantial contributions from its schools, chiefly its public schools, in helping people understand the culture of which they are a part and in equipping them with the capacity to appraise critically that culture and to find ways of improving it.

Now a word about facilitating social mobility. Many institutions in our society may become instruments in social mobility—business, the military, sports, the entertainment world, and even the church. But again, the public school seems to be the one institution which has as its obligation the *deliberate* attempt to see that all children and youth, regardless of race, geographic location, or economic circumstance, have an opportunity to learn. This obligation is made realistic by the fact that the school is the one place where “all the children of all the people” may be found. As we know, this function of the school is often poorly implemented,⁶ but the obligation remains.

I have attempted to say in the above that education, chiefly public education, is a built-in corrective for our kind of society. Only through general public enlightenment can the experiment we call democracy succeed. It seems clear that the administrator of schools charged with such a critical function needs to understand the nature of the charge, and he needs the skills necessary to mobilize people to implement such a concept.

THE NATURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISE

The nature of the educational enterprise itself represents another way in which educational administration needs to be seen as a special case.

Intimate Relationships

Education is a service which deals directly and intimately with people. As Graff and Street have put it, the school “does

⁶For example, see August Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1949).

things to people rather than *for* them."⁷ Moreover, the most intimate relationships the school has are with children and youth. These pupils represent the dearest possessions of their parents, and these parents, by and large, are greatly concerned with how the school is treating their offspring. In other words, the school is confronted with the emotional attachments of parents to their children, and these attachments are much stronger than those which most parents have for other public or private services.

Moreover, for most parents there is no alternative to the public school. Children are required by law to attend school. With private school attendance being impractical, either through not being available locally or because of high fees, in most cases public school attendance is the only course of action open. The school administrator, then, is always confronted with a group of clients who may not be his by choice. But with or without their complete consent, he and the institution he represents are profoundly affecting the lives of the children of these clients.

The Learning Process

Another aspect of the educational enterprise that seems pertinent here is the nature of the learning process itself. To begin with, learning seldom seems to be a simple matter. A teacher may attempt to teach comprehension of certain science principles, for example, but in so doing a number of concomitant learnings may also take place. For instance, the pupil may learn to like or dislike the teacher; he may learn to like or dislike the school. He may have his independence strengthened, or he may find that he has to rely upon parents or classmates. What began as a simple matter of knowledge or understanding may provoke many emotional concomitants. Since educational administration, finally, exists only to enhance the teaching-learning process, it is inevitably confronted with the complex character of learning itself.

Moreover, if that learning has to do with the growth of the pupils' capacity to do critical thinking, as we have maintained above, additional problems are in store. When children and youth

⁷Orin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, in *Administrative Behavior in Education*, ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 122.

begin to think critically, they inevitably examine the status quo, and they of course find conditions to question and to challenge. This behavior by pupils is part of their school experience. Some members of adult society may feel that in this respect the school is dealing with matters beyond its ken. These same people may view school administrators not only as social strangers but as social estrangers. The administrator who would have his school be vital for its pupils will inevitably, at times, be seen as leading pupils into revolt against parents and established society.

Another characteristic of learning needs to be mentioned briefly. People learn from their total experience. Schools, therefore, are but one of many institutions in a community which affect learning. Homes are still the chief teaching-learning institution. Neighborhood groups, character-building agencies, churches, recreational programs, the mass media, and the example of adults singly or in many combinations may become powerful teaching-learning influences.

This being the case, the educational administrator is confronted with two kinds of problems: working with other community leaders to improve the total learning environment of the community and working with his own staff to clarify the unique purposes of the school and to find ways of adequately implementing them. Moreover, since school communities vary greatly in their characteristics, the balance between these two lines of endeavor must be determined anew for each situation.

Difficulty of Evaluation

In still another way the nature of the educational enterprise poses problems peculiar to educational administration. Evaluation of results in education is a difficult process. In business, one can use sales or production as evaluation measures. In the military, objectives are definite and their achievement relatively easy to ascertain. In at least some aspects of government, results tend to be rather concrete. (To be sure, in all these enterprises the achievements of some objectives are more difficult to assess than I have suggested.) In education, however, evaluation is particularly complex. In the first place, there are still large areas of disagreement as to what the schools should be about, anyway—witness the current uncertainty of what it is that the American

high school ought to be doing. With diverse, confusing, and often incompatible objectives for at least some aspects of the educational program, we are hardly ready to do much about testing the degree to which these objectives have been met.

Assuming, however, substantial agreement on the objectives for the school, there is still the question of their intangibility. I have used the term "critical thinking." What does it mean? With no further definition, it could mean almost anything. In such a state of generality, few people would rule out such an objective as a defensible goal for a school program. But if critical thinking were seen as permitting examination of alternative forms of government or alternative economic systems or alternative religions to our own, the area of agreement would probably decrease.

Or, to extend the matter further, what is meant by examination? Does examination mean that the seeming achievements of our own way of life will be compared to the seeming failures of another culture? Or may we examine the shortcomings and strengths of our own society in terms of our value framework and do the same for other people in terms of their value framework? Will we be permitted to learn that there may be more than one plausible value framework, and can we build our own values by choice and not entirely by accident of birth? Inevitably, teaching and learning must deal with some questions like these. Nor can the school be satisfied that its pupils only *think about* such matters. If there has been learning, the acquired understandings and attitudes will determine action.

If the school is really concerned about behavior, it may be ten years or more before evidence about behavioral change can be ascertained. At best, the school often has to accept intermediate evidence that certain learning objectives have been achieved, for ultimate evidence may not be available for years to come. In other terms, this delayed feedback makes it difficult to monitor the course of action.

We have seen, then, that the nature of the educational enterprise in itself makes educational administration a special case—particularly because of the intimate relationship between the school and its clients, because of the complexity of the learning process, and because the evaluation of the products of learning

is exceptionally difficult. No educational administrator can fail to be affected by this set of circumstances. Again, he needs understanding and skill if he is to help the people in his organization grapple with the complexities of the learning process even as it applies to themselves.

THE ADMINISTRATOR'S MAJOR REFERENCE GROUPS

Most administrators must deal with a controlling board of some kind, with the staff or employees of the organization, and with the public. These three major reference groups of the educational administrator seem to differ, at least in some respects, from those of other administrators, and they thus help establish educational administration as a special case.

The Board of Control

Educational administration, for the most part, is an activity which goes on in a local community. In each of these local communities there is a controlling board, most often called a board of education, whose members are usually elected by the people of the community. To these local boards of education the respective state legislatures have given broad powers for the organization and operation of the public schools in their communities. In more than fifty thousand boards of education over the nation these powers are jealously guarded and vigorously exercised.

In legal theory, boards not only have the powers specified by the several legislatures, they also have implied powers necessary to implement the expressed powers. Actually, within certain broad limits which may be stipulated by statute, boards of education in this country have great discretion in school operation. In fact, the degree of local control found in American education never fails to amaze our foreign visitors.

School administrators, by way of contrast with the boards of education, have almost no legal status. To be sure, in the certification laws or regulations of most states one or more administrator's certificates are provided, and some states provide specifically that the board of education shall employ a superintendent of schools. But it should be quite clear that in our scheme of things, legal responsibility for the operation of public

schools has been lodged with local boards of education. The extent to which superintendents or other administrators share in this responsibility comes at the pleasure of those boards.

This circumstance would perhaps not be unusual were it not for the nature of the educational enterprise, some aspects of which have been elaborated above. The school exists to facilitate teaching and learning. These are complex processes, and their comprehension requires years of study and practice. In short, it takes a professional to speak and act wisely with respect to the enhancement of teaching and learning. Yet almost without exception, the local boards of education, in which the legal control of teaching and learning has been lodged, are composed of laymen. Note, too, that some of these board members seek election to the board for reasons other than the promotion of education. We have, then, the professional in education being controlled by laymen, some of whom are using their board membership as a political stepping-stone.

By way of contrast, the manager in business ordinarily works for a controlling board made up, in large part at least, of people who are themselves thoroughly familiar with business aims, organization, and procedure. Many members of the board of directors may themselves have been managers and may still be active in business. Under these circumstances, the professional in business is attempting to make sense to other professionals in business.

The city manager may have a lay board, as does the educational administrator, but his board, for the most part, spends most of its time looking at such matters as roads and streets, water supply, fire and police protection, parks and playgrounds, and zoning regulations. City council members are usually asked to make policy on relatively tangible matters with which they have had considerable firsthand experience.

But to return to the educational administrator, we find him charged by a lay board to develop and operate, with the help of a number of other professionals, a program of teaching and learning whose complexities are beyond the full comprehension of most board members. Moreover, these same lay board members will sit in judgment on how well the program they do not fully understand is being executed. Under these circumstances, for the

sake of the program and to protect his own hide, the educational administrator must become not only the executive but the teacher of the board of education.

The Staff

The staff, or certificated personnel of a school system, as I am using the term here, also appears to be somewhat different for the educational administrator than for many other administrators. In the first place, many members of the staff have had as much formal training as the administrator. Often this training and subsequent experience give these staff members considerable confidence in how well they are doing their jobs. The educational administrator, then, is working with professionals who feel, often rightly, that they know more about teaching and learning than he does.

Nor is this feeling of independence on the part of many teachers to be thought of simply as resistance to administrators or to institutional expectations. Actually, as Getzels and Guba⁸ have pointed out, professionally trained people, in contrast to day laborers, are more inclined toward idiographic than nomothetic behavior. Moreover, a school organization as contrasted to a military organization is more permissive of idiographic behavior. In other words, the training of teachers and the institutional settings in which teachers work produce behavior which stresses personality factors more than role factors.

When legal tenure for teachers, as found in most states, is coupled with greater tolerance for personality factors, the conditions noted above seem to be compounded. Teachers on tenure can successfully resist even minimum direction from a school administrator and yet not be guilty of outright insubordination. The school administrator finds that he must accept almost any idiosyncrasy on the part of his professional workers. To do otherwise is contrary to the mores of his institution; furthermore, he would not be firmly backed up by the practical effects of the law.

The above circumstance becomes even more significant when two other points are noted. First, the majority of the employees of a school district with whom an educational administrator is

⁸Jacob W. Getzels and Egon G. Guba, "Social Behavior and the Administrative Process," *School Review*, XLV (1957), 423-41.

required to work are people with professional or near-professional competence. In other words, the non-teaching or non-certificated personnel of a school district are in the minority. Few other administrators would appear to have such a proportion of their staffs at or near the professional level. In industry the professionals appear to be relatively few, while the production workers are relatively numerous. Even in hospitals the graduate nurses are few compared to nurses in training, nurses' aids, and other workers. Second, studies show clearly that these professionals have conflicting perceptions of what the role of the educational administrator is or should be. Some teachers, for instance, would have the administrator leave them alone, while others have great need for direction from their status leaders.⁹ These wide differences in professional workers' perception of the administrative role pose unusual problems for the educational administrator.

The Public

Educational administration may also be a special case because of the nature of the publics with which the school is confronted. As Shipton¹⁰ has suggested, the school administrator stands almost by himself in the sheer number of diverse sub-publics to whom he is indirectly responsible. Since the schools are public schools, the business groups, the labor groups, the patriotic groups, the women's groups, the church groups, the character-building agencies, and numerous other groups, to say nothing of the parents, feel that they have a right to school co-operation and that they should be able to influence the educational program.

In the last decade, particularly, public concern for the school program has been formalized in the organization of literally thousands of citizens' committees on education. These committees have often been established by the official action of boards of education, but in many cases they have come into

⁹The nature of the expectations are developed further in *Administrative Behavior in Education*, ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), chap. vii.

¹⁰James M. Shipton, "Who Are the Critics of the Public Schools?" (Staff Research Memorandum No. 3 [Cambridge: Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, 1954]).

being on their own initiative. Some of these committees know that they have an *advisory* role to perform, but others have no such self-imposed framework, or they enjoy unusual interpretations of the word. In any case, the educational administrator finds a citizens' committee a demanding, even though at times rewarding, instrumentality.

It should be noted, too, that the raw material of the school, its pupils, are quite different from the raw material of a factory. Unlike nuts and bolts, the pupils talk back. They not only talk back in school, but they report daily on the enterprise of which they are a part to numerous publics, notably parents. And many of these adults place much credence in such reports in spite of the limited perceptiveness and the immaturity of the reporters.

In all of these relationships with the public—because schools are the public's business—the educational administrator finds himself highly visible and accessible. School board action and administrative implementation are good copy for newspaper, radio, and television. Citizens from almost every station in life feel, on occasion, that they have a legitimate right to call on and talk with the school principal or superintendent. This visibility and accessibility is perhaps as it ought to be, but it does place the educational administrator in a unique position.

By way of summary, I have indicated that the major reference groups of the educational administrator—specifically, the board of control, the school staff, and the public—act differently toward the educational administrator or have different expectations of him than comparable reference groups do for other administrators. This condition stems from the fact that the schools are a public institution and that they are concerned with the complex process we call teaching and learning.

SEMI-PROFESSIONALISM OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The semi-professionalism of educational administration may also help make it a special case. This is not to suggest that all other administration is thoroughly professionalized, but rather to indicate that the road to professionalism in educational administration has some peculiar characteristics.

Present Status

A brief look at the status of educational administration as a profession is desirable. To begin with, there is a great diversity of positions. In the administration of public elementary and secondary education alone there are probably one hundred thousand administrative positions. These include approximately forty thousand elementary school principalships, ten thousand secondary school principalships, sixteen thousand district superintendencies, and two thousand county superintendencies. In addition, there are thousands of central office positions whose incumbents are called supervisors, directors, and co-ordinators, or who are described by some similar title.¹¹

Not only are there a variety of positions in educational administration with numerous incumbents for each type of position, but there is great diversity in the character of any single type of position. The district superintendency, for instance, may refer to the chief administrative post in city school districts such as San Francisco or Boston, or it may refer to any one of seven hundred local district superintendencies found in the state of Ohio alone. In large cities the superintendent may have a far-flung organization, whereas in small local districts the entire school staff may number not more than a dozen people, and the superintendent may also be the principal and a part-time teacher. For each of the other types of administrative positions almost as much diversity is found. One can well ask, "Who is a school administrator, anyway?"

A second characteristic of educational administration has to do with the source of supply of administrators. With few exceptions, administrators are chosen from the teaching ranks. This may have serious implications. Some of the best raw material for educational administration may be unavailable because of the commonly accepted teaching-first expectation. By way of contrast, the plant manager or the military leader need not spend years of his life performing tasks over which he will later have some supervision.

¹¹For more details on these positions, see Roald F. Campbell, John E. Corbally, Jr., and John A. Ramseyer, *An Introduction to Educational Administration* (New York: Allyn and Bacon, 1958), chap. xiii.

Third, the placement of educational administrators is often haphazard and provincial. This condition reflects, in part, the local operation of education. Lay boards of education, in choosing their superintendents, seldom engage professional assistance. Matters quite extraneous to a man's competence often become major factors in his selection. Because many of these local boards operate with little comprehension of what the administrator's job is, there is no wonder that selection frequently hinges upon personal rather than upon professional factors.

A fourth problem in making educational administration professional is found in the lack of standards for the profession and in the lack of agreement about what constitutes effective administration. At the present time effectiveness is what people think it is. Since the people making such judgments have different orientations or represent different reference groups, success in educational administration is defined quite differently, for example, by school board members and by school staffs.¹²

Nor is this situation easy to correct. Ideally, effectiveness ought to be measured in terms of an administrator's contribution to the achievement of the purposes of the organization, in this case the enhancement of teaching and learning. This circumstance presents two difficulties: the complexities of educational appraisal, as noted above, and the determination of the administrator's contribution to whatever learning may have taken place. I am not suggesting that improved criteria of effectiveness for educational administration are impossible, but I am pointing out some of the difficulties inherent in making such improvement.

Finally, the elimination of ineffective administrators in education, ineffective in terms of such gross criteria as do exist, is virtually impossible. In part, this is due to the great diversity of administrative positions, as already noted. An administrator of almost any caliber is apt to find a school board or a school system somewhere to which he is fairly acceptable. He may be "down-graded," or he may become a victim of "sidewise mo-

¹²See, for instance, Andrew W. Halpin, *The Leadership Behavior of School Superintendents* (Columbus: University Press, The Ohio State University, 1956).

bility,"¹³ and his tenure in each position may be short, but if he persists he will probably remain a job-holder in the field.

Elimination of ineffective administrators in organizations other than education may be easier. In business, management seemingly can be less concerned with the public and with the workers than the board of education can ordinarily be in deciding whether an administrator is to be discharged. Even the owner-manager in business may be forced to quit if he can not meet his competition. In education, the school is seldom eliminated, and no clear-cut way of eliminating administrators exists.

I have suggested that educational administration has many obstacles to overcome in its attempt to become professional. These include the great diversity of positions, the recruitment of administrators from the teaching ranks, placement that is often haphazard and provincial, the lack of agreement on effectiveness criteria, and the difficulty of eliminating the incompetent. I have made the picture rather somber—perhaps too somber. I do wish to make it clear that while I think educational administration, as a whole, is but semi-professional in character, there are in its ranks people who are thoroughly professional in their outlook and competence.

Tasks Ahead

Since educational administration is, for the most part, a public service with legal control lodged essentially at the state level and with operation delegated almost completely to local communities, the road from semi-professionalism poses some rather special problems. Space does not permit their elaboration here, but it seems clear that if the theory and practice of educational administration are to move forward, the universities which share in selection and training, the practitioners themselves, and the legal agencies which have to do with public education, both state and local, must join in this task.

¹³See, for instance, Harold W. Boles, "Changes in Local School Executive Positions in Ohio during 1951," *Educational Research Bulletin*, XXXI (1952), 119-28.

THE DUAL FUNCTION OF THE EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATOR

In still one other way educational administration is, at least to some degree, a special case. Each educational administrator, in my judgment, has two major functions to perform. First, he needs to be the administrative officer of his school or his school district, or to serve as a staff member of such an officer. Second, he continuously needs to reshape or help reshape his organization so that it will perform its purposes more adequately. Let us look at these two functions more closely.

We are quite familiar with the duties of executive officers and their staff members. In the realm of government we often see this in operation. A project such as the TVA is authorized by specific congressional action. A chief administrator is selected to plan and operate a program designed to implement the *provisions of the act*. The legal framework has been provided, and ordinarily it is not the administrator's function to suggest how that framework should be altered; rather, it is his job to operate within such a framework.

The superintendent of schools performs in much the same way when he acts to implement some policy which has been adopted by his board of education. But he has another function. He needs to bring continuously to the board of education ideas about what basic policy ought to be adopted in the first place. Often these ideas take the form of recommendations. Often, too, these recommendations grow out of careful study and examination of current conditions and relevant facts on the part of many members of the chief administrator's staff. In other words, the educational administrator needs to continuously examine the purpose of his organization as it attempts to serve its unique role in our society and to make recommendations for reshaping the organization as well as for operating it.

Perhaps I can further illustrate these two functions by reference to the administrator of an important state university. He seemed to conceive his function as essentially that of the executive officer of the controlling board. In such capacity he demonstrated great competence. He seemed unable to sense his second function. Seldom did long-term plans for the institution get taken to the board. The realities of impending en-

rolment increases were pushed aside. The particular function of that institution among many public and private universities in that state apparently did not perturb him. Nor was his a voice enunciating the place of higher education in our kind of society. In short, his board of control had a high-grade executive secretary; it did not have an educational statesman.

I am suggesting that in education more than in some other areas administrators need to reassess the purposes, structure, and operation of their organizations; recommendations for improvement that grow out of this assessment must then be brought to the controlling board for its consideration. In some realms of public administration this function is performed by political leaders. In business administration this function may be performed by members of the board of directors. In education, chiefly because of the nature of teaching and learning and because the board of control is made up of laymen, there is greater urgency that the administrator function as a statesman.

Let me reiterate that in this paper I have not attempted to deny the common elements in administration, including educational administration. I have suggested, however, that educational administration may be a special case. Support for this position has been offered by noting the critical function of public education in our kind of society, by suggesting the nature of the educational enterprise—its intimacy, its complexity, and its difficulty of evaluation—by reviewing the character of the major reference groups with which the educational administrator must work, by describing the relatively chaotic state of educational administration as a profession, and by proposing that the educational administrator has a special responsibility for reconstruction as well as for operation. In a sense, all of these points are an elaboration of the first. To help perpetuate what we call a democratic way of life, a system of public education was devised, partly by design and perhaps also by fortuity. It becomes the lot of every educational administrator to help the people of this nation examine the instrumentality to which so much has been intrusted, to build it into a better instrument, and at the same time to keep it operating effectively in spite of much apathy, some ignorance, and frequent interference.



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THEORY AND RESEARCH IN ADMINISTRATION

By Andrew W. Halpin

A dramatic school of thought has emerged in the graduate training for educational administrators. Termed the "new movement," it draws from the behavioral sciences, stresses the similarity between educational and other forms of administration, and eschews "nakedly empirical" research in favor of research based firmly upon theory. This book, written by a scholar who is one of the major forces behind this new movement, discusses the nature of theory and reports recent research on administration. The author is both a scientist and a humanist. His book, although focused upon educational administration, opens new vistas for workers in all areas of administration.

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